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 1 
Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I will try to find out how we can accommodate human mind in a physical 
world. What is significant in my attempt is that I try to approach this problem with a 
prospect that the theory of mental causation and consciousness will be subsumed under 
the general theory of properties. 
 With this general orientation, I will do the following three things in this thesis: 
(1) I will trace and develop the theories of mental causation and consciousness that 
have been conducted in the philosophy of mind. 
(2) I will trace and develop the general theories of properties that have been 
conducted in analytic metaphysics. 
(3) I will try to show that there is a prospect of combining the theory of mental 
causation and consciousness with the general theory of properties (or rather subsume 
the former under the latter). 
 In Chapter 2, I will clarify what physicalism should be. I formulate a minimal 
version of physicalism. The reason why I take physicalism is also stated. In Chapter 3, I 
survey the history of non-reductive physicalism, and examine a version of 
non-reductive physicalism, Anomalous Monism. I will show that Anomalous Monism 
cannot explain the causal efficacy of mental properties. In Chapter 4, I will examine 
Jaegwon Kim’s attack on non-reductive physicalism – the causal exclusion problem. I 
will survey several defences from non-reductive physicalist camp and show that none of 
them is successful. In Chapter 5, I will examine Kim’s solution to the causal exclusion 
problem. After I defend Kim’s position from possible objections, I will make clear 
some consequences of Kim’s position. These chapters are devoted to setting the 
background for discussing mental causation. 
 Chapter 6, 7, 8, and 9 compose a main part of the thesis. Chapter 6 and Chapter 
7 are devoted to the ontology of properties. In these chapters, I will try to formulate and 
defend a Causal Trope Theory of Properties, which is a causal theory of properties 
combined with a trope theory. Chapter 6 starts with the examination of John Heil’s view 
on the ontology of properties and objects. I will then expound my own view on 
properties and compare it with Heil’s view. After that, I will try to defend the Causal 
Trope Theory against a rival theory, Humean Theory. In Chapter 7, I will defend my 
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own view (a version of a dispositionalist view) from a typical and influential 
categoricalist view on properties – Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson’s view. I will also 
attack the categoricalist view. 
 After I set the background for the mental causation problem and the general 
theory of properties, I will go on to apply these results to the mental causation problem. 
In Chapter 8, I will show how David Robb’s argument brings in new aspects of the 
problem. I will show that Robb’s view has a similar consequence as Kim’s but it gives 
us a more precise ontological picture. In Chapter 9, I will examine Shoemaker’s view 
on mental causation. I will show that Shoemaker’s view is the most prospective and 
successful option so far. 
In Chapter 10, I will survey the main theories of consciousness (qualia) and 
intentionality. After I explain why consciousness (or qualia) is a serious problem for 
physicalists, I try to defend the representation theory of consciousness. I will show that 
if we can explain consciousness by intentionality, and explain intentionality in a 
physicalistic framework, then we can understand consciousness in a physicalistic 
framework. I also focus on the normativity character of intentionality and try to defend 
a teleological approach to intentionality. 
Finally, in Chapter 11, I will show how the problem of consciousness (qualia) 
could be viewed as some versions of the problem concerning the general theory of 
properties. I will show that which view in the general theory of properties we take has 
some effects on which view in the theory of qualia we should take. It will be shown that 
the view about the theory of properties which I take in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 and the 
view in the theory of consciousness (the representation theory of consciousness) which I 
take in Chapter 10 are good combination, and that I have good reason to support the 
representation theory of consciousness discussed in Chapter 10. 
In the appendix, I will, quite briefly, consider another problem of mental 
causation, the problem of the extrinsicness of mental properties. I will show why this 
problem is not a problem for physicalism alone and suggest a possible way to solve it. 
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１	 Introduction 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I will try to find out how we can accommodate human mind in a physical 
world. On one hand, many of us believe that scientific theories, especially the ultimate 
physical theory, get at the truth of the matter more or less. We believe that our world 
consists of physical objects and properties and that the physical objects and properties 
behave as the physical theory insists, more or less. This is an intuition of physicalism. 
On the other hand, we also believe that we have our minds. Suppose William notices 
Mary who is on the other side of a road. He wants her to notice him, he believes that if 
he raises his hand she will notice him, and he raises his hand. In this situation, he has a 
series of mental experiences: he feels a conscious feeling of seeing a colour; he has a 
desire and a belief; he also has a belief that his desire and belief cause the rising of his 
hand. All these events (or states) are mental phenomena. Now there is a problem. Are 
these two world views compatible with each other? It seems that the physicalistic world 
view does not include mental phenomena. It seems, moreover, that the physicalistic 
world view excludes mental phenomena. We, therefore, need to find out a way to 
accommodate mental phenomena in a physical world. To be more specific, what I will 
investigate in this thesis is the problem of mental causation and the problem of 
consciousness. I will try to explain these mental phenomena within a physicalistic world 
view. 
 This is not a new problem, of course. The problem of accommodating the 
human mind in a physical world is a version of the traditional mind-body problem. 
What is significant in my attempt, however, is that I try to approach this problem with a 
prospect that the theory of mental causation and consciousness will be subsumed into 
the general theory of properties. 
 With this general orientation, I will do three things in this thesis: 
(1) I will trace and develop the theories of mental causation and consciousness that 
have been conducted in the philosophy of mind. 
(2) I will trace and develop the general theories of properties that have been 
conducted in analytic metaphysics. 
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(3) I will try to show that there is a prospect of combining the theory of mental 
causation and consciousness with the general theory of properties (or rather subsume 
the former into the latter). 
 In Chapter 2, I will clarify what physicalism should be. I formulate a minimal 
version of physicalism. The reason why I take physicalism is also stated. In Chapter 3, I 
survey the history of non-reductive physicalism, and examine a version of 
non-reductive physicalism, Anomalous Monism. I will show that Anomalous Monism 
cannot explain the causal efficacy of mental properties. In Chapter 4, I will examine 
Jaegwon Kim’s attack on non-reductive physicalism – the causal exclusion problem. I 
will examine several defences from the non-reductive physicalist camp and show that 
none of them is successful. In Chapter 5, I will examine Kim’s solution to the causal 
exclusion problem. After defending Kim’s position from possible objections, I will 
make clear some consequences of Kim’s position. These chapters are devoted to setting 
the background for arguing mental causation. 
 Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are devoted to the ontology of properties. In these 
chapters, I will try to formulate and defend a Causal Trope Theory of Properties, which 
is a causal theory of properties combined with a trope theory. Chapter 6 starts with the 
examination of John Heil’s view on the ontology of properties and objects. I will then 
expound my own view on properties and compare it with Heil’s view. After that, I will 
try to defend the Causal Trope Theory against a rival theory, Humean Theory. In 
Chapter 7, I will defend my own view (a version of a dispositionalist view) from a 
typical and influential categoricalist view on properties – Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson’s 
view. I will also attack the categoricalist view. 
 After I set the background for the mental causation problem and the general 
theory of properties, I will go on to apply these results to the metal causation problem. 
In Chapter 8, I will show how David Robb’s argument brings in new aspects of the 
problem. I will show that Robb’s view has a similar consequence as Kim’s but it gives 
us a more precise ontological picture. In Chapter 9, I will examine Shoemaker’s view 
on mental causation. I will show that Shoemaker’s view is the most prospective and 
successful option so far. 
In Chapter 10, I will trace and develop the theories of consciousness (qualia) and 
intentionality. After I explain why consciousness (or qualia) is a serious problem for 
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physicalists, I try to defend a representation theory of consciousness. I will show that if 
we can explain consciousness by intentionality, and explain intentionality in a 
physicalistic framework, then we can understand consciousness in a physicalistic 
framework. I also focus on the normativity character of intentionality and try to defend 
a teleological approach to intentionality. 
Finally, in Chapter 11, I will show how the problem of consciousness (qualia) 
could be viewed as some versions of the problem concerning the general theory of 
properties. I will show that which view in the general theory of properties we should 
take has some effects on which view in the theory of qualia we should take. It will be 
shown that the view in the theory of properties which I take in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 
and the view in the theory of consciousness (the representation theory of consciousness) 
which I take in Chapter 10 are good combination, and that I have good reason to 
develop the representation theory of consciousness in Chapter 10. 
In the appendix, I will, quite briefly, consider another problem of mental 
causation, the problem of extrinsicness. I will show why this problem is not a problem 
for physicalism alone and suggest that in what direction the problem could be solved. 
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２	 What Physicalism Should Be: A Minimal Physicalism as a 
Research Programme 
 
 
 
As was stated in the introduction, the purpose of the whole thesis is to understand how 
our mind is realized in a physical world. To restate the problem in another way, I try to 
investigate how physicalists can accommodate mental phenomena in their world view. 
The first thing I must do is to make it clear what physicalism is. Of course, this is not an 
easy task. I can not give the answer to this difficult problem once and for all, at this 
stage. In this chapter, I am going to describe a rough idea of what physicalism should be. 
I will try to formulate a form of physicalism – a minimal physicalism. This will set the 
background on which the whole research after Chapter 3 is organized. 
 
２-１	 What is Physicalism? 
 
Physicalists accord special privilege to physics. Roughly speaking, physicalists claim 
that only physical things (or material things – I don’t distinguish them throughout this 
thesis) exist in our world. Physicalism insists that everything in this world is nothing 
over and above material things, such as the atoms, the ultimate particles, or whatever 
the current or future physics says there are. The size of the things doesn’t matter at all: 
there exist ordinary macroscopic things such as tables, chairs, and pencils; there exist 
much smaller microscopic things such as molecules or ultimate particles; there exist 
much bigger things such as planets or galaxies. If physicalism is true, however, all these 
things are composed of microscopic particles which are posited by the physical theory; 
they do not have as their components non-physical things, i.e. entities which do not 
appear in the physical theory. We believe or desire something; we think about, 
remember, and image something; we perceive something and feel various sensations. 
These are usually regarded as mental activities. If physicalism is right, however, these 
mental activities are not conducted by some non-material (non-physical), mental objects. 
These purported mental activities must be explained by the physical. 
 It is, thus, fairly easy to grasp a rough idea of physicalism, and many scientists 
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and philosophers seem to share this physicalistic intuition. However, it is not so easy to 
provide an exact formulation of physicalism. First of all, what exactly does ‘the 
physical’ mean? And what exactly does ‘the non-physical’ or ‘the mental’ mean? What 
exactly is the criterion to distinguish between the physical and the mental? These are, 
no doubt, important questions. I think, however, that we can bypass these difficult 
questions for the time being, and just rely on the ordinary concepts of the physical. The 
physical includes physical substances such as ultimate particles, tables, galaxies and so 
on. The physical also includes physical properties such as charge, mass, shape and so on. 
The physical is the ontological item that current and future physics could capture 
properly. The reason why I think we can bypass these questions is because we are going 
to shape a minimal physicalism in the following. I will return to this problem later in the 
thesis. For the time being, I freely mention physical substances and physical properties 
(‘the physical’) without defining the meaning of ‘the physical’ clearly. 
 Setting aside the problems concerning the meaning of ‘the physical’ and ‘the 
mental’, there is still a problem about the formulation of physicalism. Although several 
formulations of physicalism have been suggested1, there seem to be no agreement about 
the formulation of physicalism. I do not, however, attempt to provide the formulation of 
physicalism in this thesis. That is to say, I do not try to give the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for physicalism. What I will try to do in the following is to give three 
necessary conditions for physicalism. This is to formulate a minimal physicalism. As I 
see it, physicalism requires, at least, three principles: the principle of the denial of 
non-physical objects, the principle of physical determination, and the principle of 
physical causal closure. Let us see them one by one. 
 
２-２	 Requirement One: The Principle of the Denial of Non-physical Objects 
 
The first requirement for physicalism is the denial of non-physical objects. It can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
The Principle of the Denial of Non-physical Objects (DNO): Every object in the 
world is a physical object. 
                                                
1 See Chapter 2 of Poland (1994) for a survey of several formulations of physicalism. 
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The main point of this requirement should be clear. This requirement tries to exclude, 
first of all, non-physical substances – the Cartesian soul, for instance – from a physical 
world. Therefore, the defender of DNO clearly commits oneself to Anti-Cartesian. This 
commitment is appropriate. If one is a physicalist, one cannot believe in Cartesian soul. 
 However, does DNO deny only the non-physical substances – the Cartesian 
soul? Does DNO deny non-physical properties as well? That depends on how we 
interpret ‘the non-physical objects’ in the formulation. If we include properties in the 
category of ‘object’ in DNO, then DNO clearly denies the existence of non-physical 
properties, as well as non-physical substances. However, I do not take this way. That is 
because I am trying to formulate a minimal physicalism. It is an open question if 
physicalism should deny non-physical properties. If one accepts the existence of mental 
substances, one cannot be a physicalist at the same time. However, many philosophers 
believe that one can both accept the existence of mental properties and be a physicalist 
at the same time. In fact, as I will discuss it in the next chapter, the dominant view in the 
philosophy of mind since the late 1960th has been a version of the latter type of 
physicalism – non-reductive physicalism. Non-reductive physicalism has it that while 
there exist only physical substances in this world, some of the physical substances, 
when composed in some special ways, have mental properties as well that cannot be 
reduced to physical properties. If one formulates physicalism as the denial of any 
non-physical items, one cannot take any kind of non-reductive physicalism: one has to 
take either reductive physicalism or eliminativism. Even if non-reductive physicalism 
were to be denied, it should be denied as a consequence of arguments. We should not 
exclude the possibility of such position right from the beginning. 
 I will, therefore, interpret ‘object’ in DNO as the ontological items that are 
particularized and are bearers of properties. Substances are objects in this sense. And I 
interpret ‘physical object’ as objects which possess at least one physical property. 
Therefore, DNO insists that there cannot be an object which has only non-physical 
properties. The typical example of such objects is, off course, the souls that Descartes 
believed in. Notice again that DNO does not deny the existence of mental properties. It 
insists that if an object has a mental property, it must have physical properties as well. 
 Now I will mention further qualification concerning objects. In the category of 
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objects, I include substances. What about events, processes, and states? Whether we can 
include events in the category of ‘object’ in DNO depends on the definition of events. 
According to Davidson’s view (‘coarse grained’ view) on events, one and the same 
event can possess both mental properties and physical properties2. Therefore, we can 
state, as a minimal requirement for physicalism, that every event in the world is a 
physical event; this statement does not preclude the possibility that an event might have 
mental properties as well. However, according to Kim’s view (‘fine grained’ view) on 
events, where events are defined as property exemplifications, one and the same event 
cannot have both mental properties and physical properties at the same time: they must 
be different events with each other3. Therefore, if we state that every event in the world 
is a physical event, this statement precludes the possibility that there exist mental 
properties. This preclusion is not appropriate if we are looking for a minimum 
requirement for physicalism. In sum, if we take Davidson’s view on events, we can 
include ‘events’, in the category of ‘objects’ in DNO; if we take Kim’s view, we cannot. 
The same consideration applies to the concept of ‘processes’ and ‘states’ as well. If a 
process (state) can have different properties at the same time, then a physicalist can 
insist that every process (state) in the world is a physical process (state) – a process 
(state) with at least one physical property, without precluding the possibility that the 
process (state) might possess mental properties as well. A brain, for example, might be 
in a mental state that is not reduced to physical states. We should not preclude this 
possibility, as we are stating minimum requirements for physicalism. 
 There is one more point which should be noticed concerning this principle. 
Although the principle of the denial of non-physical objects captures the core of 
physicalistic intuition, we should notice that this principle only states the ontological 
claim concerning just one possible world – actual world (that is, our world). It only 
states that there is no non-physical object in our world. It does not preclude the 
possibility that there exists a possible world where there are immaterial, non-physical 
Cartesian souls. I will return to this problem in the next section where I discuss the 
second requirement for physicalism. 
 
                                                
2 See Davidson (1969). 
3 See Jaegwon Kim, ‘Events as Property Exemplifications,’ reprinted in his 
Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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２-３	 Requirement Two: The Principle of Physical Determination 
 
An intuition of physicalism includes the claim that everything in this world is material, 
and the first requirement captures this aspect of the physicalist intuition. There are, 
however, other aspects of the physicalist intuition. Some physicalist formulate their 
views as insisting that the way how the world is, concerning its material constitution, 
determines the way the world is simpliciter.4 To use a theological metaphor, once God 
creates all the physical substances and specifies their properties and relations, God does 
not have to add something else any more. 
 Frank Jackson formulates physicalism along this line. According to Frank 
Jackson’s formulation, physicalism insists that any world which is a physical duplicate 
of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world. 5  To use the concept of 
supervenience, it insists that every property in our world supervenes on micro physical 
properties and relations – the properties of fundamental particles and the relations 
between them. Along this line, I will formulate the second requirement as follows: 
 
The principle of Physical Determination (PD): It is nomologically necessary that 
two objects that share all the physical properties must share all the mental properties 
as well. 
 
This requirement insists that mental properties supervene on physical properties. 
 Let me add some comments on the formulation. First, the supervenience in the 
formulation must be strong supervenience. Strong supervenience requires that two 
objects that share all the physical properties (we can call them ‘physical duplicates’) 
share all the mental properties as well, even if those objects inhabit in different possible 
worlds (so long as those possible worlds share all the natural laws). Weak supervenience, 
on the other hand, requires that two physical duplicates share all the mental properties 
only when those objects inhabit in the same world. It should be fairly clear that we need 
strong supervenience here. For an ontological view is not worthy of physicalism if it 
admits that two physical duplicates differ in their mental properties in different possible 
                                                
4 See, for example, Lewis (1983) and Jackson (1998). 
5 See Jackson (1998), p.12. 
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worlds, all the physical laws being shared by those worlds. 
 Secondly, we must notice that this requirement concerns properties across 
possible worlds. While the first requirement, DNO, is a claim concerning a single world, 
the second requirement, the principle of physical determination, is a claim across 
possible worlds. Remember that DNO concerns only one world: it denies mental 
substances (substances with mental properties only) in the actual world. DNO allows 
the possibility that a substance a with a physical property P1 and a mental property M1 
in the actual world Wactual has the same physical property P1 and a different mental 
property M2 in a possible world W2, as long as the substance a has some physical 
properties. In this situation, the physical property fails to determine, or fix, the mental 
properties. What PD denies is this situation. Once God creates the world where the 
substance a has the physical property P1, God does not have to specify further whether 
a has M1 or M2 in a possible world. It just has the same mental property M1 as in the 
actual world, according to PD. 
 Thirdly, we must also notice that supervenience does not say much about 
ontology. As Kim persuasively points it out, supervenience (strong or weak) does not 
specify ontological matters very much. What any supervenience thesis says is just that 
there is a covariance between two sets of properties. As Kim sees it, we need to add 
something to supervenience thesis, if we want to make our view on the mind-body 
problem more substantive in an ontological sense. 6  I agree with Kim in that 
supervenience thesis does not say much about ontology. However, because of this 
austereness, as I see it, the concept of supervenience is quite proper for stating a 
minimal requirement for physicalism. One can add some ontological content to the 
supervenience thesis if one wishes. It suffices, for the time being, to notice that the 
supervenience thesis works as a necessary condition for a minimal physicalism. I will 
take ‘realization’ as the ontological ground for supervenience, later.   
 The first requirement, DNO, is the claim which states an ontological 
qualification within one (actual) world. The second requirement, PD, widens the scope, 
and states an ontological qualification on properties across possible worlds. However, 
there is still a limitation about the second requirement: it does not concern the properties 
across time. In PD, we consider the possible situations with time being fixed. Now we 
                                                
6 See Kim (1998), pp. 9-15. 
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are going to see the third requirement, where we consider properties across time. 
 
２-４	 Requirement Three: The Principle of Physical Causal Closure 
 
There is one more aspect of physicalist intuition: physicalism should insist that the 
world is physically and causally closed. If a glass on the table breaks, then there must be 
a physical cause of the breaking if there is any cause at all.7 The third requirement, 
therefore, concerns the causal network where physical events are connected with each 
other across time. Suppose that a glass on the table moves at some time. If we see this 
event (the moving of the glass), we expect there is some physical cause of this event: 
someone might have pushed the glass; someone might have tilted the table and the glass 
might have been attracted by the gravitation force downward. If we cannot find any 
physical cause and if we have to accept that a non-physical cause contributes to the 
moving of the glass, this means that we must give up physicalism. Thus, I will 
formulate the third requirement for physicalism as follows: 
 
The Principle of Physical Causal Closure (PCC): For all physical objects, if it has 
a cause at t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t. 
 
Many philosophers have suggested various formulations of something like the principle 
of physical closure8, and I will discuss one of them later. Here, I give some comments 
on the requirement in this formulation. 
 First, we must admit the possibility that a physical event has no cause 
whatsoever. According to the big bang theory, the very first event in the universe – Big 
Bang – does not have any cause (physical or non-physical). It just happened. To admit 
the existence of Big Bang is no more denying physicalism. This is why ‘if it has a cause 
at t’ is inserted in the requirement. 
 Second, if we don’t mention the time when a cause exists, the requirement 
                                                
7 See, for example, Papineau (1990) and Kim (1998).  
8 Douglas Ehring, for example, formulates the principle he calls ‘the completeness of 
physical property causation’ in the following way: for every physical effect e that has a 
cause at t, there are physical properties Pi … Pn that are instantiated at t that are causally 
sufficient for e. It is obviously very close to my formulation. My formulation can be 
understood as a simplified version of Ehring’s formulation. See Ehring (2003), p362. 
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would be too weak. Suppose that there exist a physical event P3 at t3, a mental event M 
at t2, and another physical event P1 at t1 (t1<t2<t3). Suppose also that P1 causes M, M 
causes P3, and there is not a cause of P3 at t2 other than M. This case means that if we 
trace back a physical event, we must get out of the physical domain, which should not 
be acceptable for physicalism. If we don’t mention the time t in the requirement, we 
cannot exclude this case.9 
 Third, notice that we must mention the sufficiency of the physical cause at t in 
the requirement. Even if a physical event P has a physical cause P’ at t, if the physical 
cause P’ is not sufficient for bringing about P, then we need an extra non-physical cause 
M at t to cause P together with P’. This is obviously the violation of physicalism. That 
is why the sufficiency of the cause is mentioned in the requirement. 
 At this point, someone might insist that the requirement of sufficiency of 
physical causes is too strong, considering what the current quantum physics tells us. 
According to quantum mechanics, the world is ineliminably probabilistic. Even if we 
are given the complete physical information about the world at a time, we cannot 
predict the future from the information deterministically. Therefore, the physical cause 
cannot be sufficient in the sense that it brings about the effect as a matter of 
nomological necessity, can it? I don’t object the ineliminably probabilistic character of 
quantum mechanics and its implication about the ontology. However, I don’t think I 
must alter the principle in the face of the indeterministic implication of quantum 
mechanics. The ineliminably probabilistic nature of physical processes and the 
sufficiency of the physical causes are perfectly compatible, if we understand the 
sufficiency in the sense that the world does not need any non-physical causes for the 
physical effects to occur. ‘Sufficient physical cause’ in the requirement does not mean 
that the physical cause necessarily (in nomological sense) brings about the effect. It 
might be that the effect does not occur although its purported physical cause occurs. As 
long as the probability of the occurrence of the effect is completely fixed by the 
physical cause, it is OK. The requirement just excludes the case that a non-physical 
cause changes the probability of the effect’s occurrence specified by the purported 
physical cause: in this case, the physical closure is, of course, violated. 
 
                                                
9 This is pointed out by Lowe (2000). 
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２-５	 A Minimal Physicalism as a Research Program 
 
As stated above, these three requirements are offered as a minimum requirement for 
physicalism. Denying any one of them would lead to the denial of physicalism. 
However, it should be noticed that these requirements would not be the sufficient 
condition for physicalism. As I stated in the introduction, I will devote quite many 
amount of this thesis to the mental causation problem and the consciousness problem 
with the supposition of physicalism. That is to say, I will try to clarify whether we can 
understand mental causation and consciousness within the framework of physicalism or 
not. 
 But there might be a question: why start with physicalism? Can we really 
presuppose physicalism? Is it so sure that physicalism is, or turn out to be, true? I am 
not sure if physicalism is, or turn out to be, true. I am not sure how we can prove the 
truth of physicalism, either. I believe, however, that physicalism is worthy of pursuing 
as a research program in ontology. When we have several research programs, we can 
assess the prospect of the programs in some respects. What research programs do we 
have with us now? Roughly speaking, there are three programs: physicalism, dualism, 
and mentalism. All three of them have both advantages and disadvantages of their own. 
But, as I see it, the disadvantage of mentalism – its counter intuitiveness – is too 
conspicuous for us to pursue it today: it is difficult for us to really believe that every 
object in the world is mental. What about dualism? Dualism has long history since 
Descartes, and many ontological attempts have been made in this tenet. I cannot fully 
discuss the disadvantages of dualism here, but I can at least point out one problem. If 
we try to understand mental causation within the framework of dualism, we are 
naturally led to accept that a purely mental event without any physical energy at all 
could cause a physical event, such as bodily movements, with some physical energy. 
Trying to avoid this consequence, many dualists are led to the views such as 
pre-established harmony or epiphenomenalism which deny our common sense about the 
mental causation, our common sense that there exists the mental causation. 
 Also, physicalism has an advantage: its simplicity. Physicalism conducts the 
investigation of the world, insisting just one working hypothesis that the world is made 
up of the physical materials and the physical principles alone. If the physicalist 
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investigation is successfully accomplished in this way, our understanding of the world 
would progress very much. Even if it ends up in failure, it would be fairly easy, due to 
its simplicity, to see in what way it fails, which would help us to revise the strategy of 
the investigation. In sum, I believe that when two or more research programs are 
available and we are not very sure which one of them should be true, we should take the 
simplest one. This is why I take physicalism as a research program.10 
 
 
 
                                                
10 The idea of ‘a minimal physicalism as a research program’ comes from Mino (2004), 
although his formulation of the minimal physicalism is slightly different from mine. 
The general idea of physicalism as a research program seem to be widely shared by 
many physicalists, such as J. Kim, J. Fodor and others. 
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３	 The Rise of Non-reductive Physicalism 
 
 
 
３-１	 A Brief History until the Rise of Non-reductive Physicalism 
 
Many of the current philosophers of mind adopt physicalism as a research program. In 
this section, I will follow the development of the current philosophy of mind and show 
how the problem of mental causation arises in the framework of the physicalism. 
 The direct ancestor of the current philosophy of mind is ‘the mind-brain identity 
theory’ which arose around 1950th.11 It insists that mental states are the states of cranial 
nerves, or, to be precise, that mental states will be identified with the states of cranial 
nerves by future brain neurophysiology. An experience of pain, for example, is 
identified with a neurophysiological state. This is not to say that one and the same 
object has both a mental property of being pain and a neurophysiological property, but 
it is to say that a property (or type) of being pain is identical with a neurophysiological 
property (or type). Mind-brain identity theory (or ‘type identity theory’) is a version of 
physicalism, for neurophysiological properties are naturally considered to be physical 
properties. If mind-brain identity theory is right, then we have at least one explanation 
of mental causation: mental properties are nothing but physical properties and mental 
causation is nothing but physical causation. 
 Mind-brain identity theory, however, declined very quickly. The reason of the 
decline is because mind-brain identity theory was attacked by the objections from two 
directions: the objection based on the multiple realizability of mental properties and the 
objection based on the anomalousness of the mental. Let us see these objections in 
order. 
 
                                                
11 I have in mind the works by U. T. Place, H. Feigl, and J. J. C. Smart etc. See, for 
example, Place, ‘Is consciousness a brain process?’, British Journal of Psychology 47, 
1956; Feigl, ‘The mental and the physical’, in H. Feigl, G. Maxwell, and M. Scriven, 
eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.2, Minneapolis, 1958: 
University of Minnesota Press; Smart, ‘Sensations and Brain Process’, Philosophical 
Review 68, 1959. 
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３-２	 Objection from the multiple realizability 
 
One objection to mind-brain identity theory, which is first raise by Hilary Putnam12, is 
based on the multiple realizability of mental properties. This objection has it that a 
mental property can be realized by various physical properties. A pain, for example, can 
be realized in many ways. In human beings, a neural state, C-fibre excitation, realizes 
pain. An animal with quite different neural constitutions from human beings could feel 
pain, and the neural property that realizes the pain in that animal would be quite 
different from those of human beings. If a Martian or a robot could feel pain, their 
physical states that realize their pain would be quite different from those of human 
beings. Therefore, we cannot identify a mental property with any one of the physical 
properties that realize the mental property. 
 One might attempt, here, to identify a mental property with the disjunction of 
the physical properties that realize the mental property. However, it is not possible. For 
a disjunctive property cannot generally be regarded as a genuine property. It is difficult 
to regard a disjunctive property of ‘being C-fibre excitation or being such and such 
Martian brain state or being such and such electric state’ as one genuine property (I will 
discuss the genuineness of properties later, especially in Chapter 5, 8, and 9). 
 
３-３	 Objection from the anomalousness of the mental 
 
There is another objection to mind-brain identity theory, which is raised by Donald 
Davidson independently of the objection from the multiple realizability. 13  This 
objection is based on the thesis that the mental does not accord with laws (i.e. the 
mental is anomalous). As I take up this objection later in more detail, I just sketch the 
outline. As Davidson insists it, while it is the principle of causation that governs the 
network of the physical, it is the principle of rationality that governs the network of the 
                                                
12 See H. Putnam, ‘Psychological Predicates’, in W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill, eds., 
Art, Mind, and Religion, 1967, University of Pittsburgh Press. Reprinted under the title 
of ‘The Nature of Mental States’ in his Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical 
Papers, vol.2, 1975, Cambridge University Press. 
13 See D. Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, in L. Foster and J. Swanson, eds., Experience and 
Theory, 1970, Duckworth. Reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events, 1980, Oxford 
University Press. 
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mental. We can apply the concept of rationality to the mental, but not to the physical, 
whereas we can apply the concept of causation to the physical, but not to the mental. If 
this is right, there cannot obtain any strict law connecting the mental, neither can obtain 
any strict law connecting the mental with the physical. If mental type is identical with 
physical type, there should be a kind of law connecting the former to the latter. 
Therefore, we cannot identify a mental property with a physical property. I will get back 
to this objection later. 
 
３-４	 The Rise of Non-reductive physicalism 
 
With the objections above, a new physicalism arose around the late 1960’s. The new 
physicalism insists that the mental properties are not identical with the physical 
properties. It also insists that the mental properties are not reducible to the physical 
properties. In this reason, the new physicalism is called ‘non-reductive physicalism’. 
Within non-reductive physicalism, we can distinguish two views (or two groups of 
views) according to the objection they make to mind-brain identity theory: 
functionalism and anomalous monism (Davidson’s view)14. While the former arises 
from the objection based on the multiple realizability, the latter arises from the 
objection based on the anomalousness of the mental. 
   Non-reductive physicalism denies mind-brain identity theory (type identity 
theory) and accepts the existence of mental properties which are different from physical 
properties. Why can we, then, regard non-reductive physicalism as a version of 
‘physicalism’ nonetheless? First, although it admits real mental properties that cannot 
be reduced to physical properties, it denies the existence of mental substances. 
Therefore, it satisfies the first requirement, the principle of the denial of non-physical 
objects, in section 2-2. Second, it satisfies the second requirement, the principle of 
supervenience of the mental properties on the physical properties. Therefore, we can say 
that non-reductive physicalism satisfies at least two of the necessary conditions for 
physicalism. As we will see shortly, however, there is a doubt that non-reductive 
                                                
14 The leading functionalists include Putnam and Fodor. See, for example, their studies 
in N. Block, ed., Reading in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol.1, 1980, Harvard 
University Press. I will discuss Davidson’s anomalous monism shortly. 
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physicalism might not satisfy the third requirement for physicalism.  
 Non-reductive physicalism was considered to accord the multiple realizability of 
mental properties, for the principle of supervenience just requires that if a physical 
property of an object is determined, then a mental property of the object is also 
determined, but not vice versa. Also, non-reductive physicalism insists that the 
irreducibility of mental properties, which was thought to certify the autonomy of 
psychology along with other special sciences. Furthermore, non-reductive physicalism 
was thought (or expected) to explain mental causation in the following way. The 
principle of supervenience has it that every mental event is also physical event, which 
would make it possible to think that mental causation is a kind of physical causation, 
and mental properties have causal efficacy or causal relevance of their own not 
reducible to physical properties. However, this expectation got into difficulties and I 
will discuss this problem in chapter 4. 
 Let us sum up the non-reductive physicalist assertion clarified so far. It insists, 
first of all, the three requirements formulated in chapter 2: 
 
The Principle of the Denial of Non-physical Objects (DNO): Every object in the 
world is a physical object. 
The Principle of Physical Determination: It is nomologically necessary that two 
objects that share all the physical properties must share all the mental properties as 
well. 
The Principle of Physical Causal Closure: For all physical objects, if it has a cause 
at t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t. 
 
In addition to these, it also insists the following two assertions: 
 
The Principle of Difference: Mental properties are different from and irreducible to 
physical properties. 
The Principle of Causal Efficacy: Mental properties have causal efficacy or causal 
relevance as well as physical properties. 
 
In the next section, I will examine a version of non-reductive physicalism, Anomalous 
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Monism. 
 
３-５	 Anomalous Monism and the Causal Efficacy of the Mental 
 
In order to properly assess the current arguments on mental causation, we need to go 
back to Donald Davidson’s Anomalous Monism and a serious problem raised against it. 
Anomalous Monism is Davidson’s solution to the mind-body problem. In this section, I 
will, first, review Anomalous Monism, and then examine an objection raised against it. 
 
３-５-１	 Anomalous Monism 
 
Anomalous Monism is the following view: 
 
Anomalous Monism (AM): Mental events are identical with physical events (i.e. 
monism) and mental descriptions of events cannot conform to strict laws (i.e. 
anomalism). 
 
Davidson draws AM from the following three principles, each of which seems plausible 
in itself: 
 
(P1) Mental events cause, and are caused by, physical events. (The Principle of the 
Reality of Mental Causation) 
(P2) If a causal relation obtains between two events, then there must be a ‘strict’ law 
connecting the descriptions (or the properties) of the cause event and the effect event. 
(The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causation) 
(P3) There are no ‘strict’ psycho-physical laws. (The Principle of the Anomalousness 
of the Mental) 
 
Although it appears to be difficult to hold three principles at the same time, this 
apparent incompatibility is, as Davidson sees it, deceptive. Davidson insists that we can 
hold the three principles at the same time by adopting a version of monism about events, 
and he insists moreover that the version of monism about events is drawn from these 
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principles as a logical consequence. The argument goes like this. Suppose a mental 
event c caused a physical event e (P1). By (P2), there must exist a strict law connecting 
a description (property) of c and a description (property) of e. However, by (P3), a 
mental description (i.e. a description by mental predicates) cannot appear in a strict law. 
Therefore, there is no possibility other than the mental even c has a physical description 
(property) as well as the mental description (property) and that physical description 
(property) appears in the strict law. It is, thus, concluded that every mental event has 
some physical descriptions (properties) as well, and, therefore, is a physical event as 
well. Therefore, it is not that there are two kinds of events, mental events and physical 
events, in the world, but that there is just one kind of neutral event, describable both by 
mental predicates and physical predicates. When we call Davidson’s view on 
mind-body problem ‘Anomalous Monism’, it might refer to just [AM], or [AM] + 
principles (P1)-(P3).15 
 Let me add a few brief comments. First, in the argument outlined above, a 
description and a property of events are not distinguished. We must notice that 
Davidson does not commit himself to the existence of properties in the sense that 
properties are distinguished from descriptions. However, in the arguments on mental 
causation starting from Anomalous Monism, many philosophers have not distinguished 
clearly between properties and descriptions. Therefore, I do not distinguish between 
them for the time being. I will consider this point later. 
 Second, it is very important to ask what is the ontological status of causal relata. 
As a candidate for causal relata, one could think of various ontological items such 
events, facts, and properties. Even if one chooses events as causal relata, there still 
remains a problem of what kind of ontological theory of events one would take. As 
Davidson himself sees it, a causal relatum is an event as a particular, a particular that 
could be described in many ways and that in itself does not have any essential character 
at all. The problem of the ontological status of causal relata will be argued in detail 
later. 
 
３-５-２	 Anomalous Monism as a Non-reductive Physicalism 
 
                                                
15 See Donald Davidson, 1970, ‘Mental Events’.  
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Anomalous Monism is plausibly considered to be a version of non-reductive 
physicalism. It insists that every mental event is also a physical event (and not vice 
versa). This means that there cannot be a purely mental event, an event that has only 
mental properties (lacks physical properties), which satisfies the Principle of the Denial 
of Non-physical Objects. It also insists on the anomalousness of the mental, which says 
that there cannot be any strict law connecting mental properties with other mental 
properties (a strict mental-mental law), nor can there be any strict law connecting 
mental properties with other physical properties (a strict mental-physical law). 
According to Nagel’s conception of reduction, a reduction of a theory to another theory 
is conducted by deriving the laws of the former from the laws of the latter. And, for the 
derivation, we need ‘bridge laws’, laws connecting the basic predicates (concepts) of 
the former with those of the latter16. If there cannot be any strict mental-physical law, 
then we cannot have the bridge laws which are needed to reduce mental properties to 
physical properties. 
 Denying the reduction of the mental to the physical in this way, Anomalous 
Monism, on one hand, allows the autonomy of the mental, while it keeps a physicalistic 
ontology on the other hand. However, Anomalous Monism faces a difficulty. 
 
３-５-３	 The Problem about the Causal Efficacy of the Mental 
 
A serious problem is raised against Anomalous Monism. According to Anomalous 
Monism, an event c causes another event e if and only if the pair <c, e> is subsumed 
under a strict physical law. In case of mental causation <m, e> (where m is a mental 
event and e is a physical or mental event), m causes e in that m has a physical property 
P, and that P is connected with some physical property of e by a strict physical law. 
Therefore, it seems that the mental property M of m does not contribute to the causal 
relation at all in bringing about e. Suppose we accept the following principle: 
 
The Principle of the Causal Efficacy of Properties (EP): For every event c and e, if 
c causes e, then there exists a property F of c and c causes e in virtue of F. 
 
                                                
16 Cf. Nagel (1961). 
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Then we must say that in the case of mental causation, the mental cause m caused the 
effect e in virtue of its physical property P, not its mental property M.17 
 Davidson himself replies to this objection as follows. As he sees it, causal 
relation is extensional relation. If an event c causes another event e, then this causal 
relation obtains no mater how these events are described: c causes e simpliciter. An 
event does not cause another event in virtue of something (physical or mental 
properties).18 Therefore, he denies EP. 
 Davidson’s reply, however, is not persuasive. First, there are cases that seem to 
support EP. Suppose a soprano singer shouted in a high note, “Shatter!”, and thereby 
broke a glass window. Which property of her voice broke the window, the property of 
meaning ‘Shatter!’ or the property of having a high frequency? It seems to be the 
property of having a high frequency that is causally efficacious or active in bringing 
about the shattering of the window. The reason is this. Were the frequency of her voice 
not high enough, her voice would not break the window, which suggests that the 
property of having a high frequency is causally active. On the contrary, even if she sang 
a different word, it would nonetheless break the window if only its frequency is high 
enough. These considerations suggest that the property of having a high frequency has 
causal efficacy, while the property of meaning something does not.19 We need, of 
course, to examine the notion of causal efficacy more precisely, but we can at least say 
as follows. In general, when an event which has various properties causes another event, 
it is one of the properties possessed by the event that is causally relevant; it is not true 
that all the properties are causally relevant, nor is it true that none of the properties is 
causally relevant. (We can call the property which is relevant in a causal relation ‘the 
property which has causal efficacy’.) Denying EP, we could not predict or explain the 
occurrence of events based on the other events. This does not conform to the fact that 
we usually do these predictions and explanations. We can also point out the following: 
if the concept of causation cannot accommodate our ordinary practices such as 
predictions and explanations, it would be too vacuous, almost meaningless, as a concept 
of causation. 
                                                
17 Many philosophers point out this problem. See, for example, Stoutland (1980), 
Honderich (1982), Sosa (1984), and Kim (1984). 
18 See Davidson (1993). 
19 The example of a soprano singer is borrowed from Yablo (1992). 
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 Second, we should notice that there is an asymmetry between mental 
descriptions and physical descriptions even in Davidson’s own view. Why does he cite 
and accept the principle (P2), the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causation, 
which insists that causal relations need to be backed up by strict causal laws? Why is 
the existence of strict laws a necessary condition of the existence of causal relation? 
That is, as I see it, because Davidson himself concedes that laws and properties 
(descriptions) do a crucial role in causal relations. If mental properties (descriptions) do 
nothing important in causal relations, then Davidson must take the objection seriously. 
 The objection so far does not reproach Davidson for taking it that causal relata 
are events as particulars: the ontological item that serves as causal relata might be 
events as particulars, not properties or properties instances as some philosophers insists 
it. The objection insists that some property of a cause event must have causal efficacy in 
bringing about an effect event, and that Anomalous Monism cannot exclude the 
possibility that mental properties lose their causal efficacy. 
 
３-５-４	 Attempts to Save Anomalous Monism 
 
As argued above, Anomalous Monism faces the problem that it cannot exclude the 
possibility that mental properties lack their causal efficacy. There have been several 
attempts to save Anomalous Monism from the objection. The notable attempts are as 
follows: 
 
Supervenience: If we establish some relation between mental properties and physical 
properties that is not too strong to allow reduction of the former to the latter, we 
can give causal efficacy to mental properties.  
Non-strict Laws: Although we don’t have ‘strict’ mental laws, we have ‘non-strict’ 
mental laws and these ‘non-strict’ laws are sufficient for mental properties to have 
causal efficacy. 
Counterfactual Dependence: Even though we don’t have any mental law, we can at 
least find out a counterfactual dependence between mental properties and physical 
properties. This counterfactual dependence gives causal efficacy to mental 
properties. 
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Explanatory Practice: In our daily lives, we often explain our behaviours by 
mentioning our mental states. This explanatory practice should be the ground to 
give causal efficacy to mental properties. 
 
In this section, I will only examine the first attempt, Supervenience. The other three, I 
will examine in the next chapter when I discuss the causal exclusion problem. 
 The main reason why Anomalous Monism cannot give causal efficacy to mental 
properties is because it requires a strict law to back up a singular causal relation and the 
strict law must be a physical law. However, there is another reason (thought it is related 
to the first reason): Anomalous Monism cannot give causal efficacy to mental properties 
because it does not specify any connection between mental properties and physical 
properties. 
 It would be plausible to suppose that the principle EP entails the following 
principle: 
 
Counterfactual Test for Causal Efficacy (CT): For every event c and e, and every 
property F, if c caused e in virtue of F of c, then the following counterfactual 
conditional is true: ceteris paribus, if c hadn’t had F, then c wouldn’t have caused e. 
 
Remember the example of a soprano singer. When we discussed the causal efficacy of 
the property of having a high frequency and the property of meaning something, we 
regarded the former as having causal efficacy because the voice wouldn’t have broken 
the window if it had not had a high frequency, whereas even if the voice had not meant 
‘Shatter!’, it would still have broken the window as long as the frequency was kept high 
enough. This consideration obviously relies on CT. Here, it is important to notice the 
following: CT insists that the truth of the counterfactual conditionals is a necessary (not 
sufficient) condition for causal relation. If a property does not satisfy CT, then the 
causal efficacy of the property is called in question. Even if a property satisfy CT, it is 
not sufficient to guarantee the causal efficacy to the property, as there is a case of a 
common cause producing two independent effects (I will discuss this problem later). 
 Given CT, it should be clearer why Anomalous Monism cannot give causal 
efficacy to mental properties. Anomalous Monism allows any physical events to have 
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any mental properties. Because of this generosity, mental properties cannot satisfy CT. 
It can be showed as follows:20 
 
(1) Suppose that a mental event c caused another event e. 
(2) By (P2), c and e must be subsumed under a strict law, and by [AM] it must be a 
physical law: a physical property P of c appears in the strict physical law. 
(3) By (P3), a mental properties M of c cannot covary with a physical property P of c: 
it is always possible that c has P but lacks M. 
(4) Therefore, a counterfactual conditional, ‘ceteris paribus, if c hadn’t had M, then c 
wouldn’t have caused e’, turns out to be false. 
 
Anomalous Monism does not satisfy CT, therefore it cannot give the causal efficacy to 
mental properties. 
 This consideration gives us a clue to regain the causal efficacy of mental 
properties: we need to constrain the relation between mental properties and physical 
properties. Some philosophers, including Davidson himself, try to constrain the relation 
between mental properties and physical properties by means of supervenience. 
Davidson defines supervenience as follows: 
 
[A] Predicate p is supervenient on a set of predicates S if and only if p does not 
distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by S.21 
 
This definition is equal to the Weak Supervenience, which is formulated by Kim as 
follows: 
 
[With A and B being families of properties,] A weakly supervenes on B if and only if 
necessarily for any x and y if x and y share all properties in B then x and y share all 
properties in A – that is, indiscernibility with respect to B entails indiscernibility with 
respect to A.22 
 
                                                
20 I am helped by Mino (1995) for the formulation of the following argument. 
21 Cf. Davidson (1993), p.4. 
22 Cf. Kim (1984), p.58. 
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The weak supervenience certifies that two objects sharing all properties in B will share 
all the properties in A just in case they are both in the same world. When two objects 
inhabit the different possible worlds with each other, the weak supervenience does not 
certify that the two objects sharing all properties in B will share all the properties in A.  
Because of this weakness, the weak supervenience cannot endow the causal efficacy to 
mental properties. The weak supervenience allows a possible world that is exactly the 
same as the actual world except that c lacks M. Therefore, a counterfactual conditional 
‘ceteris paribus, if c hadn’t had M, then c wouldn’t have caused e’ is still false. 
 This shows that the weak supervenience is too weak to endow the causal 
efficacy to mental properties. Kim suggests the stronger version of supervenience which 
is formulated as follows: 
 
A strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x and each property F in 
A, if x has F, then there is a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any 
y has G, it has F.23 
 
However, as Kim sees it, this strong supervenience is so strong that it allows a kind of 
reduction of mental properties to physical properties. 24  Therefore, non-reductive 
physicalist cannot take this option. In sum, if supervenience is weak enough to keep 
non-reductiveness of mental properties, then mental properties cannot have causal 
efficacy; if, on the other hand, supervenience is strong enough to endow causal efficacy 
to mental properties, then mental properties are, in some sense, reduced to physical 
properties and they lose their independent reality. 
 
３-６	 The Principle of Physical Realization 
 
The requirements are intended to form a minimal physicalism, so we cannot say that 
non-reductive physicalism is qualified as ‘full-fledged’ physicalism just because it 
satisfies these requirements. Some non-reductive physicalists might insist that the 
                                                
23 Cf. Kim (1984), p.65. 
24 See, for example, Kim (1989) p.283 and Kim (1998). We will see later what kind of 
reduction the strong supervenience allows. 
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second requirement, The Principle of Physical Determination, is too weak for the 
requirement for physicalism, as long as it is formulated by the concept of supervenience. 
They might suggest the following requirement for substitution: 
 
The Principle of Physical Realization: Mental properties must be realized by 
physical properties. 
 
As it will become clear later, I will take this principle. However, it is important to notice 
that even if we take the Principle of Physical Realization, there could still be several 
options corresponding to which formulation of realization one takes. Jaegwon Kim, for 
example, formulates physical realization as follows25: 
 
A property F is physically realized by a property G just in case: 
(1) F is a second-order property over set B of base (or first-order) properties in that F 
is the property of having some property P in B such that D(P), where D specifies a 
condition on members of B. 
(2) G is a member of B. 
 
Although I accept the Principle of Physical Realization, I will not take Kim’s 
formulation of realization. I will explain the reason why I deny it later when I discuss 
multiple realization and formulations of physical realization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 Cf. Kim (1998), p.19-23. 
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４	 The Causal Exclusion Problem 
 
 
 
Non-reductive physicalism insists that mental causation is real. This should mean that 
mental properties are causally effective. Is it really possible? Jaegwon Kim offers an 
argument against non-reductive physicalism in quite a general form. It is called ‘the 
causal exclusion argument’. The problem posed by the argument is called ‘the causal 
exclusion problem’ (or simply, ‘exclusion problem’). I will, first, reformulate the 
argument in his Mind in a Physical World (p.38-47). Then, I will examine notable 
defences to the exclusion argument that have been offered so far. It will be argued that 
none of the defences are successful. 
 
４-１	 Kim’s Attack on Non-reductive Physicalism: The Causal Exclusion 
Argument 
 
Consider a case of mental causation where a mental event c at t1 causes a physical event 
e at t2 (t1 < t2). As c is a mental event and e is a physical event, c has a mental property 
M1 at t1 and e has a physical property P2 at t2 respectively. Then in this case, we can say 
that c’s having M1 causes e’s having P2. Let us suppose, for simplicity, that c’s having 
M1 is a sufficient cause of e’s having P2. 
 According to the Principle of Realization (or the Principle of Supervenience), 
which is required for a view to be physicalism, M1 must be realized by (or supervene 
on) a physical property at time t1 (let us call it P1). That is to say, c’s having P1 
determines c’s having M1, and c’s having P1 is sufficient for c’s having M1. Therefore, it 
turns out to be that c’s having P1 is sufficient for e’s having P2. Now, according to the 
Principle of Physical Closure, a physical event (e’s having P2, in this case) must have a 
sufficient physical cause, which is, in this case, nothing but c’s having P1. All the 
inference above, then, will have a very annoying consequence that what does the causal 
work in bringing about the physical effect, e’s having P2, is not the mental property M1 
but the physical property P1: the mental property M1 does not, in fact, have causal 
efficacy in the purported case of mental causation. Do we avoid this annoying 
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consequence for non-reductive physicalism? 
 There seem to be only two possible ways to avoid the consequence. First, we 
might be able to think that c’s having P1 causes c’s having M1, and then c’s having M1 
causes e’s having P2. The second way would be such that both c’s having P1 and c’s 
having M1 are sufficient to bring about e’s having P2. The first way regards the 
realization relation as a kind of causal relation. However, it is difficult to regard the 
realization relation as a causal relation. First, the realization of M1 by P1 should be 
considered to be simultaneous, whereas the cause is usually considered to precede the 
effect. There are two fundamental theories in contemporary physics: the relativity 
theory and the quantum theory. While quantum theory admits, in one sense, 
simultaneous causation, the relativity obviously denies it. It is an open question in 
current physics whether we can admit simultaneous causation or not. Therefore, we 
should not expect that we can assess the possibility of simultaneous causation just by a 
priori argument. Nor should we presuppose simultaneous causation in discussing the 
metaphysical problem of mental causation. Second, ‘it is difficult… to imagine a causal 
chain, with intermediate links, between the subvenient and the supervenient properties. 
What intermediary events could causally connect a mental event with its subvenient 
physical base?’26 Finally, to regard the realization of M1 by P1 as a causal relation 
might violate the Principle of Physical Closure. This is because c’s having P1 must take 
a detour (i.e. causing c’s having M1) in causing e’s having P2. 
 The second way is to accept the overdetermination of the effect by both the 
mental cause and the physical cause. If we accept this, we must accept for every case of 
mental causation that the physical effect that is caused by the physical cause is also 
caused by the mental cause as well. A typical example of the overdetermination is the 
case of double assassins: two independent assassins shot the victim to death, two bullets 
hitting the heart of the victim simultaneously. While one bullet would be sufficient to 
kill the victim, he was unluckily shot double. This scenario, however, is not applied to 
mental causation. According to the Principle of the Physical Closure, for every physical 
effect, there must be a sufficient physical cause (if there is a cause at all). It follows 
from this that for every case of mental causation, the effect is always overdetermined by 
the physical cause and the mental cause. Overdetermination, if it happens, is considered 
                                                
26 Kim, Mind in a Physical World, p.44. 
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to happen accidentally. If non-reductive physicalist must require that overdetermination 
always happens in mental causation, it must explain this fact in some ways. 
 Non-reductive physicalism might, still, try to explain why an effect is always 
overdetermined in mental causation. It might be explained by linking the metal with the 
physical in some way. In fact, according to the Principle of Supervenience (or the 
Principle of Realization), c’s having P1 determines c’s having M1. A non-reductive 
physicalist might insist that because of this linkage, the overdetermination does not 
happen accidentally in the case of mental causation. But then, the next problem takes 
place. The physical cause, c’s having P1, must be a sufficient cause of e’s having P2, as 
it is required by the Principle of Physical Closure. Then what work is left for the mental 
cause in bringing about the physical effect? Isn’t it redundant? 
 This is the reformulated outline of Kim’s attack on non-reductive physicalism. 
The upshot of his attack is that in the case of mental causation, every mental property is 
pre-empted by the physical property which realizes the mental property in causing the 
effect, in the framework of non-reductive physicalism. And nothing is left for the 
mental properties to do in the mental causation. If so, the mental properties should be 
excluded by the physical properties that realize them in the case of mental causation. 
Kim called this problem the causal exclusion problem. 
 
４-２	 Some Defences from the Non-reductive Physicalist Camp 
 
Many defences have been proposed from the non-reductive physicalist camp. In this 
section, I will overview some of the leading defences. It will be shown that none of the 
defences is successful.27 
 
Defence 1: Counterfactual Dependence as a Ground for Causal Relation 
 
The most popular defence tries to insist that the counterfactual dependence obtains 
between the mental properties of cause events and the properties of effect events, and 
                                                
27 The survey and the discussions in this section are based on the chapter 3 of Kim 
(1998) and Mino (2004). 
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the counterfactual dependence grounds the causal relation between them.28 Suppose an 
event c has a property F and event e has a property G. This defence has it that we will 
have enough evidence that c’s having F caused e’s having G when the following two 
counterfactual conditionals are true29: 
 
(1) If c had not occurred, then, other things being equal, e would not have occurred. 
(2) Given that c did occur, the other things being equal, e would inevitably have 
occurred. 
 
Consider, for example, a case of mental causation: I opened the window because I 
wanted to breeze fresh air. In this case, if I had not a desire to breeze fresh air, then, 
other things being equal, I would not have opened the window. Also, given that I had a 
desire to breeze fresh air, the other things being equal, I would have opened the window. 
Both (1) and (2) being satisfied, we are certified to say that the mental property (my 
desire) did cause the opening of the window and has causal efficacy. 
 However, there is a counter example to this defence. It is the case where one 
common cause brings about two different effects. Suppose that an event c, a common 
cause, brings about two different events, e1 (with a property F) and e2 (with a property 
G). If e1 had not occurred, then, other things being equal, e2 would not have occurred as 
c had not occurred either in this case (counterfactual conditional (1) obtains). And given 
that e1 did occur, the other things being equal, e2 would inevitably have occurred as c 
must have occurred in this case (counterfactual conditional (2) obtains). Therefore, a 
proponent of Defence 1 must say that e1 caused e2 and that F has causal efficacy in 
bringing about G, which is obviously absurd. What has causal efficacy in bringing 
about G is a property of c. This counter example shows that satisfying (1) and (2) is not 
sufficient to endow causal efficacy to a property. 
 A defender might try to revise the definition of causation to avoid the above 
counter example. Although I cannot take it in more detail here, it is very likely that 
counterfactual criterion is not appropriate for fully grasp the concept of causation. 
Anyway, we can at least say that the prospect of this approach is still open to 
                                                
28 See, for example, Baker (1993) and Horgan (1997). 
29 See Baker, ‘Metaphysics and Mental Causation’, p.93 
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discussion. 
 
Defence 2: Non-Strict Mental Laws 
 
The second defence insists that some causal laws include mental predicates and this 
guarantees the causal efficacy of the mental properties indicated by the mental 
predicates appearing in the causal laws. The point is, causal laws do not have to be strict 
laws; a non-strict law with ceteris paribus condition would be fine for it to guarantee 
causal efficacy. Jerry Fodor, for example argues like this. If there is a causal law such 
that ceteris paribus, an event with F causes another event with G, then a property F 
determines which event the event with F causes. This is to say that F is the property in 
virtue of which an event with F causes another event. Therefore, we must say that F is 
the property with causal efficacy. In general, a property F has causal efficacy if and 
only if there is a law such that ceteris paribus, an event with F causes another event with 
G. The ceteris paribus condition in the formulation implies that the causal law might be 
a non-strict one, but this does not spoil the causal efficacy of F. That is because the 
property F can determine which event the event with F can cause, given that ceteris 
paribus condition obtains. Now, we do have causal laws (perhaps with ceteris paribus 
conditions) including mental predicates, therefore the mental properties corresponding 
to those mental predicates are causally efficacious and real properties.30 
 This defence, however, has the following problem.31 Suppose that a pair of 
events <c, e> is subsumed under a mental law such that ceteris paribus an event with M 
(a mental predicate or property) causes another event with P (a physical predicate or 
property), and suppose also that ceteris paribus condition obtains. Is this pair <c, e> 
subsumed under some physical law as well? If the answer is no, then the Principle of 
Physical Closure will be violated. Because the fact that there is no physical law 
subsuming <c, e> implies that e’s having P does not have a physical cause. On the other 
hand, if the answer is yes, then we must say that there exists a physical law subsuming 
<c, e> such that ceteris paribus an event with P’ causes another event with P. This 
means that the property P’ determines the causal relation of <c, e>. However, this 
                                                
30 See Jerry Fodor, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, p.152. 
31 Cf. LePore and Loewer (1989). 
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defence also insists that the property F determines the causal relations of <c,e>. Here 
the overdetermination kicks in again. If we don’t want to violate the physical closure in 
this state, we must render the mental property redundant. A dilemma of this sort occurs 
again and again in the following. 
 
Defence 3: Generalization of Mental Causation 
 
Defence 3 insists that if mental causation does not exist, then causations in special 
sciences, such as chemical causation and biological causation, do not exists either, 
which is quite ridiculous. The argument goes like this. Suppose that mental properties 
don’t have causal efficacy and what really do the causal works in purported ‘mental 
causation’ are neuro-physiological properties which realize mental properties (or which 
mental properties supervene on). However, those neuro-physiological properties are 
also realized by lower-level properties such as physical or chemical properties. And 
those physical or chemical properties are realized by lower-level properties such as 
micro physical properties. This realization process will not end until it comes to the 
ultimate physical properties (if there are such properties at all) that will be specified by 
future fundamental physics. If the causal efficacy of the mental properties is pre-empted 
by the lower properties that realize them, then all the properties other than the ultimate 
physical properties, the properties such as macro physical properties, biological 
properties, or chemical properties, would be pre-empted by the ultimate physical 
properties as well, and would lose their own causal efficacy. We would, then, be unable 
to literally state that a hitting of a glass caused the glass to shatter or that a gust of 
strong wind caused a tree to fall down: these statements would not be literally true. This 
is absurd. Therefore, by reductio ad absurdum, we must say that metal properties have 
causal efficacy and reality. Lynne Rudder Baker, a notable philosopher trying to defend 
non-reductive physicalism in this line, insists as follows: 
 
Moreover, I want to show that the metaphysical assumptions with which we began 
inevitably lead to scepticism not only about the efficacy of contentful thought, but 
about macro-causation generally. But if we lack warrant for claiming that 
macro-properties are generally causally relevant, and if we take explanations to 
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mention causes, then most, if not all, of the putative explanations that are routinely 
offered and accepted in science and everyday life are not explanatory at all. (Baker, 
‘Metaphysics and Metal Causation’, p.77) 
 
Many philosophers try to defend the causal efficacy of mental properties in this line.32 
 Defence 3 might, however, mistakenly state that when a property is realized by 
another property, the realized property and the realizing property belong to the different 
levels in macro-micro hierarchy. To take a biological property, being a gene, as an 
example, the defence might have it that being gene is realized by a lower level chemical 
property such as being a base sequence, and that the latter is a micro property, whereas 
the former is a macro property. However, as Kim points out rightly, this is not a right 
way to see the situation33. The property that realizes a macro property is not a micro 
property as Defence 3 insists. The property that realizes a biological property, being a 
gene, is the base sequence of the aggregate of bases. Kim calls it (in this case, the 
property that realizes a biological property) a micro-based property and formulates it 
using David Armstrong’s notion of ‘structural property’ as follows: 
 
P is a micro-based property just in case P is the property of being completely 
decomposable into nonoverlapping proper parts, a1, a2, … , an, such that P1(a1), 
P2(a2), … , Pn(an), and R(a1, … , an). (Kim, Mind in a Physical World, p.84) 
 
Using Kim’s term, we should say that a micro-based property is not a micro property 
but a macro property. The exclusion problem concerns two (or more) properties in the 
same level. Therefore, Defence 3’s worries that the causal efficacy of a macro property 
(or a property belonging to ‘higher level’) is pre-empted by that of a micro property (or 
a property belonging to ‘lower level’) and that the causal efficacy drains away, miss the 
point of the exclusion argument. 
 Of course, this is not to insist that there is no problem about the causal efficacy 
                                                
32 See, for example, the following studies: L. R. Baker, ‘Metaphysics and Mental 
Causation’; Tyler Burge, ‘Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice’; Robert van 
Gulilck, ‘Who’s in Charge Here? And Who’s Doing All the Work?’, all in Heil and 
Mele, eds., Mental Causation, 1993. 
33 See Kim (1998), p.80-87. 
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of the properties in special sciences. Quite the opposite. If all the macro properties and 
all the properties in special sciences supervene on (or realized by) the micro-based 
properties composed of the properties in the ultimate physics (and it is plausible 
enough), then the causal efficacy of those macro properties and the properties in special 
sciences would be pre-empted by the micro-based properties. And all the macro 
properties and the properties in special sciences are to be either not causally efficacious 
or redundant. But, again, we must notice the following: it is not that the exclusion 
argument has an absurd consequence that macro properties and properties in special 
sciences lose their causal efficacy, but rather that the exclusion argument asks what kind 
of ontology we could take in the physicalistic framework, keeping our intuition that 
there exists mental causation. To solve the exclusion problem for mental properties is 
also to solve the problem for other macro properties and properties in special sciences.34 
 
Defence 4: Causing (or Explaining) Different Effects 
 
One might insist that a mental explanation and a physical explanation does not explain 
one and the same effect but, in fact, two different effects. We can explain an agent’s 
behaviour of opening the refrigerator by referring to the agent’s mental property, the 
desire to drink beer and the belief that there is a bottle of beer in the refrigerator. We 
can also explain the same behaviour by referring to the agent’s physical property (the 
neuro-physiological property of the agent’s brain). However, as this defence insists it, 
these explanations do not, in fact, explain the same effect. While the mental explanation 
explains the action of the agent, the physical explanation explains the bodily (physical) 
behaviour of the agent.35 
 If we can regard two explanations as explaining one and the same event or the 
different events depends on the ontology of events. If we take Kim’s view on events, we 
can regard two explanations explain two different events. If we take Davidson’s view 
on events, we would regard the explanandum of two explanations are two different 
properties of one and the same event. Anyway, it seems that we do not have to worry 
                                                
34 Cf. Kim (1998), pp.77-87. 
35 Amie Thomasson offers a defence of nonreductive physicalism in this line. See her 
‘A Nonreductivist Solution to Mental Causation’, in Philosophical Studies 89, 1998, 
pp.181-95. 
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the overdetermination any more. 
 It is true that according to this defence, we do not have to worry about the 
overdetermination of the effect. However, it is not possible to secure the causal efficacy 
and the reality of mental properties in this line. First, according to this view, we must 
admit that every mental causation would be mental-mental causation. But isn’t it 
counter-intuitive that our mental states or properties cannot cause our behaviours as 
physical events? We usually believe that our mental states can sometimes cause our 
behaviours. Event though the mental event (the action) which is caused by the mental 
property turns out to be a physical event (an event described in both mental and 
physical predicates) in Davidson’s event ontology, it would not very happy for 
non-reductive physicalism to give up the intuition that mental properties can cause 
physical events as physical. 
 Second, and more importantly, it seems that the mental explanation that explains 
actions by referring to mental properties is not itself a ‘causal’ explanation any more. 
As I have already showed when discussing Anomalous Monism in 3.5, the mental 
properties (or descriptions) of events are in the relation of rationality: they are 
connected by normative principle. Of course, as Davidson puts it, for a mental event to 
be the cause of the action, it is not sufficient for the mental event is a reason of the 
action: the mental event must cause the action. However, the mental event causes the 
action in virtue of its physical description appears in the strict causal law that connect 
the event with the action (the effect). Therefore, mental properties does not have any 
causal efficacy by its own. With this consideration, I insist that the explanation by 
referring to an agent’s mental properties is not a causal explanation by itself. Therefore, 
I also insist that non-reductive physicalist cannot secure the causal efficacy and the 
reality of mental properties in this line. 
 
Defence 5: Taking our Explanatory Practice Seriously 
 
Some defenders of non-reductive physicalism argue, against Kim’s objection, that we 
can save the reality of mental causation by taking our explanatory practice seriously. It 
goes like this. The causal exclusion argument takes an ontological principle, the 
Principle of Physical Closure (in some form or other), seriously. It argues from the 
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ontological principle to the conclusion that we must deny our common activity of 
explaining our behaviour by referring to our mental properties or mental states. But this 
is, so the defender insists, the other way around. We normally refer to mental properties 
in the causal explanations of behaviours. This type of explanation is widely conducted 
and widely accepted as a proper explanation. We must not, therefore, deny it so easily. 
The right way to take is to take our explanatory practice seriously, thereby securing the 
causal efficacy of mental properties. As Tyler Burge puts it, ‘materialist metaphysics is 
not the most plausible starting-point for reasoning about mind-body causation. 
Explanatory practice is.’36 If we refer to a mental property in a causal explanation of 
behaviours and the causal explanation is plausibly considered to be a true (or a proper) 
explanation, then the mental property should be regarded as a real property.37 
 However, if this defence regards the causal exclusion argument as a kind of 
sceptical argument that casts doubt on the existence of mental causation, then the 
defence misses the point. That is because the point at issue is not an epistemological 
problem, the problem concerning whether our assertion that there exist mental 
causations is well grounded, but rather an ontological problem concerning the existence 
of mental causation. We begin by noticing the fact that our belief in mental causations is 
firm, and then go on to argue how the mental causation is ontologically possible in the 
framework of non-reductive physicalism. The exclusion argument insists that 
non-reductive physicalism is not a proper ontological theory, based on the consideration 
that the existence of mental causation is not compatible with the ontological framework 
of non-reductive physicalism. 
 The point of the defence might be that there could exist two causal chains (or 
processes), both of which are equally qualified as real properties and are compatible 
with each other, leading to a physical event. Tyler Burge insists: 
 
 I think that we have reason … to think that mentalistic and physicalistic 
accounts of causal processes will not interfere with one another. 
                                                
36 Tyler Burge, ‘Mind-Body Causation and Explanation’, in Heil and Mele, eds., 
Mental Causation, 1993, p.118.  
37 See Tyler Burge, ‘Mind-Body Causation and Explanation’, and L. R. Baker, 
‘Metaphysics and Mental Causation’, both in Heil and Mele, eds., Mental Causation, 
1993. 
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 … we know that the two causal explanations are explaining the same physical 
effect as the outcome of two very different patterns of events. The explanations of 
these patterns answer two very different types of inquiry. (Burge, ‘Mind-Body 
Causation and Explanation’ p.115-6) 
 
So, the Defence 5 might insist that a mental explanation (explanation referring to an 
agent’s mental state) and a physical explanation (explanation referring to an agent’s 
bodily state) of the agent’s behaviour are compatible with each other and that both the 
agent’s mental state and the agent’s bodily state could equally be a cause of the agent’s 
behaviour. 
 A question, however, immediately arises for this insistence: what is the relation 
between the two causes, the mental state and the bodily state of the agent? If each cause, 
independent with each other, is sufficient for the behaviour, then the problem of 
overdetermination arises again: we must either assume the massive coincidence of 
overdetermination or admit that one of the causes (i.e. the mental cause, because of the 
Principle of Physical Closure) is redundant. Or is one of the causes is a part of the 
other? But if one takes ‘non-reductive’ physicalism, one would insist that mental 
properties are different from physical properties, and therefore would not like to take 
this option. Is it, then, possible to think that two causes are different parts of a whole 
cause which is sufficient for the behaviour? This is the case when both striking a match 
and the existence of enough oxygen are different parts of a whole sufficient cause for 
the lightening of the match. However, we cannot apply this case to mental causation if 
we try to stick to non-reductive physicalism. If mental causation is a case of this kind, 
then a physical cause (the bodily state of the agent) turn out to be insufficient for 
bringing about the behaviour: it needs a help by the mental state to cause the behaviour. 
This is a violation of the Principle of Physical Closure. 
 These are, of course, ontological questions, and the defender might insist that we 
cannot presuppose the plausibility of ontological considerations. However, the point is 
this. Two explanations, each of which is different from the other in that they offer us 
different information about the object (or the world), could nonetheless be compatible 
with each other. But if they are causal explanations and their explanatory powers come 
from their describing some aspects of the world, then we cannot avoid the ontological 
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questions concerning the conflict between two causes. We must remember that the 
problem at issue is the reality of mental properties and mental causation: this is an 
ontological matter.38 
 
 
４-３	 Can We Weaken the Principle of Physical Closure? 
 
It would be fairly obvious now that the Principle of Physical Causal Closure plays a 
crucial role in the exclusion argument. As long as it is required as a necessary condition 
for the physicalism, any property which is distinguished (in some sense) from physical 
properties is always exposed to the danger that it gets deprived of its causal efficacy and 
therefore its reality as well. 
 Can’t we, then, secure the causal efficacy of mental properties by weakening the 
Principle of Physical Causal Closure some way or other? Eric Marcus distinguishes two 
versions of the principle; Completeness and Closure39: 
 
According to Completeness, all physical events have complete physical causal 
histories. …  
… According to Closure, physical events cannot interact causally with non-physical 
events, or with physical events in virtue of their non-physical properties. (2005, 
p.28-9) 
 
Completeness, a weaker version, has it just that when we trace back a sufficient cause 
of a physical effect, we need not get outside the physical domain: the physical domain is 
complete in that the network of the physical is self-contained without any help of the 
non-physical. On the other hand, Closure, a stronger version, has it that the 
non-physical cannot get into the causal relations with the physical: it prohibits the 
non-physical from getting into the physical causal network. Marcus insists that we are 
not forced to accept Closure: it is too strong and it needs some justification that has not 
been offered yet. On the other hand, continues he, Completeness is plausible enough. 
                                                
38 For more discussion, see Kim (1998), pp.60-67. 
39 See Eric Marcus (2005), p.27-50. 
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We should now notice that Completeness itself does not exclude the non-physical. It 
just says we need not get outside the physical domain. It does not prohibit the causal 
histories of the physical effects getting outside the physical domain.40 
 Does Marcus succeed in solving the exclusion problem by weakening the 
principle? In earlier part of this thesis, section 2-4, I formulated the Principle of 
Physical Causal Closure as follows: 
 
The Principle of Physical Causal Closure: For all physical objects, if it has a cause 
at t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t. 
 
It is quite obvious that our Principle of Physical Causal Closure is virtually identical 
with Marcus’s Completeness, which Marcus himself is willing to accept. However, in 
the preceding part of this chapter, we saw a consequence that mental causes are 
excluded by the physical cause, which Marcus does not accept. Why does this happen? 
In what point do Marcus and I depart? 
 The point of departure is that he accepts redundancy and I do not. It is true that 
the Principle of Physical Causal Closure does not in itself prohibit mental properties to 
get into physical causation. But if we don’t have any clue to understand the correlation 
between mental properties and physical properties, then we must just accept the 
mysterious coincidence. On the other hand, if we think that mental properties are in 
some sense dependent on physical properties, then it seems that mental properties are 
redundant. Physical properties do all the work. Why we need mental properties in 
addition to physical properties? If the reason is just to save our intuition about the 
reality of the mental, it seems quite ad hoc to me to just introduce mental properties by 
this reason. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
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５	 Kim’s Reductionism 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will review and examine Jaegwon Kim’s solution to the exclusion 
problem. The upshot of Kim’s attack on non-reductive physicalism is that non-reductive 
physicalism is quite an unstable ontological position. That is to say, the non-reductionist 
intuition and the physicalist intuition are not compatible. If mental properties are to be 
reduced to physical properties, then one would naturally take ‘reductive’ physicalism 
(‘outright’ physicalism); if mental properties are not to be reduced to physical properties, 
then one must either give up physicalistic intuition and take a dualistic view or 
otherwise take eliminative or epiphenomenal physicalism. 
 
５-１	 Kim’s Solution to the Exclusion Argument 
 
Kim’s solution is to take a reductionist way. How, then, mental properties are reduced 
to physical properties? We have already seen that the case of the multiple realizability 
of mental properties placed the reduction of mental properties in serious trouble. Kim 
tries to accomplish the reduction by revising ‘the concept of reduction’ itself. 
 As Kim sees it, the way to a new theory of reduction is suggested by 
functionalism. 41  According to functionalism, mental properties are functional 
properties which are realized by physical properties. In other words, a mental property 
is described as a causal role which a physical property occupies (or plays). More 
precisely put, a mental property is a second-order property, a property of having a 
first-order physical property that satisfies some causal condition. For example, a mental 
property of having a pain is a property of having a first-order physical property that 
satisfies the causal condition such that typically it is caused by the tissue damage and 
causes the wincing behaviour. 
 What is a second-order property of having a first-order property in general? As 
Kim sees it, a second-order property should be nothing but a property of having a 
first-order physical property. For, when we say that a particular object has a 
                                                
41 For Kim’s ‘functional reduction’, see Kim (1998), p.19-27, 97-101. 
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second-order property, the truth-maker of this statement should be nothing but the 
first-order physical property that realizes the second-order property that makes the 
statement true. An object having a second-order property is nothing more or less than its 
having the first-order property that realizes the second-order property. Therefore, if a 
mental property is a second-order property (functional property), then it would be 
identified with the first-order physical property that realizes the mental property. In this 
way, we can say that if a mental property can be interpreted as a functional 
(functionalizable) property, then we would be able to reduce it to the physical property. 
 What about the multiple realizability? As we have already seen, a mental 
property, having pain, might be realized by P (e.g. having C-fibre activation) in human 
beings and by some quite different physical property Q in octopus. Then, we cannot 
identify a mental property of having pain with P. That is because, if we identify pain 
with P, then in quite the same way we can identify pain with Q as well, and by 
transitivity of identity, we would have to say that P is identical with Q; this is, of course, 
absurd. 
 Can we, then, identify pain with a disjunctive property of P1 v P2 v…v Pn, where 
P1, P2, … , Pn are physical properties that realize a mental property pain in each of 
different systems or organisms. But this is quite implausible. Consider, for example, the 
property of having a primary colour.42 This second-order property is realized by any of 
the first-order properties, having red, having blue, and having green. The proposal, 
however, would come down to insist that there is a disjunctive first-order property of 
having red or having blue or having green, in addition to the first-order properties such 
as having red, having blue, and having green, and this disjunctive first-order property is 
identical with the second-order property of having primary colour. But it is not plausible 
that there is such kind of disjunctive first-order colour. Therefore, in the same reason, 
we cannot identify a mental property of having pain with the disjunctive first-order 
physical property. 
 Facing the multiple realizability, in what way should a reductionist go? We have 
already confirmed that for every mental property, we cannot find a single physical 
property that is identified with it. As Kim insists it, we should give up the idea that 
when we use a mental predicate, there is one mental property corresponding to the 
                                                
42 This example is from Kim (1998) p.20. 
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predicate. Although there might be a single concept of pain, there is not a single 
property of having pain. These mental concepts or predicates refer to the different 
physical properties according to the different contexts. If a mental concept pain is 
applied to human beings, it refers to the physical property of having C-fibre activation. 
If applied to octopus, it refers to the physical property Q which is quite different from 
having C-fibre activation. And so on.43 
 Considering the multiple realizability of mental properties in this way, Kim 
offers a solution to the exclusion problem. It is quite simple: there is not a mental 
property that is multiply realized by various physical properties and excluded by them. 
There are just mental concepts or predicates. A mental concept or predicate refers to 
different physical properties in each case of the realization. For example, a mental 
predicate (or concept) ‘having pain’ refers to having C-fibre activation when it is 
applied to human beings, to a different physical property Q when it is applied to 
octopuses, and so on. Therefore, in each case of realization, what causes the physical 
effect is the first-order physical property that realizes the mental property.44 
 There could be some objections to Kim’s reductive solution. Let us see some of 
them. 
 
５-２	 Doesn’t It Deny the Autonomy of Psychology? 
 
Jerry Fodor criticizes Kim for his denying the autonomy of psychology. He sums up 
Kim’s view as follows: 
 
… Kim thinks philosophers haven't gotten it right about why MR states are ipso facto 
unsuitable for reduction. Once they do, Kim says, they’ll see that the moral of 1&2 
isn’t, after all, that psychology is autonomous. Rather, it’s that quotidian 
psychological states aren’t reducible because they aren’t projectible. Unprojectible 
states are, by definition, not the subjects of a possible science; they aren’t bona fide 
kinds and they can’t appear in bona fide nomological explanations. A fortiori, terms 
that express psychological states are not available for incorporation in “bridge laws” 
                                                
43 See Kim (1998) pp.103-112. 
44 Ibid. 
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or in (metaphysically necessary) property identities. This is all, of course, contrary to 
what a lot of philosophers, to say nothing of a lot of psychologists, have hitherto 
supposed. (Fodor, 1997, p.150) 
 
Understanding Kim’s view as above, Fodor criticizes it as follows: 
 
 In effect, Kim wants to make it true by fiat that the only projectible kinds are 
physically homogeneous ones. … 
 But, for better or worse, you don’t get to decide this sort of thing by fiat ... Only 
God gets to decide whether there is anything, and, likewise, only God gets to decide 
whether there are laws about pains; or whether, if there are, the pains that the laws are 
about are MR. Kim’s picture seems to be of the philosopher impartially weighing the 
rival claims of empirical generality and ontological transparency, and serenely 
deciding in favor of the latter. But that picture won’t do. (ibid. p.161) 
 
Fodor’s criticism here has some connection with but is different from the defence 3 (the 
generalization of mental causation) discussed in the previous chapter. As Fodor sees it, 
Psychology, as well as the other special sciences, is autonomous from micro-physics in 
that mental properties appearing in several theories of psychology are projectible. The 
fact that mental properties appearing in the theories of psychology are projectible is , as 
Fodor insists, undeniable, because there are, in fact, many confirmed empirical 
generalizations in the theories of psychology. According to Kim’s view, however, there 
do not exist such properties as multiply realizable mental properties. According to 
Kim’s view, only mental predicates or concepts exist, and they refer to various physical 
properties in each distinct context where they appear. As Fodor puts it, Kim sticks to 
‘ontological transparency’ of physicalism, and thereby denies well confirmed empirical 
facts – the projectibility of mental properties and the autonomy of psychology. 
 Kim, however, responds to this objection and ask: is the projectibility of mental 
properties so strongly confirmed? As Kim sees it, there are some empirical facts that 
seem to cast a doubt on the projectibility of mental properties. Using Kim’s example, 
consider the following possible law: ‘Sharp pains administered at random intervals 
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cause anxiety reactions’45. Suppose this generalization has been well confirmed for 
humans. Should we expect on that basis that it will hold also for other organisms that 
can have pains and whose psychology is implemented by a vastly different physical 
mechanism?46 We would not expect it. That is because we can plausibly conceive an 
organism whose pain reactions we can observe, but whose anxiety reactions we cannot. 
We would not expect anxiety reactions of such organisms as octopuses, worms, and so 
on. We do not expect that the generalization about pains that has been well confirmed 
for humans will hold for some of the other organisms. In view of this example, Kim’s 
denial of the projectibility of mental properties seems to have enough grounds, whereas 
Fodor needs more grounds for his view. 
  
５-３	 Doesn’t It Come Too Close to Eliminativism? 
 
There might be an objection that says Kim’s view comes quite close to eliminativism 
about mental properties and it does not save the causal efficacy and the explanatory 
relevance of mental properties. Terence Horgan stresses this worry about Kim’s view in 
a footnote of his paper as follows: 
 
But this turn toward eliminativism about mental properties appears to throw out the 
baby of mental realism along with the bathwater of psychophysical property-dualism. 
If there are no mental properties at all, then it is harder than ever to see how token 
mental events could be causally efficacious qua mental. Put another way, it is harder 
than ever to see how mentalistic causal/explanatory ‘because’-statements, such as 
“She winced because she was thinking of Pat Buchanan,” could ever be true. We do 
not save the causal efficacy and the explanatory relevance of mental properties by 
denying their existence. (Horgan, 1997, p.182) 
 
This is certainly a good point and I largely agree with this objection. But before 
pursuing an alternative view from the next chapter, I would like to point out a couple of 
points. 
                                                
45 This example is from Kim (1992), p.324. 
46 ibid. 
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 First, we might be able to distinguish Kim’s reductionism from robust 
eliminativism such as one advocated by Churchland or others. It is true that in Kim’s 
view, the mental properties as a second-order (functional) property do not exist: what 
exist are second-order predicates or concepts. However, those predicates or concepts do 
refer to some first-order physical properties, even though the referred physical 
properties are different in each case of realization. Those real physical properties which 
are referred to by mental concepts in each case are real, of course. And what is more, 
we might be able to say that those real physical properties are, at least in one sense, 
mental properties as well, because those real properties are truly referred to by mental 
predicates of concepts in each case of realization. Eliminativism, on the other hand, 
should be understood as the following view. For example, Churchland, a robust 
eliminativist, insists that folk psychology should be eliminated and the mental 
properties appearing in folk psychological theories should also be eliminated: he insists 
that the mental properties referred to in folk psychological theories are not real. The 
reason why he insists on eliminativism about folk psychology is as follows: first, there 
are many mental phenomena which folk psychology cannot explain at all, such as the 
nature of mental disorder, the nature and function of sleep, the ability to throw a 
snowball at moving car, etc.; second, folk psychology cannot be reduced to fundamental 
physical theories47. Therefore, Kim’s view could be distinguished from eliminativism 
about mental properties insisted by, for example, Churchland. I think Kim holds a 
principle such as follows: whether one commits oneself to the reality of mental 
properties depends on whether one admits that mental predicates or concepts refer to 
some real properties even though they might be different in different cases of 
realization. If this principle is admissible, then we might be able to think that Kim is a 
realist about mental properties.48 
 However, we can at least say this: in Kim’s view, mental properties do not have 
causal efficacy or reality distinguished from that of physical properties. Mental 
properties might be causally efficacious and real, but they are not causally efficacious or 
real as mental properties different from physical ones. I will go back to this problem 
                                                
47 See, for example, Churchland, P. “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional 
Attitudes”. 
48 See, for example, ‘Postscripts on mental causation’ in Kim (1993) for the related 
arguments. 
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later, when I discuss John Heil’s view in Chapter 6 and David Robb’s view in Chapter 
8. 
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６	 The Need for the Ontology of Properties (1): Towards a Causal 
Trope Theory of Properties 
 
 
 
In this chapter and the next, I will depart from the problem of mental causation for a 
while, and focus on the ontology of properties. Overall, I will try to defend a Causal 
Trope Theory of properties, which is a disposition essentialist view combined with a 
‘sparse’ trope theory. Its detail will be explained and clarified throughout this chapter 
and the next. Before beginning this chapter, however, I will briefly explain why I deal 
with the ontology of properties. 
 As we  have just seen in the previous chapters, very few philosophers of mind 
have focused on the ontology of properties. It is obvious in the case of Donald Davidson. 
Davidson’s Anomalous Monism insists that one and the same event can be described 
both by physical vocabulary and by mental vocabulary. It does not explicitly state that 
there are properties, as ontological entities, corresponding to all or some of the 
descriptions (physical or mental). Suppose an event can be described both as ‘Alice’s 
desiring for drinking orange juice’ and as ‘Alice’s desiring for rehydrating herself’. Do 
these descriptions correspond to different properties? Or is it the case that an event 
which has a mental property of ‘desiring for drinking orange juice’ has another mental 
property of ‘desiring for rehydrating oneself’? This kind of indifference of properties is 
observed in the works of some non-reductive physicalists as well. As was shown in the 
preceding chapters and as will be shown in the later part of this thesis, much confusion 
in the discussions on mental causation (and other problems in the philosophy of mind) 
arise from the confusion in the ontology of properties. 
 I will begin this chapter by focusing on John Heil’s ontology of properties and 
substances, which is expounded in his book, From an Ontological Point of View 
(hereafter, FOPV)49. This will set the ground for me to expound my own view on 
properties, a Causal Trope Theory. 
 
                                                
49 Heil (2003). 
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６-１	 Heil on the Levels Conception of Reality 
 
John Heil’s general message in FOPV, is as follows: many philosophers have attached 
too much importance to linguistic analysis rather than ontological considerations, and 
now we have to take ontology seriously; ontological considerations will help us resolve 
(or dissolve) many philosophical problems that have been besetting us. I am very 
sympathetic with this general message. What, then, is his view more specifically? What 
exactly does Heil mean by ontological considerations? What philosophical problems 
does he insist can be resolved by his ontological studies and how is it possible? 
 His main ontological claims which are argued for throughout FOPV can be 
listed as follows: 
 
(1) The levels conception of reality is denied. 
(2) There are no higher-level entities like human beings or horses, nor is it possible 
that talks about human beings or horses be linked analytically to truth-makers for 
such talks. Nevertheless, predicates like ‘is a human being’ or ‘is a horse’ are literally 
and truly applicable to particular objects. 
(3) Properties are modes (tropes). 
(4) All properties are both dispositional and qualitative at the same time. 
(5) All properties are, strictly speaking, intrinsic properties. 
(6) Heil lists substances in his ontological catalogue; therefore, any form of bundle 
theory is denied. 
 
I will examine the first two claims in this section and the third claim in the next 
section. The remaining claims will be discussed in section 6-3, after I expound my own 
view on properties. 
 Let us start with (1), the denial of the levels of reality. The chapters from 2 to 7 
of FOPV are devoted to deny ‘the levels conception of reality’. When we think that our 
languages represent or mirror reality (‘Picture Theory’ in Heil’s terminology), we tend 
to think the following principle (φ) holds:  
 
(φ) When a predicate applies truly to an object, it does so in virtue of designating a 
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property possessed by that object and by every object to which the predicate truly 
applies (or would apply).50 
 
Principle (φ) can lead to the idea that the world is composed of multiple layers. Take, 
for example, a predicate, ‘is an egg beater’. Many types of physical devices can be told 
as ‘an egg beater’. We can apply the predicate, ‘is an egg beater’, truly to a simple stick 
made of wires. We can also apply the same predicate truly to a more complicated 
electrical machine which is usually used in large factories. If the predicate, ‘is an egg 
beater’ is applied truly to all these objects in virtue of each objects having the same 
property corresponding to the predicate, then each object has both its own specific 
property and the property of being an egg beater. A simple stick has its own specific 
physical properties: it has a property of being made of wires, a property of being 15cm, 
and so on. The stick, however, has the property of being an egg beater as well if 
Principle (φ) holds. So does a more complicated electric egg beating machine. It is 
usually said that a functional property can be multiply realized by various properties. If 
principle (φ) is true, then we are easily led to the idea that the world consists of many 
layers – the ground layer of microphysical substances and properties, the upper layer of 
macro substances and properties, and so on. This is ‘the levels conception of reality’, 
the idea that Heil denies. He denies principle (φ), and thereby denies the existence of 
the upper layers. The alleged ‘functional properties’, he says, are not really properties 
but just predicates. It is a mistake to posit genuine properties and objects to all the 
predicates which truly apply to the world. 
 Here, we should notice that the levels conception of reality could mean two 
things:  the levels of properties and the levels of objects. In case of predicates such as 
‘is an egg beater’, Heil’s claim amounts to the denial of the levels of properties. In case 
of predicates such as ‘is a human being’, it amounts to the denial of the levels of objects, 
substances, or kinds. 
 As argued in Chapter 3, multiple realizability has often been considered to 
support non-reductive physicalism in the history of the philosophy of mind. 
Non-reductive physicalism, as Kim persuasively argued, has a serious problem, the 
causal exclusion problem (see Chapter 4). If, however, we follow Heil and deny the 
                                                
50 FOPV, p.26. 
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levels conception of reality, the causal exclusion problem just vanishes away, for there 
is no multi-causations here! This perplexingly simple resolution of the causal exclusion 
problem has some similarity with Kim’s solution51 explained in the previous chapter. 
We are inclined to ask the following question: is Heil’s solution not a 
‘reductionistic’ resolution or an ‘eliminativist’ resolution of the exclusion problem?  
This concerns the claim (2) of Heil’s view. Is not the denial of the levels conception of 
reality a reductionistic view or eliminativistic view on higher-order properties (objects)? 
The answer depends on the meaning of the reduction and elimination. In Chapter 6, 
‘Philosophical Analysis’, of FOPV, Heil argues as follows. Thinking about the nature of 
Fs, ordinary philosophers start with the question, ‘Is there any analytical route to Gs?’ 
There are two horns according to the answers to this question. If the answer is ‘yes’, 
then Fs are reducible to Gs (i.e. Fs are Gs). If the answer is ‘no’, then Fs are not Gs, 
where we have two choices: we might just eliminate Fs or we might accept that Fs exist 
over and above Gs. Such are the ordinary lines most philosophers tend to take. Heil, 
however, casts doubt on these lines of thought. According to Heil, even if there is no 
analytical route from Fs to Gs, it is possible to state both that Fs are not eliminated and 
also that Fs do not exist over and above Gs. 
 
There is little or no prospect of a systematic mapping between talk of statues and 
talk of collections of particles. But it need not follow either that, in addition to the 
particles, the universe contains statues, or that there are no statues. (FOPV, p.53) 
 
Here we should distinguish ontological reduction and epistemological (or conceptual) 
reduction. Epistemological reduction entails ontological reduction, but not vice versa. 
When there is no analytical route about a mental entity, this mental entity is not 
conceptually reducible, but the mental entity still could be ontologically reducible to the 
fundamental entities. Heil’s argument has the following scheme. Even if Fs are not 
analyzed to Gs, Fs are in some sense (i.e. in an ontological sense) equal to Gs, therefore 
we don’t fall into eliminativism. As we have seen, Kim can be interpreted as taking a 
retentive reductionist view about the mental, with functional analysis model for 
                                                
51 As I will show later, Robb’s solution also has a similar consequence. See Chapter 8. 
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reduction, which means that he keeps conceptual reduction in mind.52 Heil, on the 
other hand, does not think that mental properties are conceptually reduced to 
fundamental properties. But, as Heil sees it, this conceptual irreducibility does not entail 
that mental properties do not exist (are eliminated) or they exist over and above 
fundamental (probably physical) properties. As Heil sees it, the conceptual irreducibility 
of mental properties is perfectly compatible with that they exist as physical properties 
(in other word, they are ontologically reduced to physical properties). There is 
obviously a similarity between their views. 
There might be a slight difference between them, though. Kim thinks that 
phenomenological experiences (qualia) cannot be functionally analyzable and, therefore, 
they are irreducible to physical properties. In Kim’s view, therefore, the irreducible 
qualia might raise the causal exclusion problem. In Heil’s view, on the other hand, there 
is a prospect for ontologically (not conceptually) reducing qualia and, therefore, a 
prospect for avoiding the causal exclusion problem. 
Anyway, setting aside the details, I agree with Heil in that we should not 
uncritically accept the levels conception of reality. Also, I have to say that I have a 
worry about Heil’s view with respect to the causal exclusion problem. The worry is 
quite similar to what I mentioned about Kim’s solution. In Heil’s view, mental 
properties are ontologically reduced to physical properties although they are not 
analyzed by them. Mental properties are, as he sees it, not causally efficacious as 
mental properties but as physical properties. But do we really have to give up the causal 
efficacy of mental properties as mental properties? If we have another way to save the 
causal efficacy of mental properties as mental properties, we should, as I insist it, take 
that way. I will go back to this problem in Chapter 8. 
 
６-２	 Heil on Modes (Tropes) 
 
Now let us go to the third claim of Heil’s view: properties are modes (tropes). Heil is a 
robust particularist: he denies universals, and claims that properties are modes. Modes 
are ‘particularized ways objects are’.53 
                                                
52 See Kim (1998) and Kim (2004). 
53 FOPV, p. 138. Heil prefers ‘modes’ to ‘tropes’ because, as he sees it, ‘trope theorists 
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 Heil insists that the decision between the two theories, a universalist theory and 
a trope theory, should be made on the basis of the benefits and costs of those theories.54 
As he sees it, the main benefit of the universalist theory is that ‘universals promise a 
significant explanatory pay-off’55. First, if we have universals, we have a solution to the 
one-over-many problem. Second, if we have universals, we can easily explain the 
similarity relation among objects in terms of strict identity. Third, strict identity enables 
us to answer Hume’s sceptical question: why should we expect similar things to behave 
similarly? That is to say, universals warrant inductive inferences, expressing our 
expectation that similar objects will behave similarly. The main cost of the universalist 
theory, on the other hand, is its counter-intuitiveness: a universal can be wholly present 
at many places at once. One more cost of the universalist theory might be that it is less 
parsimonious, as it posits an extra ontological item, universals, in addition to particular 
objects. As to a trope theory, the benefits and costs are reverse. Its main benefit is its 
intuitive plausibility: a tropist need not posit the mysterious entity which can be wholly 
present at many places at once. The ontological parsimony might be counted as one 
more benefit: it does not posit universals. Its main cost, on the other hand, is that it 
seems difficult to provide easy solutions to the problems stated above – the 
one-over-many problem, the similarity relation problem, and the Hume’s question. 
 As Heil sees it, the benefit of a universalist theory is not so large as it seems to 
be at first glance. As to the first and the second problem, a proponent of tropes can 
freely speak of objects ‘sharing’ properties (concerning the one-over-many problem) or 
of distinct objects possessing ‘the same’ property (concerning the similarity relation). It 
is true that in these cases, ‘same’ means not self-sameness (strict identity) but exact 
similarity. However, as Heil sees it, ‘this is the sense of ‘same’ intended by 
non-philosophers when they speak of distinct objects possessing the same 
characteristic’56. 
 As to the third problem, the induction problem, the benefit of a universalist 
theory is not so large either. If we build causal powers into the properties (whether they 
                                                                                                                                          
have by and large regarded objects as made up of bundles of tropes’ and this he rejects 
(cf. ibid.). I will, however, use more popular term ‘tropes’ in this thesis. 
54 See Chapter 13, ‘Modes’, of FOPV. 
55 FOPV, p. 137. 
56 Ibid. p. 139. 
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are universals or tropes), we do not have to worry about whether objects possessing 
similar properties behave similarly or not. Properties are similar only if their 
contribution to the dispositionalities of their possessors is similar. It is true that objects 
could behave differently in the future because they cease to possess properties similar to 
these, but this point applies equally to the universalist theory as well. Identity is doing 
no work here.57 
 I do not make the final decision about the debates between the universalist 
theory and the trope theory: it should be the topic of another book. It suffices, however, 
to notice that the trope theory is at least as prospective as the universalist theory. As I 
see it, both theories have their advantages and disadvantages, and we should consider 
them as a kind of research programmes. I myself will take the trope theory. The 
assessment of the theory should be made on the basis of the whole plausibility – what 
problems it solves and what problems it leaves unsolved. I will construct my view on 
the basis of trope theory, in the next section. 
 
６-３	 A Brief Look at a Causal Trope Theory 
 
In the following, I will expound my own view on properties, a Causal Trope Theory. 
The theory has three components, which are listed as follows: 
 
Sparseness: Properties are sparse. That is to say, not every predicate corresponds to 
a genuine property. 
 
Tropism: Properties are tropes. 
 
Essentialism: Properties have their own causal profiles essentially and, indeed, are 
reduced to the clusters of causal powers. 
 
It should be quite easy to see the similarity between Sparseness and Heil’s denial of the 
principle (φ) (and his denial of the levels conception of reality).58 Also, Tropism shows 
                                                
57 See FOPV, pp.143-145. 
58 David Armstrong and David Lewis are the main philosophers who advocate the 
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that I share with Heil a tropist intuition on properties: I am a robust particularist and I 
deny universals. As to Essentialism, I depart from Heil’s view, and this is the topic of 
the sub-sections below. 
 
６-３-１	 Three Views on the Relation between Properties and Causal Powers 
 
We have an intuition that there is some connection between properties and causal 
powers. This intuition is obvious when we consider the properties of fundamental 
physics. Physicists construct theories and make experiments based on the theories, 
trying to capture the real features of the world. When they construct a theory and make 
experiments, positing the fundamental physical properties such as charge of electrons, 
charm of quarks, and so on, it is crucial how those fundamental physical properties 
causally behave. 
 But what exactly is this connection? And how strong is this connection? There 
are two views on the connection between properties and their causal powers – Humean 
Theory and Causal Theory: 
 
Humean Theory59: The connection between properties and their causal powers is 
contingent. 
Causal Theory60: The connection between properties and their causal powers is 
necessary. 
 
According to Humean Theory, we can identify properties independent of their powers. 
A property can have different causal powers in a possible world where different natural 
laws obtain. Which natural laws obtain in which possible worlds is a contingent matter 
according to Humean Theory, and causal powers of properties depend on natural laws. 
                                                                                                                                          
‘sparse theory’ of properties. However, they are not trope theorists as me. Armstrong is 
a universalist and Lewis is a class nominalist. See, for example, Armstrong, What is a 
Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and Lewis, On the 
Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) for their views on properties. 
59 See, for example, Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983) and Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986). 
60 See, for example, Shoemaker (1980), Shoemaker (1998), Martin (1980), Hawthorne 
(2001), Heil (2003), Bird (2007). 
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Therefore, the connection between properties and their causal powers is also contingent. 
As Causal Theory has it, on the other hand, there is a stronger connection between 
properties and their causal powers. It is impossible for a property to behave differently 
in a possible world. 
 I make two comments here. First, notice that ‘causal powers’ are sometimes 
expressed as ‘causal behaviours’, ‘dispositions’, ‘causal features’, or ‘causal profiles’; I 
don’t distinguish them. Second, although I sometimes use the expressions such as ‘a 
property behaves this way or that way’ or ‘a property has such and such causal powers’, 
it should be understood as abbreviated expressions. What behave or have causal powers 
are not properties themselves but the possessors of properties. If an electron with a 
negative charge is attracted by a metallic plate with a positive charge, then the 
behaviour – the moving towards the plate – is the behaviour of the electron, not of the 
positive charge of the electron. The electron behaves in that way in virtue of having the 
charge. 
 Now, we can further distinguish the two versions of Causal Theory – Weak 
Causal Theory and Strong Causal Theory61: 
 
Weak Causal Theory: For every property, there is a causal profile the possession of 
which is a necessary condition for having that property. 
Strong Causal Theory: For every property, there is a causal profile the possession of 
which is necessary and sufficient condition for having the property. 
 
Both versions insist that one and the same property cannot have different causal profiles. 
That is to say, both versions of causal theory insist that causal profiles supervene on 
properties. Weak Causal Theory stops here: it allows the possibility that two different 
properties have the same causal profile. Strong Causal Theory, on the other hand, goes 
further: it insists that properties and causal profiles are in one-to-one correspondence. 
 It is fairly natural to interpret Strong Causal Theory as the theory insisting that 
we need not add anything to causal profiles in order to get properties, the theory 
insisting that properties are entirely exhausted by causal profiles or that properties are 
causal profiles. We may call it the reductive causal theory: it insists that properties are 
                                                
61 Cf. J. Hawthorne, 2001, ‘Causal Structuralism’, Philosophical Perspectives 15. 
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reduced to causal profiles. However, a reductive theory is not the only interpretation of 
Strong Causal Theory. We might be able to say that causal profiles and properties are 
different entities although having a causal profile is necessary and sufficient for having 
a corresponding property. Sydney Shoemaker, one of the main advocates of causal 
theory of properties, once expresses his view as follows: 
 
…properties are causal powers. (Shoemaker 1980, p. 210) 
 
In a recent paper, however, he uses a slightly different expression: 
 
…the properties…have [causal features] essentially, and are individuated in terms of 
them. (Shoemaker 1998, p. 413) 
 
As I see it, the difference between two expressions reflects the difference between the 
reductive reading of Strong Causal Theory and the non-reductive reading of it. In any 
way, we should notice that both versions of Shoemaker’s formulation are Strong Causal 
Theory. 
 Now it should be clear that the third component of the Causal Trope Theory, 
Essentialism, indicates that it can be classified as the strongest causal theory, the 
reductive Strong Causal Theory. It explicitly says that properties are nothing over and 
above the cluster of causal powers.62 
 
６-３-２	 What the Causal Theory of Properties Is Not? 
 
Now I would like to make two comments on what the causal theory of properties 
(whether or not it is combined with trope theory) is not. First, any version of the causal 
theory of properties is not intended to apply to all properties. The causal theory applies 
to sparse properties which appear in genuine changes or causal explanations. Properties 
appearing in the ultimate physical theory are the typical examples of such properties. 
We might be able to extend the scope of the causal theory as to include the properties 
                                                
62 The proponents of the strongest causal theory include, for example, John Hawthorn 
and Alexander Bird. See Hawthorne (2006) and Bird (2007). 
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appearing in the folk physics or folk psychology. However, the mathematical properties , 
the logical properties, or properties such as ‘being grue’ are out of the scope of the 
causal theory. The causal theory is not intended to apply to these properties. 
 Second, the causal theory of properties is intended to answer the question: in 
virtue of what does a property F is the property F (instead of the other property G)? 
That is to say, it gives the criterion of identity within the category of property. 
Therefore, the causal theory of property itself is perfectly neutral to the debates between 
universalists and tropists. The causal theory itself does not tell us if we should regard 
properties as universals, classes of tropes, or classes of possible particulars. Shoemaker, 
for example, who is a significant defender of the causal theory, seems to be a 
universalist, while I am a tropist. The difference depends on how one should think of 
the concept of causation. 
 
６-３-３	 Compared with Heil’s Identity Theory 
 
In the remaining of the chapter, I will compare the Causal Trope Theory with Heil’s 
view. First, I examine his identity theory of dispositions and qualities in this subsection. 
Then I will examine the intrinsicness of properties in the next subsection. 
Let us look back to section 6-1, where I listed Heil’s main ontological claims. 
The claim (4) says that all properties are both dispositional and qualitative at the same 
time. Heil calls this claim the Identity Theory. The identity theory is a version of neutral 
monism63, where one and the same property is dispositional and categorical (‘qualitative’ 
in Heil’s terminology) at the same time.64 We can describe a property both as 
dispositional and as qualitative. Heil says: 
 
Being spherical is a manifest quality of a snowball. But it is in virtue of being 
spherical that a snowball could, for instance, roll: sphericity is, it would seem, a 
power possessed by the snowball. … the snowball’s sphericity is a quality possessed 
                                                
63 Stephen Mumford presents a very similar view, which can be also classified as 
neutral monism. See Mumford, 1998, Dispositions. I will discuss Mumford’s view in 
the next chapter. 
64 Heil calls his own view ‘the identity theory’. See Chapter 11, ‘The Identity Theory’ 
of FOPV. 
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by the snowball and is a power.65 
 
It is clear enough that Heil’s identity theory is not Humean Theory. It is also clear 
enough that Heil’s identity theory is not Weak Causal Theory. If qualities are identical 
with powers, then causal powers should be necessary and sufficient for qualities. (I will 
argue against Weak Causal Theory later in this chapter.) Heil, however, does not take 
the strongest Causal Theory, the reductive Strong Causal Theory. He says: 
 
Think of a quality: being white, for instance […]. It is surely in virtue of its being 
white that a cupcake would look white […]. Being white and being sweet are powers 
of the cupcake to affect […]. The mistake […] would be to conclude from this that 
whiteness and sweetness are mere powers.66 
 
Although Heil thinks that qualities are powers, he denies the view that qualities are 
nothing over and above powers. 
 What exactly, according to Heil, is added to powers? Why does he need 
qualities in addition to dispositions at all? What makes him believe that dispositions are 
qualities as well? We can at least insist that it is quite difficult to imagine the identity 
between dispositionality and qualitativity. While dispositions are essentially for 
something, qualities are not. Two descriptions, dispositional and qualitative, are 
apparently inconsistent with each other. How can two descriptions that are so radically 
different from each other be applied to one property? Is it the same case as ‘heat = mean 
kinetic energy’ or ‘being in pain = C-fibre excitation’? Let us see the arguments Heil 
presents for the identity theory. Heil points out our ability of abstraction (‘partial 
consideration’). We can describe one and the same property both as quality and 
disposition. Why can we do this? That is because, as Heil sees it, we have the ability of 
abstraction. Just as we can think about a man’s height without thinking about his skin 
colour, so can we think about dispositionality of a property without thinking about its 
quality.67 Heil also mentions a Necker cube (i.e. which has recourse to Gestalt 
perception) as an example. We can perceive a Necker cube one way or another. 
                                                
65 FOPV, p.112. 
66 FOPV, p.113. 
67 See FOPV, pp.118-120. 
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However, we don’s say that the cube has two distinct properties with respect to each 
perception. 
 Here, Heil seems to think about properties parallel to objects (substances). But I 
think there is an asymmetry between objects (substances) and properties. One and the 
same object (substance) can be described in many ways. We can think that the object 
has many properties with respect to some of the descriptions. The reason why this is 
possible is that an object has substratum (bare particular) as its component, a component 
which is perfectly neutral to the ways we describe the object. On the other hand, 
properties are ways objects are.68 So it seems that the ultimate description (if there is 
such) of a property should exactly correspond to the feature of the property. This 
asymmetry seems to cause some uneasiness as to treating properties and objects in the 
same way. I will return to this problem when I discuss the problem of quiddity in 
Chapter 7. 
 Heil points out that the world of pure powers faces a great difficulty. The world 
of pure powers (dispositions) is, as he sees it, just like the world of dominos where all 
there is to each domino is to be toppled by the former domino and to topple the next 
domino – nothing occurs without quality69. As he sees it, qualities are needed to stop 
this regress. Introducing qualities and identifying them with dispositions (powers), we 
can avoid the difficulty. 
 What exactly about the quality stops the regress in the pure powers world? It 
might be the actual occurrence of dispositions. But how can we identify the occurrence 
with the possibility? They seem to be totally different with each other. Heil never offer 
an explanation on this problem. I am not quite sure if Heil’s argument works well, but 
so far as we can regard pure dispositions in themselves as intrinsic and actual, there 
seem to be no threat of infinite regress here. I will return to this problem in Chapter 7.70 
                                                
68 At least, this is what Heil himself takes for the theory of properties. See FOPV, p.12. 
69 See Chapter 10 of FOPV. 
70 The difficulty in identifying a power with a quality may have some connection with 
the difficulty in identifying a potentiality with the exercise of it. It might be suggestive 
to see E. J. Lowe’s view on dispositions. According to his four-category ontology, the 
distinction between the dispositional and the occurrent (categorical) lies in the 
difference between the ways of characterizing substances. When we say ‘This lump of 
gold has such and such micro-structure’, we are characterizing it as possessing a mode 
(trope) of micro-structure which belongs to a non-substantial universal – a 
micro-structure. When we say ‘This lump of gold has ductility’, we are characterizing it 
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 There is one more motivation for Heil’s identity theory. Heil says: 
 
To my mind, the identity theory is independently attractive, but, even if it were not, 
it appears to win by default! Purely qualitative properties lack appeal, as do pure 
powers. Mixing these does not help matters, nor does turning dispositionality and 
qualitativity into aspects or kinds of higher-order property.71 
 
This quotation, as I see it, best expresses what makes Heil take the identity theory. Heil 
seems to propose the identity theory as what can overcome the difficulties that pure 
quality theory and pure power theory encounter, leaving the unintelligibility of the 
identity aside. If he succeeds in reducing the unintelligibility well enough, we may 
accept this identity theory. However, as I have seen it so far, he does not succeed in 
doing it well enough. 
 
６-３-４	 Intrinsicness of Properties 
 
According to Heil, all dispositional properties (not to mention qualitative properties) are 
                                                                                                                                          
as belonging to a kind gold which possesses a non-substantial universal – ductility. The 
former corresponds to the occurrent (categorical, qualitative) predication and the latter 
to the dispositional predication. In this example, two different non-substantial universals 
(micro-structure and ductility) were used to explain the dispositional/occurrent 
distinction. When we characterized a particular lump of gold dispositionally, we 
mentioned ductility. When we characterized it occurrently, we mentioned 
micro-structure. Can we characterize it dispositionally, mentioning micro-structure?  
The answer is probably yes. We have only to admit that a kind can possess a 
non-substantial universal. Can we, then, characterize a lump of gold occurrently, 
mentioning ductility? The answer is probably no. I believe that we can’t characterize a 
lump of gold occurrently by means of ductility. For, what is a particularized ductility? 
It’s the very thing we should call a manifestation of ductility! This will explain the 
unintuitiveness of Heil’s identity theory. According to their ontology, universals such as 
solubility can be particularized. I believe, however, the idea of a particularized 
solubility conflicts with the concept of solubility as a disposition. We might be able to 
say that there are two sorts of non-substantial universals in Lowe’s ontology. As to the 
universals such as micro-structure, geometrical features, and so on (which roughly 
correspond to so-called categorical properties), we can use them to characterize 
particular objects both dispositionally and occurrently. As to the universals such as 
solubility, ductility, and so on, we can only use them when we characterize particular 
objects dispositionally. Cf. Lowe (2006), especially Chapter 8. 
71 FOPV, p.120. 
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intrinsic (see claim (5) in section 6-1). But here we should note that this intrinsicness of 
the dispositional is a consequence of identifying the dispositional with the qualitative. 
In Heil’s ontology, dispositional conception, in itself, does not include intrinsicality. It 
is, as it were, derived from intrinsicality of the qualitative. In contrast to this, I attach 
intrinsicality to the dispositional independent of the qualitative. I will return to this 
matter in the next chapter. 
 The philosophers who contribute to the dispositions debates do not agree with 
the meaning of ‘dispositions’, which causes some confusion. Let us see how the 
dispositional/categorical distinctions are characterized by the main contributors. 
According to Lowe’s four-category ontology, the dispositinal/occurent (categorical) 
distinction lies in the difference between the ways of characterizing substances. When 
we say ‘Mr. Jones is short-tempered.’, we are characterizing him as belonging to a kind 
which possesses a non-substantial universal – short-temperedness.  When a disposition 
is ascribed to a particular object, the particular object does not really possess the 
disposition. It just belongs to a kind which possesses the disposition. On the other hand, 
when we say ‘Mr. Jones becomes angry’, we are characterizing him as possessing a 
mode – being angry. In this case (unlike fragile vase case), he does not lose 
short-temperedness (disposition) when he becomes angry. We should notice that in 
Lowe’s ontology, the way the dispositional exist is totally different from the way the 
occurrent exist. The dispositional are potentialities, while the occurrent are exercises of 
potentialities.72 
 Let us see the following view stated by Stephen Mumford: 
 
Disposition ascriptions are categorical in the sense that to say that something has a 
dispositional property is to say that something has a property actually. (1998, p.37)  
 
If we call those who agree with this view ‘disposition actualists’, we can include 
George Molnar in this ‘disposition actualists’ as a core member (cf. Molnar 2003, 
Chapter 5).  Being both a pure dispositionalist and a disposition actualist, Molnar’s 
                                                
72 For E. J. Lowe’s concept of dispositionality based on his ‘Four-Category ontology’, 
see, for example, his The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for 
Natural Science, Chapter 8. 
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intuition about dispositions can be sharply contrasted with E. J. Lowe’s intuition.73 
 Is John Heil a disposition actualist? Yes. But we should notice how he takes a 
disposition actualist view. He takes a disposition actualist view just by identifying 
dispositions with actual qualities. Remember his argument from the never-toppled 
dominos example. We can interpret this argument as an attack on non-actuality of pure 
powers. The world of pure dispositions, he argues, is just like the world of dominos 
where all there is to each dominos is to be toppled by the former domino and to topple 
the next domino – nothing occurs! He introduces the qualities and identifies them with 
dispositions (powers) to avoid the difficulty. But why can’t he just say pure powers are 
actual in its own right without identifying them with actual qualities? This is because he 
shares with Lowe the intuition about dispositions (powers).  Just identifying 
dispositions with qualities to avoid difficulty is not good way to solve the problem but 
to put off dealing with the problem. 
 All in all, I think that Heil’s identity theory is unstable. You might take the 
disposition NON-actualist view (like Lowe and Armstrong). You might take the view 
that says there exist pure dispositions and they have full-fledged actuality (like me). But 
we cannot easily take the middle way just by presupposing the identity between 
dispositions and qualities.74 
So far, I have just sketched the general idea of my own theory of properties, the 
Causal Trope Theory, comparing it with some other views (especially with John Heil’s). 
                                                
73 Molnar also admits pure categorical properties (‘non-powers’ as he calls them). So 
he is, to be exact, a property dualist. See Molnar (2003), pp.158-172. 
74 There is one more worry about Heil’s view. Some philosophers have regarded 
intentionality as the mark of the mental – ‘Brentano’s thesis’. What kind of account 
does Heil give to intentionality? He proposes that we tie the intentional character of 
states of mind to their dispositionality (cf. FOPV, p.210). ‘Dispositionality underlies the 
projective character of thought.’ (ibid.). Heil presents the internalist view about the 
content of thought on the basis of the intrinsic theory of dispositions. One worry 
remains. Heil’s ontology apparently opposes Brentano’s thesis. What criterion, then, 
can Heil give to distinguish the mental from the physical? For example, George Molnar, 
who is a property dualist, seems to regard quality as the mark of the mental (cf. Molnar 
(2003)). Without an adequate criterion of the mental, Heil might be led to panpsychism. 
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I have not defended the Causal Trope Theory, with contrast with a main rival, Humean 
Theory. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
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７	 The Need for the Ontology of Properties (2): Defending 
Dispositionalism and Attacking Categoricalism 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I will do two things: defending dispositionalism and attacking 
categoricalim. 
I will first examine a typical and influential categoricalist view on properties 
which is pressed forward by Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson many years ago. I will then 
focus on an assumption of their argument, the Causal Thesis. The Causal Thesis has its 
origin in David Armstrong’s argument against Gilbert Ryle’s phenomenalism. I will 
examine Armstrong’s argument and conclude that Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson’s 
argument does not succeed in knocking down dispositionalism. After that, I will 
examine a recent argument by Bradley Rives which tries to defend Prior, Pargetter, and 
Jackson’s view. I will show that Rives’ argument does not succeed. 
After that, I will try attack categoricalism, posing some serious problems for it. 
 
７-１	 Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson on Dispositions 
 
In their seminal paper, ‘Three Theses about Dispositions’, Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson 
(hereafter, PPJ) argue that dispositions are distinct from their causal bases and that 
dispositions are causally impotent75. Their argument is considered to be one of the first 
attempts to argue for a categoricalist view on properties. I will start my support for a 
dispositionalist view on properties, with a close examination on their argument. What I 
will try to do in the following is to analyse their argument and to clarify what is the 
ontological assumption of their argument. 
 
７-１-１	 Three Theses (Overview) 
 
In ‘Three Theses about Dispositions’, PPJ argue for the following three theses about 
                                                
75 Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, 1982, ‘Three Theses about Dispositions’ 
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dispositions76: 
 
The Causal Thesis: It is a necessary truth that dispositions have causal bases. 
The Distinctness Thesis: These bases are distinct from their attendant dispositions. 
The Impotence Thesis: Dispositions are causally impotent with respect to their 
manifestations. 
 
Let us see what the theses mean and what is the outline of their argument, just briefly (I 
will closely examine the argument in the next section). 
The Causal Thesis says that every disposition must have its causal basis. What is 
‘a causal basis’ of a disposition? By ‘a causal basis’, they mean ‘the property or 
property-complex of the object that, together with ... the antecedent circumstances[,] is 
the causally operative sufficient condition for the manifestation in the case of ‘surefire’ 
dispositions, and in the case of probabilistic dispositions is causally sufficient for the 
relevant chance of the manifestation’77. For a disposition, e.g. fragility, we can specify a 
pair <knocking, breaking>, where the former (knocking) indicates a stimulation or a 
triggering cause and the latter (breaking) indicates a manifestation. To ascribe a 
disposition to an object is to say that the object satisfies the pair that we specify for the 
disposition. To ascribe fragility to a glass is to insist that the glass satisfies the pair 
<knocking, breaking>: if it were knocked, it would break. The causal basis of the 
fragility is the property possessed by the glass which is, together with the knocking of it, 
causally operative sufficient condition for the breaking of it. As they see it, a property 
of having molecular bonding α is the causal basis in this case. The Causal Thesis says 
that for every disposition there necessarily exists a causal basis of it. 
Now PPJ ask one question: what is the relation between the disposition, e.g. 
fragility of a glass, and its causal basis, e.g. the molecular bonding α of the glass? Are 
they identical or distinct? The Distinctness Thesis says that they are distinct: the 
fragility of the glass is not its molecular bonding α. The main reason they offer for the 
Distinctness Thesis is so-called ‘multiple realizability of dispositions’: a glass with a 
slightly different molecular bonding β than α would be fragile, as well as a glass with 
                                                
76 ibid., p.251. 
77 ibid. Italicized by me. 
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the molecular bonding α would. Moreover, something that has a very different 
microstructure than a glass with a molecular bonding α, e.g. a vase with microstructure 
γ could be fragile as well. The fact that one and the same disposition may have different 
causal bases suggests that the disposition cannot identical to all of them; otherwise the 
transitivity of identity is violated. If α is identical with fragility and fragility is identical 
with β, then α is identical with β (transitivity of identity), whereas, ex hypothesi, α is not 
identical with β. 
 Suppose a glass is knocked and breaks. Is its fragility the cause (or a part of the 
cause) of its breaking? The Impotence Thesis says that it is not. It insists that every 
disposition, including fragility of course, is causally impotent: they do not play any role 
in bringing about the effects. PPJ argue that the Impotence Thesis is implied by both the 
Causal Thesis and the Distinctness Thesis. Here is the argument: 
 
By the Causal Thesis, any disposition (and thus fragility) must have a causal basis. 
This causal basis is a sufficient causal explanation of the breaking as far as the 
properties of the object are concerned. But then there is nothing left for any other 
properties of the object to do. By the Distinctness Thesis the disposition is one of 
these other properties, ergo the disposition does nothing.78 
 
Suppose a disposition manifests itself. We are asked what caused the manifestation. The 
natural answer should be this: it is the basis of the disposition that caused the 
manifestation event. But if dispositions are distinct from their bases, we cannot say that 
the disposition itself caused, or at least causally contributed to the occurrence of, the 
manifestation. 
 While the argument seems, at least at a glance, plausible, the conclusion, the 
Impotence Thesis, is rather surprising. If dispositions do nothing in bringing about their 
manifestation, why do we have to posit dispositions in the first place? The Impotence 
Thesis has it that every disposition does nothing in bringing about its manifestation. If 
this is true, why we need dispositions as ontological items? If they are causally impotent, 
we wouldn’t have any access to them. Therefore, we cannot know that there really are 
such things in the world at all, can we? In the following, I will examine the argument 
                                                
78 ‘Three Thesis about Dispositions’, p.255 
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and make it clear what Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson’s argument shows and what it does 
not show. 
 
７-１-２	 Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson’s Argument for the Causal Thesis 
 
The Causal Thesis has it that every disposition necessarily has causal basis. The whole 
of the first section of their paper is devoted to argue for the Causal Thesis. As I 
mentioned in the previous section, they define the causal basis as follows: 
 
A causal basis is the property that, together with the antecedent circumstances, is the 
causally operative sufficient condition for the manifestation. 
 
It is not quite clear, though, exactly what the Causal Thesis means and what is the 
causal basis of dispositions. Ask the following question: what is it like for the Causal 
Thesis to fail to obtain? The Causal Thesis appears, at least at a glance, so trivial that it 
is difficult to imagine the situation where the thesis fails to obtain. Keeping this point in 
mind, let us see their argument for the Causal Thesis. 
 PPJ’s argument for the Causal Thesis goes as follows. Let us consider two cases 
– we might live in a deterministic world or in an indeterministic world. Let us start with 
a deterministic case (that is, we live in a deterministic world). Suppose that a glass is 
knocked at t in a possible world that is the closest to ours. The same laws as ours obtain 
in this possible world and the possible world is deterministic because our own actual 
world is deterministic. Either the glass breaks at t+δ or not, in this possible world. If it 
does not break, then the glass is not fragile. If it breaks, then the glass is fragile and 
‘there will be a causally sufficient antecedent condition operative in producing the 
breaking – that follows from Determinism’79. Therefore, there is no counterexample to 
the Causal Thesis in the deterministic case. However, there seem to be a putative 
counterexample for the Causal Thesis in an indeterministic case. Suppose that we live in 
an indeterministic world and that two rubber bands A and B are fully examined and 
proved to be causally alike with each other in this world. Suppose, also, that A and B are 
stretched at time t and that A returns to its original length at time t+δ, while B does not. 
                                                
79 ‘Three Theses about Dispositions’, p.252 
 73 
It seems to follow that A has a disposition, elasticity, and B lacks it, while, ex hypothesi, 
A and B are causally alike. Therefore, this seems to be the case where A has a 
disposition (elasticity) that, contrary to the Causal Thesis, doesn’t have a proper causal 
basis. This could happen, so insists the defender of the putative counterexample, in any 
indeterministic world. But Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson asks: could it happen indeed? If 
A and B are causally alike in an indeterministic world, it should mean that A’s and B’s 
stochastic behaviour, their probability of returning to their original lengths, are the same. 
Therefore, even if A returns to its original length and B doesn’t at this very moment, it 
doesn’t follow that they have different dispositions. The only possible counterexample 
being rejected, the Causal Thesis holds – so they argue. 
 Let us extrapolate their argument. Suppose that every physical event is causally 
determined, as determinism says it is. Every physical event, including manifestations of 
dispositions, is determined by the previous physical states, or the part of the physical 
states. So, for every disposition there is a proper physical state that is causally sufficient 
for bringing about its manifestation. So far, so good. Suppose, then, some physical 
events are not causally determined as determinism insists. That is to say, we examined 
both rubber bands, A and B, and found no difference between them; nevertheless A and 
B behave differently. What should we make of this case? It is most likely that we didn’t 
examined A and B precisely enough. If we examine them more carefully and more 
precisely, perhaps we will find the difference between them. With those fine-grained 
properties, we will be able to predict, deterministically, their behaviours. But what if no 
difference in physical properties was found, however carefully we examined the 
objects? We will, then, take it that the behaviours of A and B are probabilistically, 
thought not deterministically, determined. Now, how should we specify their 
probabilities? We must specify an ensemble that is constituted by the members with the 
same physical property and see how many of the members behave such and such way. 
But this ensemble include both A and B as its member, because ex hypothesi they are the 
same in respect of physical properties. Therefore, we never can ascribe the different 
probabilities to A and B. Otherwise, we simply have to give up scientific investigations 
and leave the world completely un-understandable. This is, as I extrapolate it, the 
general line of their argument.80 
                                                
80 Cf. Ibid. 
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 I don’t object the inferences in this argument, nor do I object the conclusion of it. 
I must ask, however, why does this argument matter to dispositions at all? Does this 
argument illuminate some aspects of dispositions? It seems that this argument just 
reconfirms the general process of how we conduct scientific investigations. As I see it, 
Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson’s alleged argument for the Causal Thesis does not prove 
the necessary existence of the causal basis of dispositions at all. It just assumes both that 
every physical events are, deterministically or indeterministically, determined by the 
previous physical states of the world and that dispositions supervene on those physical 
states. The latter assumption should be noticed when they insist that the only possible 
counterexample of the Causal Thesis is the case in which ‘A and B are causally alike but 
differ in their chance of returning to their original length the next time they are 
stretched.’81 
 However, they are not to be blamed for not offering an effective argument to 
prove the Causal Thesis. In fact, in recent studies on dispositions, a causal basis of a 
disposition is sometimes simply assumed (not proved to exist).82 Furthermore, David 
Lewis introduced the intrinsic causal bases to deal with a counterexample to the 
conditional analysis of dispositions, that is, ‘finkish’ dispositions83. It is also worth 
mentioning that the Causal Thesis does not specify the nature of the causal basis, but 
just has it that a causal basis of a disposition is the proper part of the physical states of 
the world that determines the manifestation of the disposition. The thesis, therefore, 
does not preclude the possibility that the causal basis of a disposition is itself a 
disposition as well. We will return to this problem later in this chapter. 
 I do not bring in a final verdict upon Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson’s argument in 
this stage. In the next section, I will focus on David Armstrong’s view on dispositions, 
for the Causal Thesis of PPJ has its origin in Armstrong’s requirement for causal bases. 
After I further examine the nature of causal bases and the relation between dispositions 
and their causal bases, I will say something conclusive about Prior, Pargetter, and 
Jackson’s argument. 
 
                                                
81 ‘Three Theses about Dispositions’, p.252 
82 See, for example, Lewis (1997), Mumford (1998) etc. 
83 See C. B. Martin, 1994, ‘Dispositions and Conditionals’, Philosophical Quarterly 44, 
pp.1-8. 
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７-２	 The Nature of Causal Bases and the Relation between Dispositions and 
Their Causal Bases 
 
The Causal Thesis of Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson has its origin in David Armstrong’s 
work. In this section, I will first examine David Armstrong’s argument for the 
categorical bases, where Armstrong attacks Gilbert Ryle’s anti-realistic view on 
dispositions and goes on with what he calls ‘a Realist view’. I will argue that 
Armstrong’s attack on Ryle is generally right, but that his requirement for bases of 
dispositions needs amendments. I will, then, offer a more satisfactory formulation of the 
requirement for bases (7-2-2). This new formulation will help to dissipate some 
confusion in the debates on dispositional bases and the possibility of bare dispositions. 
 
７-２-１	 Ryle and Armstrong on Causal Bases 
 
In A Materialist Theory of Mind, D. M. Armstrong argues against Ryle’s view which 
Armstrong calls the Phenomenalist or Operationalist account of dispositions. He then 
argues for his own view which he calls the Realist account of dispositions. Armstrong 
characterizes the Realist view by means of a principle which is very close to the Causal 
Thesis of PPJ. In the following, I will examine Armstrong’s argument. That would help 
to clarify what the Realist view on dispositions says about dispositions, and therefore, 
what exactly PPJ’s Causal Thesis means. 
 Ryle’s view on dispositions is shown in the following quotation: 
 
To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a 
particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a 
particular change, when a particular condition is realized.84 
 
To this, Armstrong opposes what he calls ‘the Realist view’: 
 
According to the Realist view, to speak of an object’s having a dispositional property 
entails that the object is in some non-dispositional state or that it has some property 
                                                
84 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.43 
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(there exists a ‘categorical basis’) which is responsible for the object manifesting 
certain behaviour in certain circumstances, manifestations whose nature makes the 
dispositional property the particular dispositional property it is.85 
 
It is clear that the Realist view requires the necessary existence of the causal bases for 
all dispositions; the requirement is quite similar to that of the Causal Thesis of PPJ. Let 
us list both theses. The Causal Thesis of PPJ is as follows: 
 
The Causal Thesis: It is necessary that every disposition has a causal basis 
(property) which is the causally operative sufficient condition for the manifestation. 
 
And Armstrong’s requirement for bases (ARB) is simply expressed as follows: 
 
ARB: It is necessary that every disposition has a non-dispositional (or categorical) 
property which is responsible for its manifestation under suitable circumstances. 
 
One obvious difference between them is that ARB (that is, the Realist view) explicitly 
requires non-dispositional property as a causal basis, where the Causal Thesis of PPJ 
remains neutral in whether a basis should be non-dispositional or not. 
 Armstrong presents what he calls an a priori argument to support the Realist 
account of dispositions. The argument has five steps. Let us see each step one by one. 
 Step 1. Suppose that we have a rubber band that has manifested a disposition, 
elasticity, on past occasions when the conditions of manifestation obtained: it stretched 
one inch whenever force F was applied to it. Suppose the rubber band is not in the 
condition of manifestation now. ‘Now one essential thing about dispositions is that we 
can attribute them to objects even at times when ... [the conditions of manifestation] do 
not obtain.’86 We, therefore, should be able to say, of the band, that if it were under 
force F at T1, a time when it is not under force F in the actual world, it would stretch 
one inch. Now Armstrong asks one question: what warrant do we have for that 
counterfactual statement? The Realist has an answer. The realist has good reasons to 
                                                
85 D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind, p.86 
86 ibid. 
 77 
believe ‘that the categorical state of the band which is responsible for its stretching one 
inch under force F obtains at T1’87; this belief has been confirmed by the past 
behaviours of the band. Given that the band has the categorical state at T1, it must 
stretch one inch under force F. 
 Step 2. But what answer, challenges Armstrong, can the Phenomenalist give? 
The only answer that Armstrong contrives for the Phenomenalist is that the fact that 
‘numerically the same’ band stretched one inch under force F on past occasions allows 
us to infer the present and future behaviour of this band. But this is not a satisfying 
answer because the band might change its dispositional property over a period of time. 
 Step 3. Armstrong considers a conceivable reply, by the Phenomenalist, to the 
objection. ‘[The Phenomenalist] may reply “We have every reason to think that the 
relevant categorical properties of the object are unchanged at T1, so we have every 
reason to think that the dispositional properties are unchanged.”’88 But this reply, as 
Armstrong sees it, assumes that there is some connection between categorical properties 
and dispositions. The Phenomenalist should not be allowed to rely on any connection 
between categorical properties and dispositions. 
 Step 4. The Phenomenalist might still insist, so Armstrong suggests, that a 
contingent connection between a categorical property and a disposition is available. 
 
...[S]ince he has asserted that the connection between ‘categorical basis’ and 
dispositional property is not a necessary one, he can only be arguing that there is a 
contingent connection between categorical properties and the fact that the band has 
that dispositional property at T1.89 
 
But how could we establish this kind of connection, a contingent connection between 
properties and un-manifested dispositions? There could be a contingent connection 
between a property (say, a property of a die at t) and a manifested result (say, the die is 
rolled and the result is ‘3’ at t+δ), if there could be fundamentally indeterministic 
processes. But we cannot establish, so insists Armstrong, a contingent connection 
between a property and an un-manifested disposition itself. 
                                                
87 ibid. 
88 ibid. p.87 
89 ibid. 
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 Step 5. Barring all the possible paths the Phenomenalist could take to authorize 
disposition ascriptions, Armstrong concludes that the Phenomenalist account of 
dispositions is not tenable. To deny the necessary connection between dispositions and 
causal bases leads to allow the possibility that two objects that are exactly similar in 
their categorical properties differ in their dispositions, which amounts to deny the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason: if the Phenomenalist were right, the world would resist 
any attempt to understand it and would be completely un-understandable. 
 In response to this argument, D. H. Mellor points out that if it were sound, then 
it would have the consequence that contradicts Armstrong’s earlier insistence on the 
contingency of a categorical basis of a disposition.90 According to the above argument, 
there cannot exist a contingent connection between categorical properties and 
dispositions; there is either a necessary connection or no connection at all. As his earlier 
and later works show, however, Armstrong insists that natural laws obtain 
contingently.91 This means that a categorical property behaves this way in this world, 
while it might behave another way in another possible world where different laws 
obtain. As Mellor sees it, the contradiction comes from the fact that Armstrong, in the 
above argument, tacitly and mistakenly infers from the necessary existence of a 
connection (between categorical properties and dispositions) to the existence of a 
necessary connection.92 Mellor points out that the original requirement, the requirement 
before the erroneous inference, of Armstrong’s Realist view should be the necessary 
existence of a (contingent) connection.  
 Michael Fara, following Mellor’s argument, takes it that what is insisted in 
Armstrong’s Realist view, before the erroneous inference, should be that every 
dispositions have some categorical basis, not that every dispositions have the particular 
categorical basis.93 He, then, insists that Armstrong’s view is no more enough to 
preclude the possibility that an object might change dispositionally without changing 
categorically than the Phenomenalist view. He also insists that this preclusion, although 
Armstrong makes an effort to do it, is not needed for authoring dispositional ascription 
                                                
90 D. H. Mellor, 1974, ‘In Defence of Dispositions’, p.165. 
91 See Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? 
92 D. H. Mellor, 1974, ‘In Defence of Dispositions’, p.165. 
93 M. Fara, ‘Dispositions’, Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/ 
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after all. 
 
We have no problem ... with supposing ... [the] objects don’t change categorically 
while we’re not looking at them. Why then should we anticipate an analogous 
problem ... with supposing that objects don’t change dispositionally, whether we’re 
looking at them or not (provided they haven’t change categorically)?94 
 
Fara concludes his review of Armstrong’s a prior argument with the observation, which 
he draws from Mellor (1974), that Armstrong’s problem is merely the problem of 
induction. 
 The situation is a bit complicated. Armstrong insists that, in order to authorize 
disposition ascriptions, we need some connection between a disposition and its 
categorical basis. But the connection, if there is any, must be a very strong one, a 
necessary connection, that is never available to the Phenomenalist; otherwise, there 
could be no connection at all. Mellor insists that there could be a middle way; he insists 
that a contingent connection is available. But, then, is the middle way available to the 
Phenomenalist as well? If so, does the purported distinction between the Realist view 
and the Phenomenalist view melt away? 
 As I see it, Armstrong is quite right in insisting that Ryle cannot authorize 
disposition ascriptions and insisting that it is a serious problem for him. Let us see, first, 
what is the point at issue between two parties, the Realist (Armstrong etc.) and the 
Phenomenalist (Ryle etc.). Both agree that there are ordinary things like glasses, vases, 
and so on. When a glass is hit at t and breaks at t+δ, both agree that the hitting of the 
glass (an event or a process) exists at t and the breaking of the glass (another event or a 
process) exists at t+δ. What about the supposed regularity that has obtained and will 
obtain concerning the fragile glass? I believe that Ryle, as well as the Realist, must 
concede the existence of the regularity in some way or another, because he takes ‘the 
inference ticket view’ on laws and dispositions. Whatever the nature of the world might 
be for Ryle, he must concede that the world is such that we can use the inference ticket, 
the ticket that allows us to infer from the hitting of the glass to the breaking of it. But, 
then, we need to know which glasses this ticket is for. Without this specification, we 
                                                
94 ibid. 
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cannot use the ticket. If, as the Phenomenalist would insist, the rubber band is not in a 
particular state when it is not under force F, how the Phenomenalist is able to 
distinguish the objects to which we can apply the ticket, from the objects to which we 
cannot apply the ticket. In the same way, we can ask how we issued the ticket in the 
first place without this specification. I believe this is what Armstrong has in mind. As I 
see it, when Armstrong points out, against the Phenomenalist who relies on the 
numerical identity, that the rubber band might change its dispositional property over a 
period of time, he misses the point. The possibility of an object’s changing 
dispositionally over time is not the point at issue. The most serious problem for Ryle is, 
pace Mellor and Fara, not the problem of induction. I conclude that Ryle’s view on 
dispositions is not consistent. He cannot both insist that to possess a dispositional 
property is not to be in a particular state and take the inference ticket view on laws and 
dispositions. Which is to be taken? Ryle must take the latter, the inference ticket view; 
otherwise, as Armstrong rightly points out, Ryle comes to reject the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. 
Armstrong is also right in insisting that, in order to authorize disposition 
ascriptions (or inference tickets) we need some bases or grounds for dispositions. We 
must, however, note that bases or grounds are needed, as far as Armstrong’s argument 
shows, just for indicating to which objects we can apply an inference ticket. The 
following consideration might make this point clear. Why is Ryle inclined to reject a 
particular state of an object when dispositions are not manifested? I suspect that Ryle’s 
rejection comes from his worries about the observability, or the epistemic integrity, of 
dispositions. We can certainly observe the hitting and the breaking of the glass. But we 
cannot observe the disposition itself. Therefore, Ryle might insist, when we ascribe a 
disposition to an object, we must not say that the object is in a particular state. But this 
reasoning is wrong. Suppose that the world consists of some macroscopic 
(middle-sized) objects and just four properties – being round, being triangular, being 
blue, and being red – which are all observable properties (at least we can plausibly 
suppose so). If we observe that all the round objects have changed their colour from 
blue to red (or from red to blue) and all the triangular objects have not changed their 
colour whenever they were hit, then we will say that a round object is disposed to 
change its colour and a triangular object is not. How we apply the inference ticket that 
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allows us to infer from ‘an object is hit’ to ‘the object will change its colour’? We apply 
this inference ticket to round objects, not triangular objects. In this case, the basis of the 
disposition, ‘changing colour’, is the shape (roundness) of the objects. Ryle does not 
need to worry about the observability at all. The roundness and triangularity (of 
macroscopic objects) are perfectly observable! 
 The considerations so far make it clear why we need bases for dispositions and 
what conditions these bases must satisfy. Although Armstrong is right in insisting the 
need for bases, he does not formulate the requirement for bases satisfactorily. First, it 
presupposes that the bases are ‘non-dispositional’ (or ‘categorical)’ properties. As I 
argued above, the bases of dispositions are required to pin down the objects that 
inference tickets are applied to and to issue, in the first place, an inference ticket. As far 
as this argument shows, the bases need not be non-dispositional or categorical: the 
argument does not rely on the nature of the bases. We can say quite rightly that a basis 
of a disposition might be a dispositional property. If Armstrong wants to deny this, he 
needs another argument. 
The second and more important defect of Armstrong’s formulation is that, in his 
formulation, the connection between dispositions and bases are not strong enough. 
Armstrong’s original statement can be read such that every disposition has some basis, 
not that every disposition has the particular basis. But if this means just that for every 
disposition there exists a property in one-to-one correspondence, this does not preclude 
the possibility that an object might change dispositionally without changing 
categorically (to use Armstrong’s term). We do need a kind of necessity concerning the 
connection between dispositions and their bases. In my opinion, Armstrong should have 
formulated his requirement for dispositions’ bases by means of supervenience. This is 
the subject of the next section. 
 
７-２-２	 The Minimal Requirement for the Causal Bases 
 
For the substitution of Armstrong’s formulation of the requirement for the causal bases, 
I recommend the Minimal Requirement for the Bases of dispositions (MRB): 
 
MRB: Dispositions supervene on bases, in that necessarily, for any disposition D, if 
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anything has D at t, there exists a basis B such that it has B at t, and necessarily 
anything that has B at a time has D at that time.95 
 
I offer this formulation as a minimal requirement for disposition bases that Armstrong 
could accept. The possibility that an object might change dispositionally without 
changing its basis, the possibility which Armstrong worries, is precluded by the second 
‘necessarily’ in the formulation. Note, also, that MRB says nothing about the nature of 
the bases itself. It just says that a basis is a subvenient property (or state) of a disposition. 
Whether we can ascribe a disposition meaningfully without a basis or not, is one 
problem. Whether a basis of a disposition is dispositional or non-dispositional is quite 
another problem. I will consider the second problem later. In this stage, however, I 
emphasize that it is quite important to keep these two problems separately.96 
 What about Mellor’s worry? As Mellor sees it, if Armstrong’s a priori argument 
were sound, it would establish far stronger connection, than Armstrong himself believes, 
between dispositions and bases: the necessary connection between dispositions and 
bases contradicts with contingency of natural laws which Armstrong explicitly insists 
on elsewhere. As I see it, Mellor confounds nomological necessity with metaphysical 
(or logical) necessity when he poses this worry. MRB would help us to make this point 
clear. The second ‘necessarily’ in the formulation can be interpreted in several ways 
according to the modal theory one prefers. If Armstrong interprets the second 
‘necessarily’ as expressing nomological necessity (I believe that he should), then he can 
successfully preclude the possibility that an object change dispositionally without 
changing categorically (to use his term) and also hold the view that the way a property 
behaves is quite a contingent matter. 
                                                
95 This formulation is obviously based on Kim’s formulation of ‘strong supervenience’. 
See Kim, 1998, Mind in a Physical World, p.9. 
96 Let me compare MRB with Stephen Mumford’s characterization of the basis. 
Mumford’s formulation is as follows: the basis b, of any disposition d, is generally 
understood to be that property, or property-complex, in virtue which the object or 
substance has d. It is easy to see that this characterization is quite compatible with mine. 
It is generally understood that supervenience relation is less ontologically laden than ‘in 
virtue of’ relation. It is sometimes said that ‘in virtue of’ relation explains 
supervenience relation. The fact that MRB is less ontologically laden than Mumford’s 
formulation might be thought of as a merit of my formulation compared with 
Mumford’s, at least as a minimal requirement. Cf. Mumford (1998), p.97. 
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 MRB helps to dispel Fara’s worry, as well. Fara insists that Armstrong’s view 
no more enough to preclude the possibility that an object might change dispositionally 
without changing categorically than the Phenomenalist view. This is not right. If the 
second ‘necessarily’ in MRB is interpreted as nomological necessity, an object cannot 
change dispositionally without changing categorically in any possible worlds where the 
same natural laws as ours obtain; this is, as I take it, what happens if we take 
Armstrong’s view properly interpreted. If MRB is not satisfied, an object can change 
dispositionally without changing categorically even in our actual world; this is what 
would happen if we take the Phenomenalist view. 
 There is one more point to be mentioned about MRB. Compared with Prior, 
Pargetter, and Jackson’s Causal Thesis and ARB, it is obviously abstemious about the 
specification of bases. As I have already mentioned, MRB does not specify whether a 
basis should be non-dispositional or not. What is more, it does not say whether a basis 
at t is causally operative or causally responsible for the manifestations. As I see it, the 
question of why bases are required for dispositions should be clearly separated from 
other questions – the question concerning the causal efficacy of bases, or the question 
whether we should reduce dispositions to causation or, conversely, causation to 
dispositions. Sometimes, a different question is conflated with the question of the 
requirement for bases. And this complicates many debates on dispositions. We will 
consider these other questions later. 
 
７-３	 Close Examination of the Distinctness Thesis 
 
In the proceeding section, I formulated the minimal requirement for bases of 
dispositions. The minimal requirement, however, specifies very little about the nature of 
disposition bases; it just insists that dispositions supervene on basal properties. 
Formulated in such a sparing way, the requirement makes it clear that what is required 
and what is not required for a philosopher to be a disposition Realist (in Armstrong’s 
and PPJ’s sense). My point in the previous section was that we should clearly separate 
the question of what is the nature of bases from the question of whether bases must exist. 
Now, it’s time to add something more to the minimum requirement. In this section, I 
will deal with the Distinctness Thesis of PPJ. The problem concerns a question: ‘Are 
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dispositions distinct from their bases?’ 
 Remember Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson’s argument for the Distinctness Thesis: 
the thesis insisting that dispositions are distinct from their bases. The argument relies on 
the purported multiple realizability of dispositions by various causal bases. It goes as 
follows. There seems to be an empirical fact that a disposition may have different bases 
in different objects: a vase A with a molecular bonding α is fragile; a glass B with a 
crystalline structure β is also fragile. Suppose that the basis of A’s fragility is α, while 
the basis of B’s fragility is β. If dispositions are identical with their bases, then being 
fragile is identical with having molecular bonding α in A while being fragile is identical 
with having crystalline structure β in B. But we cannot hold both of these identifications 
at the same time because, from these identifications, it follows, due to the transitivity of 
identity, that having molecular bonding α is identical with having crystalline structure β, 
which is obviously false. Therefore, the argument concludes, dispositions are distinct 
from their bases. Let us call this argument the argument from multiple realizability. 
 
７-３-１	 Mumford’s Reply: Token Identity Theory 
 
In response to the argument from multiple realizability, Stephen Mumford insists that 
while the argument succeeds in denying type-type identity between dispositions and 
bases, it does not deny token-token identity between them. He tries to defend, against 
the argument from realizability, the property monism. According to the property 
monism, there is only one kind of properties (i.e. neutral properties) which is described 
both by dispositional predicate terms and by categorical predicate terms. He says: 
 
The property monist essentially wants to show that in saying x is D and x is C, where 
‘D’ and ‘C’ are dispositional and categorical predicate terms respectively, we are not 
saying that there is some fact about x over and above instantiating C that makes it 
true that it is instantiating D.97 
 
It should be clear, from this quotation, that Mumford insists that ‘C’ and ‘D’ denote one 
and the same property instance. If we could take token-token identity between 
                                                
97 S. Mumford, 1998, Dispositions, p.159. 
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dispositions and their causal bases, we would succeed in securing the causal potency of 
dispositions (disposition tokens, in this case). This is because, as Mumford sees it, the 
causal relation obtains not between universals in the abstract sense, but between 
property instances. He says: 
 
When we say that the weight of the apple caused the pointer on the scales to move, 
for example, we do not mean that a property of weight in general, construed as a 
universal, caused the moving of the pointer. Rather it was this particular weight of 
this particular apple that caused the pointer to move.98 
 
It is to be discussed elsewhere whether he is right in insisting that not universals but 
particular instances of properties cause something, but let us suppose he is right in this 
point.99 Let us also suppose that property instances are tropes, as the difference 
between property instances and tropes doesn’t matter in the following discussion. Now, 
does Mumford’s token identity theory work properly, against the argument from 
multiple realizability? 
 
７-３-２	 Bradley Rives’ Attack on Token Identity Theory 
 
In his paper, ‘Why Dispositions Are (Still) Distinct From Their Bases and Causally 
Impotent’, Bradley Rives attacks Mumford’s token-token identity theory. He insists that 
dispositional property instances and categorical property instances differ in their modal 
properties and should therefore be considered distinct. He offers two examples where an 
object with the same disposition instance in a possible world and the actual world has a 
different categorical property instance from the actual categorical property instance of it 
in that possible world. 
 Let us see the first example. He takes a fragile vase V with molecular bonding α, 
assuming that ‘the token instance of having molecular bonding α consists in the 
instantiation by some V’s constituent atoms, a1-an, of a host of highly specific properties 
and bonding relations, P1-Pn, and in the resulting molecules’ standing in certain bonding 
                                                
98 S. Mumford, Dispositions, pp.161-2. 
99 For a defense of such a view, see, for example, Robb (1997) and Ehring (1997, 2003). 
I will discuss Robb’s view in Chapter 8. 
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relations to another’.100 He, then, invites us to consider the following situation: 
 
Now, consider a possible world W in which a1-an are replaced with exactly similar 
atoms, which instantiate P1-Pn, and in which the resulting molecules stand in the 
same bonding relations as the molecules in the actual world. Let us suppose, 
moreover, that the replacement is carried out in such a way that there is no time at 
which the vase ceases to be fragile.101 
 
Is the instance of being fragile in the possible world, W, identical with the instance of 
being fragile in the actual world? Rives insists that Mumford ought to say ‘Yes’. This is 
because it is plausible, as Mumford himself insists it (and Rives agrees with it), that 
‘any two tokens with all the same causal roles are identical, and therefore are just one 
token’102. What about, then, the instance of having molecular bonding α? As Rives 
insists it, the instance of having molecular bonding α in W is not identical with the 
instance of having molecular bonding α in the actual world. He says: 
 
[S]ince in W, some of V’s atoms, a1-an, have been replaced with exactly similar ones, 
the instance of having molecular bonding α in W and the actual world are distinct. 
The reason for this is that, whatever else Mumford’s property-instances turn out to be, 
it seems that they must be particularized entities, whose existence is tied to the very 
particulars that have them.103 
 
As the instance of having molecular bonding α is possessed by the group of the 
particular atoms including a1-an as its members, and a1-an are replaced with exactly 
similar, but distinct, atoms, the instance of having molecular bonding α in W and the 
actual world have different possessors in each worlds, therefore they are different 
property instances. On the basis of the above scenario, Rives insists that Mumford 
ought to accept that the actual-world-instance of being fragile and the 
                                                
100 B. Rives, ‘Why Dispositions Are (Still) Distinct From Their Bases and Causally 
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101 ibid. 
102 Mumford, Dispositions, p.162. 
103 Rives, 2005, ‘Why Dispositions Are (Still) Distinct From Their Bases and Causally 
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actual-world-instance of having molecular bonding α are distinct. 
 Rives argument based on the first example consists of three parts. The first part 
of the argument, the part which leads to the conclusion that the actual-world-instance of 
being fragile (instantiated by V in the actual world) is identical with the W-instance of 
being fragile (instantiated by V in W), is formulated as follows: 
 
(1) The vase V would survive the replacement of a1-an with exactly the same atoms. 
 
(2) Being fragile is instantiated by the particular vase V. 
 
(3) Any two disposition tokens with all the same causal roles are identical, and 
therefore are really just one token. 
 
(4) Therefore, from (1)-(3), it follows that the actual-world-instance of being fragile 
is numerically identical with the W-instance of being fragile. 
 
Note that the possible world W in the argument is the world where the same natural 
laws as ours obtain; otherwise, the W-instance of being fragile would have different 
causal roles from those of the actual-world instance, and (3) would not be satisfied. The 
second part of the argument, which leads to the conclusion that the 
actual-world-instance of having molecular bonding α is distinct from the W-instance of 
having molecular bonding α, is formulated as follows: 
 
(5) The aggregate of the atoms which make up the vase V would not survive the 
replacement of its parts, a1-an, with exactly the same atoms. 
 
(6) Having molecular bonding α is instantiated by the aggregate of the atoms which 
makes up the vase V. 
 
(7) It is impossible for a categorical property instance to be possessed by distinct 
particulars (substances). 
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(8) Therefore, from (5)-(7), it follows that the actual-world-instance of having 
molecular bonding α is distinct from the W-instance of having molecular bonding α. 
 
The final part of the argument is formulated as follows: 
 
(9) If two property instances differ in their modal properties, we can not say that they 
really are numerically identical. There are two distinct property instances. 
 
(10) From (4), (8), and (9), it is concluded that the actual-world-instance of being 
fragile and the actual-world-instance of having molecular bonding α are distinct. 
 
This is Rives’ argument based on the first example. 
 One might react to the argument as follows. Mumford would accept the multiple 
realizability of dispositions, but this does not cause the problem for Mumford because 
he can say that different categorical property-instances could be identical, in each 
particular object, with disposition instances which all belong to one dispositional 
property. What’s the difference between this case and Rives’ example? The difference 
is this: while, in multiple realizability case, different categorical property-instances are 
identified with different disposition instances belonging to one disposition type, in 
Rives’ example on the other hand, different categorical property-instances are identified 
with numerically the same disposition instance (therefore, it poses a serious problem). 
 We should observe that Rives relies on two criteria of identity concerning 
property instances or tropes, (3) and (7). (3) is the criterion of identity concerning 
dispositional property instances and (7) is the criterion of identity concerning 
categorical property instances. Let us, first, examine the latter one. (7) can be seen as 
stating a necessary condition for the identity of categorical property instances; for 
differently described properties to be identical, it is necessary that they are possessed by 
one and the same substance. Philosophers, who individuate tropes by means of 
space-time location104, would probably reject (7), as they think that a trope keeps its 
identity if only it exists at the same space-time location: whether a trope is possessed by 
                                                
104 See, for instance, Schaffer, 2001, ‘The Individuation of Tropes’, Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 79. 
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the same object or different objects doesn’t matter. Anyway, the condition is quite 
compatible with the following plausible identity condition of tropes: 
 
Identity Condition of Tropes: 
Trope a (of type A) is (numerically) identical with trope b (of type B) only if (i) type 
A is identical with type B and (ii) trope a and trope b are possessed by the same 
object at the same time. 
 
Therefore, I do accept (7) as one of the necessary conditions for trope identity. 
 As to another identity criterion, (3), I need to give a comment. The criterion (3) 
is drawn from Mumford’s formulation. Mumford (1998) offers a criterion of identity 
between property instances. Where d is a variable ranging over disposition tokens, c is a 
variable ranging over categorical base tokens and x and y are variables ranging over 
actual and possible events, Mumford’s identity criterion is formulated as follows105: 
 
∀ d∀ c ((d = c) ↔ ∃ x (d causes or is caused by x & c causes or is caused by x) 
& ¬∃y ((d causes or is caused by y & ¬ (c causes or is caused by y)) 
∨  (¬ (d causes or is caused by y) & c causes or is caused by y))) 
 
The possible events relevant in this formulation are events in possible worlds where the 
same laws as the actual world obtain. Drawing from Mumford’s formulation, Rives 
regards (3) as a criterion of identity for dispositional property instances. (3) can be 
interpreted as a necessary and sufficient condition (or at least as a sufficient condition) 
for dispositional property instances. It is, however, not at all plausible to state that if 
dispositional property instances (or disposition tropes) share all their causal roles then 
they are really numerically identical. A red trope in the apple at the left hand side of my 
table is not identical with another red trope in another apple at the right hand side of my 
table even if they share all their causal roles (suppose that they are exactly similar with 
each other). We, therefore, can modify (3) as follows: 
 
(3’) For any two disposition instances to be identical, it is necessary that they share all 
                                                
105 Mumford, Dispositions, p.162. 
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their causal roles. 
 
As I see it, individuation by means of causal roles should be considered as one of the 
necessary conditions, pace Rives. Replacing (3) with (3’), Rives argument based on the 
first example might seem plausible. Anyway, if we take identity condition of tropes 
stated above for both dispositional tropes and categorical tropes, Rives’ argument 
obtains, for the crucial point of the argument is that the disposition property instance is 
possessed by the same object (the same vase V) whereas the categorical property 
instances are possessed by different object (different aggregates of atoms). 
 One crucial point of the argument is that dispositional property instances and 
categorical property instances are never possessed by the same object. The fragility of a 
vase V is possessed by the vase V, whereas the molecular bonding α of the vase V is not 
possessed by the vase V itself, but by the aggregate of molecules which makes up the 
vase V. Although this is crucial for the Rives’ argument, it is not at all clear why one 
and the same object cannot have both a dispositional property instance and a categorical 
property instance at the same time. We can at least say that Rives need some more 
argument to support this. It is also crucial that, in this example, the vase V survive its 
identity even if the molecules composing V are replaced with numerically different (but 
exactly similar) molecules. This thesis also needs some more arguments to support. Let 
us sum up the crucial point of Rives’ argument and conceivable objections to it. In 
Rives’ example, a dispositional trope keeps its identity through the replacement of the 
molecules (, for its possessor keeps its identity and the causal roles associated with the 
trope is also unchanged), whereas a categorical trope which is purported to be identical 
to the dispositional trope does not keep its identity (, for its possessor does not keep its 
identity). The possible objection denies either that a dispositional trope keeps its 
identity or that a categorical trope keeps its identity. To take the former way, we can 
insist that the possessor of a dispositional trope, being fragile, is not the vase V so that it 
does not keep its identity. To take the latter way, we can insist that the possessor of a 
categorical trope, having molecular bonding α, is not the aggregate of molecules but the 
vase V so that it keeps its identity. 
  That Rives is aware of some of these objections is shown in the following 
passage. 
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…perhaps categorical bases are not instantiated by some of the constituents of the 
particulars that instantiate dispositions, but rather are instantiated by the very same 
particulars that instantiate dispositions. If this is right, V instantiates both being 
fragile and having molecular bonding α, which would preclude us from claiming, on 
the basis of the above scenario, that categorical and dispositional property-instances 
differ in their modal properties and hence are distinct.106 
 
He then offers the second example to support the Distinctness Thesis. Rives invites us 
to consider a slightly different counterfactual scenario: 
 
… [C]onsider a possible world WЭ in which some of V’s atoms, a1-an, are rearranged 
so that the resulting molecules instantiate bonding relations that are slightly different 
from the ones they instantiate in the actual world, but ones that nevertheless realize 
the property being fragile. In the actual world, V instantiates having molecular 
bonding α, whereas in WЭ, it instantiates, say, having molecular bonding β, a slightly 
different categorical realizer of being fragile.107 
 
In this example, as Rives insists it, a dispositional trope, being fragile, keeps its identity, 
whereas two categorical tropes, having molecular bonding α and having molecular 
bonding β cannot in any plausible sense be considered to be identical.  
 But is it so apparent that the fragility of the vase V with molecular bonding α is 
identical with the fragility of the vase V with molecular bonding β, even if we admit, for 
the sake of argument, that the vase V keeps its identity through the rather radical 
alteration? As I see it, the vase with molecular bonding α and the vase with molecular 
bonding β behave differently when we probe them in detail; otherwise how can we 
know that one has molecular bonding α and the other has molecular bonding β? They 
have different causal roles, therefore, their dispositions are different as well. We may 
say both are fragile, in a rough meaning. But exactly speaking, their dispositions are 
different. 
                                                
106 Rives, 2005, ‘Why Dispositions Are (Still) Distinct From Their Bases and Causally 
Impotent’, American Philosophical Quarterly 42, p.23. 
107 Ibid. 
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 The problem lies in the disjunctiveness of dispositions. It is true that Mumford 
avoids the overdetermination problem by identifying disposition instances with 
categorical property instances. But what about dispositions as type? The instance of 
fragility of vase A is identical with the instance of molecular bonding α of vase A. The 
instance of fragility of glass B is identical with the instance of crystalline β of glass B. 
Suppose that molecular bonding α and crystalline β are determinate and ‘natural’ 
property (in David Lewis’s sense). Then the instances of α make up a class whose 
members are exactly similar with each other, so do the instances of β. The instances of 
fragility, however, cannot make up such a class, because the class that the instances of 
fragility make up includes, as its members, the instances of α and the instances of β with 
many other instances, and ex hypothesi an instance of α and an instance of β are not 
exactly similar with each other. This is a consequence from the disjunctiveness of 
higher-order properties. If, as PPJ takes it, dispositions are considered to be 
second-order properties, the disjunctiveness of dispositions is un-avoidable. 
 Now I would like to mention the most fundamental defect of Rives’ argument 
(the defect common to Humean Categoricalists’ arguments in general including PPJ’s): 
the argument is not the argument against dispositions in particular. As I see it, the first 
example really concerns constitution relation and the second example really concerns 
determinable-determinate relation. As to the first example, it can be reformulated as 
follows: 
 
While dispositions are instantiated by coincident objects, their bases are 
instantiated not by the objects themselves but by the objects’ constituents. 
If tropes are numerically identical with each other, they are instantiated by the 
same object. 
Therefore, disposition-instances cannot be numerically identical with the 
instances of their bases. 
 
Therefore, as to the first example, the argument is equally applied to any properties 
which are possessed by coincident objects. So the argument is applied to a property of 
being triangular possessed by ordinary macroscopic table (being triangular is 
considered to be a typical categorical property)! Rives’ second argument is really just a 
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modal version of PPJ’s argument from multiple realizability, and it is really a problem 
concerning determinable-deteminate relation in general. The standard definition of 
determinables and determinates is as follows: 
 
An individual satisfies a determinable predicate only if it satisfies some of other 
determinate predicate. 
That an individual satisfies a determinate predicate entails (but is not entailed by) 
determinable predicate.108 
 
Notice that Rives’ second argument applies not just to dispositions but to determinables 
in general, such as being coloured (a determinate of which is being red, being yellow, 
and so on) or being polygon (a determinate of which is being triangle, being quadrangle, 
and so on). Again you can notice that being polygon is usually considered to be a 
typical categorical property. 
Rives’ first example points out a problem concerning constitution relation. The 
second example points out a problem concerning determinable-determinate relation. But 
neither of them has to do with the nature of dispositions. The dispositionalists are, 
therefore, happy to dispel the worry about the argument from multiple realizability and 
concentrate on more crucial problems about the nature of dispositions. 
 Finally, I would also like to point out that Rives’ example has some plausibility 
only when we think about the properties of compound objects, such as vases, tables, and 
so on. If we consider the ultimate particles, particles without any constituent parts, and 
its properties, we are not troubled by the multiple realizability argument like Rives’. 
And if we can say that ultimate dispositions (and only ultimate dispositions) are 
causally potent, I am satisfied with it. 
 
７-４	 The Possibility of Bare Dispositions 
 
There have been some debates concerning the possibility of ‘bare dispositions’. Are 
there bare dispositions? To put it briefly, my answer is as follows. If ‘bare dispositions’ 
means ‘dispositions that lack any basis’, then the answer is no. There are no such 
                                                
108 The definition is due to W. E. Johnson. I draw this from Gillett and Rives (2005). 
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entities, as far as we keep the Principle of Sufficient Reason. But there is, as I see it, 
another meaning of ‘bare dispositions’. In this sense, ‘bare disposition’ is a disposition 
whose basis is identical with the disposition itself. I think that in this sense there are 
‘bare dispositions’.109 
 To put quite intuitively, MRB requires just that when we ascribe a disposition to 
an object, the object must have some property such that the object with that property 
would keep the disposition in question even if it were carried to the other part of the 
actual world or to the other possible worlds (as long as the natural laws in those possible 
worlds are the same as the actual ones). It does not specify the nature of the base 
property itself. This abstemious requirement, however, is sufficient for the world to be 
understandable. In order to avoid the situations where every phenomenon occurs totally 
at random and we cannot predict the future based on the past and current phenomena, it 
is sufficient for the world to satisfy MRB.110 
 
７-５	 Against Humean Theory (The Explanation of Causal Laws) 
 
Until this section, I have not defended the Causal Trope Theory from a main rival, 
Humean Theory. In this section and the next, I will argue against Humean Theory of 
properties. The argument has two parts. The first argument concerns the explanation of 
causal laws, which is the topic of this section. The second argument concerns the 
problem of quiddity, which I will discuss in the next section. 
 The first problem of Humean Theory is that it cannot explain causal laws 
properly. This is a traditional problem going back when Hume pointed it out. In 
Humean world, categorical properties are exemplified throughout the space-time: the 
exemplified categorical properties are scattered throughout the space-time. The problem 
is this: in what way we gather them up, we cannot explain the causal connection 
between them. 
                                                
109 Many philosophers seem to think that a basis of a disposition is distinct from the 
disposition itself. But I don’t think this thought is well grounded. 
110 Molnar argues that fundamental physical properties attributed to elementary 
particles, such as charm or charge, are ‘ungrounded’ or ‘missing base’ because these 
particles have no parts or structures. However, bases should not be conflated with 
component (usually microphysical) properties. Cf. Molnar (2003), pp.131-137. 
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 The causal theory, on the other hand, can explain the causal connection quite 
easily. Why does an electron with a negative charge repel another electron with a 
negative charge? That is because the property of having a negative charge has, 
essentially, a causal power of repelling the objects with a negative charge and of 
attracting the objects with a positive charge. How the property behaves is built in the 
property. 
 An advocate of Humean Theory might object that this solution by Causal 
Theory begs the question. The advocate might say that the solution just presupposes the 
causal connection, not explain it. Well, if the solution posits the causal connection ad 
hoc, then this objection would be right. As I see it, however, the causal theory does not 
introduce the causal connection ad hoc but changes the ontological framework 
drastically so that the problem of causal connection does not happen in the first place. 
This should be allowed, and this should be considered to be a good solution to 
philosophical problems. It might be helpful to consider another philosophical theory of 
causation, causal process theory, advocated by Wesley Salmon and others. Salmon 
introduces the causal process to tie the events that are causally related with each 
other.111 If he just introduces the causal process ad hoc, that is, just to tie the events, 
then his solution to the problem of causation does not have enough plausibility. 
However, Salmon changes the ontological framework where the causal processes are 
more basic entities and particular events are constructed as the intersections of causal 
processes. He starts with causal process and then constructs other ontological items 
from causal processes. That is why Salmon’s theory has some plausibility. The situation 
for the causal theory of properties is similar to that of Salmon’s theory. The causal 
theory regards causal properties as basic. It, then, tries to explain causal laws by means 
of causal properties. According to the Causal Theory, causal properties are basic and 
causal laws are constructed out of causal properties. So we can say that its ability to 
explain causal laws properly should be considered as a big advantage of the Causal 
Theory and, conversely, its inability to explain them properly should be considered as a 
big disadvantage of the Humean Categorical theory. 
 
                                                
111 See, for example, Wesley Salmon, Causality and Explanation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) and Phil Dowe, Physical Causation (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) for causal process theory. 
 96 
７-６	 Against Humean Theory (The Problem of Quiddity) 
 
The most serious problem for Humean Theory, as I see it, is the problem of quiddity. 
The ‘this-ness’ of properties is called ‘quiddity’. Humean Theory has to admit the 
quiddity of properties. Humean Theory insists that one and the same property could 
have different causal powers in different possible worlds in accord with natural laws in 
those worlds. The property Pn of having a negative charge will repel another negative 
charge in the actual world, while it might attract another negative charge in a possible 
world, W1, where the natural law about charge is different from that in the actual world. 
But how can we identify the property in W1 with Pn, even if Pn behaves radically 
differently in W1. Can we really identify a property independently of its causal powers? 
If we can, how?112 
 Can a defender of Humean Theory provide plausible arguments for introducing 
quiddity? I will examine two possible arguments for introducing quiddity and will deny 
both of them in the following. Before examining them, let us see two possible theories 
about substances. There are two theories about substances – the substratum theory and 
the bundle theory. The bundle theory has it that a substance is a bundle of properties 
(universals or tropes). The substratum theory has it, on the other hand, that a substance 
has, as its component, a bearer of those properties. The bearer of properties is called 
substratum or a bare particular. Now, it is instructive to consider Humean Theory of 
properties as the substratum theory concerning properties and Strong Causal Theory of 
properties as the bundle theory concerning properties. We might consider Humean 
Theory as introducing (so to speak) bare properties, in the same way as the substratum 
theory introduces bare particulars.113 
 Now we can admit some plausibility for the substratum theory. However, does 
Humean Theory have the same plausibility as the substratum theory? I will show, in the 
next paragraph, that the answer is negative. What I would like to show is not that we 
should take ‘layer cake view’ (as David Armstrong calls it) of substances and admit the 
bare particulars or substratum, but that we cannot use the same arguments for 
                                                
112 See R. Black, 2000, ‘Against quidditism’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, 
87-104. 
113 This point is due to Chakravartty (2005). 
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introducing the substratum, for the purpose of supporting the plausibility of quiddity. 
 The first argument for introducing the substratum. There is at least one benefit 
for introducing substantive substratum. When we analyze substances by means of 
bundles of properties, it is very difficult to explain changes. We want to say, for 
example, that an apple changes its colour from green to red. However, if a green apple 
is a bundle of properties such as being green, being spherical, being sour, and so on, and 
a red apple is another bundle of properties such as being red, being spherical, being 
sweet, and so on, then those bundles are different things (as bundles of properties) and 
we cannot say that the same apple changes its colour. If we introduce an entity which 
sums up those properties, a bare particular, we may be able to understand the change of 
the colour of the same apple. Now, can we use the same argument for quiddity? 
Certainly not. Because we do not have to think about the situation where one and the 
same property changes its causal powers. 
 The second argument for introducing substratum. For the tropists such as C. B. 
Martin and Heil, tropes are the particularized ways objects are. For these philosophers, 
properties are not independent entities, and therefore, are essentially non-substantive 
even if they are particularized. Those dependent entities cannot constitute substances 
even if they are gathered in one bundle. We can construct a substance only when we 
introduce substratum as bearers of properties.114 Can we use the same argument for 
introducing quiddity? Certainly not. Because we have no need to substantiate properties 
at all. A defender of quiddity must invent other arguments to support their view, but I 
cannot come up with such arguments. 
 There is one other worry about Humean Theory. Humean Theory comes to 
claim that the scientific theory never reach the reality of the world. The quiddity that 
Humean Theory posits is always beyond the reach of the scientific theory. It means not 
that we cannot, as a matter of fact, capture the reality, but that we can, in principle, 
never capture the reality of the world. Is such a theory appropriate for the theory of 
properties? I cannot but think that such a theory is a theory about something other than 
properties.115 I will consider the problem of quiddity again with the connection of the 
problem of qualia in the final chapter. But let us now see how the problem of mental 
                                                
114 See Martin, 1980. 
115 Notice that the argument above applies not only to Humean Theory but also to 
Weak Causal Theory, as Weak Causal Theory admits quiddity of properties. 
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causation, the causal exclusion problem, could be solved with the general theory of 
properties. This is the topic of the following two chapters. 
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８	 David Robb’s Trope Identity Theory 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I will deal with David Robb’s trope identity theory. I will point out two 
problems concerning Robb’s theory. (1) In Robb’s theory, multiply realized mental 
types are not genuine properties, but just concepts. (2) Although ‘property of causation’ 
might be tropes as Robb insists, it should have some connection with types. 
 
８-１	 The Causal Exclusion Problem Reformulated 
 
Let us make clear the upshot of the causal exclusion problem before setting out the 
examination of Robb’s solution. The upshot of the causal exclusion problem, roughly 
put, is as follows. On one hand, mental properties are thought to be non-physical 
properties. On the other hand, the totality of physical properties seems to form the 
closed system. How, then, can mental properties as non-physical properties intervene in 
this physically closed system?: mental properties seem to be excluded as redundant. 
 David Robb characterizes the exclusion problem as a problem which arises 
when we try to satisfy the following three requirements at the same time116: 
 
Relevance: Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical events. 
Distinctness: Mental properties are not physical properties. 
Closure: Every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and 
physical properties. 
 
As to Relevance, we can interpret it as the following thesis which we have assumed in 
the preceding chapters: mental properties are causally efficacious. As to Distinctness, 
we have good reason to accept it, because we assumed, at least in some sense, that 
mental properties can be multiply realized. We can, therefore, easily identify Relevance 
and Distinctness with the premises of non-reductive physicalism in the preceding 
chapters. The problem is Closure. Discussions in 3.3 show that this principle is too 
                                                
116 Robb, 1997, ‘The properties of mental causation’. 
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strong for a premise of an argument. It is virtually identical with Marcus’s ‘Closure’ in 
section 3.3, and it obviously prohibits non-physical causes to enter into the physical 
domain. However, we can convert Closure to the weaker version of it, the Principle of 
Physical Causal Closure: 
 
[The Principle of Physical Causal Closure]: For all physical objects, if it has a cause 
at t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t. 
 
We can safely use it here instead of Robb’s Closure. 
 
８-２	 The Trope Identity Theory 
 
David Robb proposed an ingenious solution to the exclusion problem. As Robb sees it, 
the three requirements appear to be incompatible because of the ambiguity of ‘property’ 
referred to in the requirements. Properties are thought of as tropes as well as types. If 
we distinguish tropes from types, we can satisfy three requirements at the same time. 
 Let us remember what was questioned about Anomalous Monism (hereafter 
AM). AM tried to secure the causal efficacy of mental events by identifying them with 
physical events. It was, however, legitimately questioned whether a mental property of 
a cause event or a physical property of it should be causally efficacious. Robb goes 
further than AM; he identifies mental tropes with physical tropes in addition to the 
identification of mental events with physical events. By this identification of mental 
tropes with physical tropes, he can, so he insists, bestow causal efficacy upon mental 
tropes (Relevance satisfied). Closure is also satisfied if we read ‘property’ in Closure as 
‘tropes’. As to multiple realizability, we can think that mental types are multiply 
realized by physical types (Distinctness satisfied). Distinguishing types and tropes, 
Robb interprets ‘properties’ in Relevance and Closure as tropes and ‘properties’ in 
Distinctness as types. By this interpretation, he insists he can satisfy all of the 
requirements at the same time. 
 The first impression might be that Robb’s solution does not really solve the 
problem but just postpone it. Even if a mental trope is identified with a physical trope as 
Robb insists, a worry might happen again: does the trope cause the effect as the mental? 
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To this worry, Robb responds as follows. In AM, events are particulars which possess 
various properties (or which can be described in various ways). On the other hand, 
tropes are particulars which are properties in themselves (not the possessors of them). 
While we can legitimately ask, as to events, ‘Does it cause the effect as the mental?,’ we 
cannot ask the same question as to tropes. As Robb insists it, it is merely ‘a category 
mistake’ to ask ‘In virtue of what does a trope cause the effect?’ 
 I think that this reply by Robb has some persuasiveness. The following 
argument might support Robb’s point. In AM, causal relata are events as particulars. If 
concrete particulars can be analyzed into bare particulars and attributes (cf. Loux 2002, 
ch.3), we would be able to think of mental events in AM as bare particulars possessing 
both mental attributes and physical attributes, where we would be able to ask, 
legitimately, which attributes are causally efficacious. In Robb’s trope monism, on the 
other hand, mental tropes are identical with physical tropes. Can we analyze these 
tropes (particularized properties) into bare particulars and attributes? It should be 
impossible. For properties cannot lack attributes. It is mere contradiction that properties 
lack attributes. 
 However, it might be argued, against Robb, that a trope (which is both mental 
and physical) might have aspects, which could raise the same question again: which 
aspect of the trope is causally efficacious? This is what Noordhof raised in his 1998 
paper.117 Robb’s reply to this question is that we cannot imagine aspects of properties 
(or properties of properties). To see which view is more persuasive, we need to examine 
the example Noordhof presents for his view. Noordhof says we have two perfectly clear 
senses in which properties can have aspects which raise questions of causal relevance. 
 
My house burns down. It is quite legitimate to ask which aspect of air was 
responsible. The answer is that the air was causally relevant in virtue of being part 
oxygen. So it seems that complex properties do have aspects concerning which one 
can ask ‘Was that responsible?’, namely, their constituents.118 
 
Here, Noordhof seems to claim that the property of oxygen is an aspect of the property 
                                                
117 See Noordhof, 1998, ‘Do tropes resolve the problem of mental causation?’. 
118 Noordhof, 1998, p.223. 
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of air. Or he might claim that the property of being oxygen is an aspect of the property 
of being air. In any case, however, the property of oxygen (being oxygen) is not an 
aspect of the property of air (being air); the property of oxygen (being oxygen) is the 
property of the constituents of air. The second example Noordhof presents is as follows; 
 
It also seems that, if two properties stand as determinate to determinable, we can ask 
‘Which is relevant?’119 
 
But the relation between determinate and determinable is not the relation between 
properties and aspects of them. We must conclude that Noordhof does not offer a 
persuasive ground for his view. 
 
８-３	 Two Objections 
 
Has the exclusion problem been successfully solved by Robb and there remains no 
problem? I don’t think so. I will point out two problems against Robb’s theory. To see 
first point, we ask this question. Is it possible that all the following statements obtain at 
the same time? 
 
(1) A mental trope m is identical with a physical trope p. 
(2) m belongs to a mental type M, and p belongs to a physical type P. 
(3) Type M is not identical with type P. 
(4) The members of type M are exactly similar with each other, and the members of P 
are exactly similar with each other. 
 
The answer should be that it is not possible. Because exact similarity is symmetrical, 
transitive, and reflexive, the sets whose members are exact similar with each other are 
exclusive120. One trope cannot belong to more than two exact-similarity-types (i.e. types 
whose members are exactly similar with each other). Consequently, in this case, at least 
one of M and P should be a set whose members are non-exactly similar with each other 
                                                
119 Ibid. 
120 Cf. Armstrong, 1989, Chapter 6. 
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(non-exact-similarity-type). 
 Which of these, M and P, is non-exact-similarity-type? It should be M. When a 
mental type M is multiply realized by physical types P, Q, R, … , at least a part of the 
latter are considered to be exact-similarity-types. Elementary particles’ mass, spin, 
charm etc. correspond to the exact-similarity-types. Therefore, M is 
non-exact-similarity-type. 
 The argument above might not be needed. When M is multiply realized by P, Q, 
R, and so on, M includes P, Q, R,… as subsets, and P, Q, R are different types with each 
other. Therefore, the members of M cannot be exactly similar with each other. 
 That M is non-exact-similarity-type means that M is not genuine property in a 
sense its physical realizers are. From here, it might be concluded that multiply realized 
mental types are just ‘concepts’, not properties. If Robb wants to keep both trope 
monism and type dualism, considering types as corresponding to genuine properties, 
Robb’s solution cannot achieve it121. 
 There is one way out from this, if we allow the trope has aspects. If trope m (= 
trope p) has aspects X1 and Y1, trope m’(= trope q) has aspects X2 and Y2, Y1 being 
exactly similar with Y2, X1 being not exactly similar with X2, then these two tropes are 
exactly similar according to aspect Y1 and Y2 (probably mental aspect), but not exactly 
similar according to aspect X1 and X2 (probably physical aspect). But Robb cannot take 
this option because Robb does not accept a sort of things such as aspects of properties. 
 It might be instructive to think about another possible way out. What if a cause 
trope is composed of more than two tropes? Suppose there are two things here – black 
triangle A and white triangle B. A is exactly similar with B in shape (being triangular), 
while A is not similar with B in colour. In the same way, if a cause trope is composed of 
a mental trope and a physical trope, it is possible that one and the same cause trope 
belongs to two distinct types each of which is exact-similarity-type. Robb cannot take 
this option, because it is not trope ‘identity’ theory any more. I think this point reveals 
why Robb’s identity theory cannot secure mental types as genuine properties. 
 Let us now see the second point about the Robb’s solution. Robb says that the 
property of causation is tropes, not types. But Robb faces the problem that the trope 
approach makes too many properties causally efficacious. Suppose that there is one 
                                                
121 I owe Gibb (2004) about this point. 
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volume trope in Ella’s voice as a result of which it is true that she sings at 70dB or more, 
80dB and under 90dB. Any note over 70dB will shatter the glass. Robb suggests that 
our inclination to say that 
 
Ella’s voice caused the glass to shatter in virtue of being over 70dB. 
 
is true, while 
 
Ella’s voice caused the glass to shatter in virtue of being under 90dB. 
 
is false should be explained by their different pragmatic implications. Robb says: 
 
I do not think the best way to explain this is to make types the causally relevant 
properties. Types simply are not the sorts of things that can be causally relevant to 
effects, physical or otherwise.122 
 
I don’t object this. But, as I see it, although it is true that types are not the sorts of things 
that can be causally relevant, the above case clearly shows that the property of causation 
should have some connection with types. It need not be identity. But mere pragmatic 
consideration is not enough. My dissatisfaction with Robb’s trope monism can be 
boiled down to his separating classifying entities with properties of causation. We 
normally think that classifying entities are also properties of causation: if a ball’s being 
5kg makes a dent in a cushion, then being 5kg is causally relevant and all things being 
5kg are classified in one group (regardless of whether the group corresponds to a 
universal or just a class). Robb denies this. Robb claims that classifying entities are 
types and properties of causation are tropes, Distinctness obtaining for the former and 
Relevance for the latter. This separation of classifying entities from properties of 
causation is difficult for me to swallow. When the two things are classified in one type, 
they should be similar with each other in some respect, and the similarity, it seems to 
me, should be connected with some kind of causal laws. 
 Let’s take a stock. Although Robb’s solution is ingenious, it has a consequence 
                                                
122 Robb, 1997, p.192 
 105 
that is not very pleasant to non-reductive physicalism. According to Robb’s view, 
mental properties (as types) turn out to be mere concepts, not genuine properties. In this 
sense, Robb’s trope identity theory comes very close to Kim’s reductionism. Also, 
although it might be true that types are not the properties of causation, the properties of 
causation should have, at least, some connection with mental types. It is not very clear 
how Robb’s trope identity theory gives us some understanding about this matter. 
However, we can say this as well: although Robb’s trope identity theory comes very 
close to Kim’s reductionism, it gives us a more detailed ontological picture. Robb’s 
view can be understood as giving us an ontological ground for Kim’s view. 
 With the multiple realizability of mental properties by physical properties, it 
seems that we cannot have genuine mental properties, the mental properties which are 
qualified as real properties in the same sense that physical properties are qualified as 
real properties. But is it really impossible? There is a prospective theory which might 
allow us to have genuine mental properties. We will see it in the next chapter. 
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９	 A Solution to the Causal Exclusion Problem: Sydney 
Shoemaker’s View and Its Development 
 
 
 
Sydney Shoemaker has recently offered a very attractive solution to the causal 
exclusion problem. In this chapter, I will examine and develop his solution. I will first 
describe Shoemaker’s theory of properties and his view on realization. I will then 
examine Shoemaker’s view on multiple realization and compare it with Heil’s view. 
Although they share many insights, they differ in their views on the status of multiply 
realized properties. While Heil denies the existence of multiply realized properties and 
admits just predicates in multiple realization case, Shoemaker admits genuine multiply 
realized properties. I will argue that Shoemaker’s view is more persuasive. After that, I 
will examine an objection to his view. Finally, I will develop his view. 
 
９-１	 Causal Theory of Properties 
 
Shoemaker’s solution to the causal exclusion problem is based on his own causal theory 
of properties. Although I have already mentioned his theory of properties in Chapter 7, 
it is convenient to recapitulate his theory of properties before we discuss his solution to 
the causal exclusion problem. 
 As Shoemaker sees it, properties can be viewed as sets of what he calls 
‘conditional powers’. His own expression is as follows: 
 
Any property whose instantiation can be a cause or partial cause of something will be 
such that its instantiation bestows on its subject a set of what I call ‘conditional 
powers’ (Shoemaker 2001, p.77) 
 
He characterizes ‘power simpliciter’ and ‘conditional power’ as follows: 
 
A thing’s having a power simpliciter is a matter of its being such that its being in 
certain circumstances, for example, its being related in certain ways to other things of 
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certain sorts, causes (or contributes to causing) certain effects. A thing has a 
conditional power if it is such that if it had certain properties it would have a certain 
power simpliciter, where those properties are not themselves sufficient to bestow that 
power simpliciter.123 
 
For example, the property of being knife-shaped bestows on its possessor a conditional 
power of being able to cut wood if it is made of steel, and a conditional power of being 
able to cut butter if it is made of wood, and so on. Thus, the property of being 
knife-shaped can be considered as (or can be considered as corresponding to) the set of 
these conditional powers. 
 
９-２	 Formulation of the Realization Relation 
 
Shoemaker defines the realization relation on the basis of his causal theory of properties. 
Properties are sets of conditional causal powers, or correspond to them. There are cases 
where a set of conditional causal powers is a subset of another set of conditional causal 
powers. A typical example is when two properties are in the relation of 
determinable-determinate with each other. Consider the property of being red and the 
property of being scarlet. In this case, the former is a determinable of the latter, and the 
latter is a determinate of the former. The set of the conditional causal powers 
corresponding to the former is a proper subset of the set of the conditional causal 
powers corresponding to the latter. Consider, for example, a pigeon that is conditioned 
to peck scarlet things but not other shades of red (e.g. pink, wine red and so on). The 
property of being scarlet has a conditional causal power of bringing about the pigeon’s 
pecking behaviour (under suitable circumstances), whereas the property of being red 
does not have such conditional causal power as this. So the set of conditional causal 
powers corresponding to the property of being red is a subset of the set of conditional 
causal powers corresponding to the property of being scarlet. 
 Shoemaker defines the realization relation as follows: 
 
[Shoemaker Realization 1] A Property X realizes a property Y just in case the 
                                                
123 Shoemaker, 2001, p.77. 
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conditional powers bestowed by Y are a subset of the conditional powers bestowed by 
X.124 
 
Suppose there are four properties, A, B, C and D. Suppose also that A corresponds to a 
set of conditional powers {a, b, c, d}, B to {e, b, c, f}, C to {g, b, c, h}, and D to {b, c}. 
In this case, D is multiply realized by A, B, or C. Consider a brain state P1 when a 
human being is in a mental state M of having pain. We can suppose that the pain state 
M could be realized by different physical setups P2, P3, P4, and so on, in different 
organisms or robots. What Shoemaker insists is that every pain realizing physical state 
(P1, P2, P3, …) has a common set of conditional powers (M) as its subset. For example, 
a conditional power of making a possessor of pain to wince when it suffers from tissue 
damage would belong to all the set corresponding to the physical property that realizes 
pain. 
 Defining the realization relation in this way, we get an answer to the causal 
exclusion problem. That is because, in mental causation, the mental property of the 
cause and the physical property of the cause are in part-whole relation: a part and the 
whole do not compete with each other in bringing about the effect.125 A mental 
property is not excluded by the physical property which realizes it, because, in 
Shoemaker’s framework, the former is a part of the latter and it is quite plausible to 
think that a part is not excluded by the whole. 
 Let me add some comments on it. First, we should notice that Shoemaker 
explicitly commit himself to an essentialist view on properties. According to the causal 
theory of properties, properties are individuated by their causal features. Therefore, if a 
causal law obtains, it obtains as a matter of necessity. 
 Secondly, according to Shoemaker’s view, both the realized properties and the 
realizing properties could be intrinsic properties. An orthodox view on properties, 
advocated by Armstrong, has it that an intrinsic property can behave differently in 
another possible world where causal laws are different from the actual ones. According 
                                                
124 Shoemaker, 2001, p.78. The reason why this is labelled as ‘Shoemaker Realization 1’ 
is to be clarified shortly. 
125 Clapp (2001) also offers a very similar view. While Shoemaker just says that 
properties are individualized by clusters (sets) of conditional powers, Clap insists a more 
radical view that properties are nothing but clusters of conditional powers. 
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to the orthodox view, then, functional properties are not intrinsic properties. However, if 
we take an essentialist theory of properties, behaviours of a property are, so to speak, 
built in the property itself. Therefore, with an essentialist theory of properties, we can 
regard both realizing properties and realized properties as intrinsic at least in this sense 
(that is, they are not extrinsic with respect to natural laws or possible worlds). 
 Thirdly, Shoemaker’s view has it that multiply realized properties are not 
second-order (or higher-order) properties. As we have seen when we discussed Kim’s 
view, many philosophers advocates the view that the realized properties are 
higher-order properties. But as Heil plausibly argued it, this brings about the multi 
layered view on the world, and the reality of the entities in higher layers is always 
threatened (see Section 6-1). Shoemaker takes, to use Heil’s word, ‘a flat view’ on 
properties and property realization. 
 Forthly, this being related to the third point, in Shoemaker’s view, multiply 
realized mental properties are genuine properties. We don’t have to consider them as 
just concepts or predicates as is in the cases of Kim’s, Heil’s, and Robb’s view. We can 
give a full-fledged reality to the realized mental properties. A realized mental property 
is a genuine property in that it is a part of the genuine physical property that realizes it. 
In connection with this, I will discuss Shoemaker on multiple realization in the next 
section. 
 
９-３	 Shoemaker on Multiple Realization 
 
What does Shoemaker say about the multiple realizability? With Shoemaker’s view, we 
can think in the following way. Two conditional causal powers are either exactly similar 
with each other or not similar at all. Suppose physical properties, A and B, realize a 
mental property C. Two particular objects having A are exactly similar with each other. 
A particular object having A and another particular object having B are not as similar as 
the two particular objects having A, but they are still similar in some respect. Their 
not-exact-similarity is explained by the fact that they share the conditional causal 
powers which are exactly similar, by the fact that those particular objects share some 
(but less) conditional causal powers. I think this gives us a better solution to the 
problem. While Robb and Heil see, in a purported case of multiple realization, a set of 
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imperfectly similar properties in virtue of which a single predicate (e.g. ‘is in pain’) is 
applied to various objects, Shoemaker tries to find common elements among realizing 
properties which ground multiple realization.  Robb, Heil, and Shoemaker take flat 
view – no higher-level properties –, thereby avoiding the threat of overdetermination or 
causal exclusion. Shoemaker, however, secures genuine realized properties, which is a 
great advantage over Robb and Heil. 
 We can also express their difference in this way. The difference between Heil 
and Shoemaker can be boiled down to their views on properties. When Shoemaker 
regards the property A as the set of conditional powers {a, b, c, d}, and the property B as 
the set of conditional power {e, b, c, f}, we can say that Shoemaker takes a fine-grained 
view on properties, although conditional powers are not themselves properties. The 
similarity between A and B is explained by the exact (perfect) similarity between two 
instances of b and another two instances of c. (Here we take particularists’ view on 
properties, which makes the comparison with Heil’s view much easier.) Heil’s view, by 
contrast, is a coarse-grained one, as he insists that A and B are imperfectly similar and 
this imperfect similarity is a brute fact. 
 Which way should we take? I think that it should be, in the end, an empirical 
matter. But I will briefly comment on some worries with Heil’s view. My worry is that 
similarity relation might lose objectivity in Heil’s view. Heil says, ‘An atomic-powered 
egg-beater and an apprentice chef armed with a wire whisk could be said to be 
functionally similar in so far as we focus on the operations of these two systems at a 
high level of abstraction’126. We could set a ‘level of abstraction’ high or low according 
to our own concern, therefore, everything resembles everything in some sense. 
Therefore, in Heil’s view, we cannot distinguish, in principle, a case of my pain and my 
wife’s pain on one hand with a case of my pain and an octopus pain on the other hand, 
or with a case of properties which are in ‘family’ resemblance, or even with a case of 
this pencil and that shirt. Shoemaker’s view, by contrast, works much better here. 
Properties which are in ‘family resemblance’ never multiply realize a single property, 
because there is no single power common to all of them. 
 Moreover, scientific investigation seems to support Shoemaker’s view. Suppose 
ultimate physics say that there exist only, say, 5 properties (a, b, c, d, e) in the world. 
                                                
126 FOPV, p.161. 
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This should mean that an instance of b here and another instance of b over there are 
exactly similar. It is quite unlikely that the ultimate physics poses ultimate properties 
such as a, a’, b, and b’, and it says that a and a’ are imperfectly similar with each other. 
Shoemaker could take these ultimate properties as conditional powers. Some 
combination of these basic powers might correspond to a property, some might not. 
Anyway, it seems easier to make similarity relation objective for Shoemaker than for 
Heil. In Shoemaker’s view, objects which are of ‘family resemblance’ with each other 
never realize a single property or kind; the multiple realization simply does not obtain in 
this case. 
 I, with Shoemaker, think that imperfect similarity between purported multiple 
realizers must be grounded by perfect similarity between causal powers which are 
constituents of the properties. I am happy to accept exact similarities as brute facts. If 
ultimate physics pose some (a finite number of) basic properties, then they are the only 
source of exact similarities. 
 
９-４	 Forward-looking and Backward-looking Causal Powers 
 
Shoemaker’s causal theory of properties and his view on realization has been changed 
slightly. The change concerns the difference between forward-looking causal powers 
and backward-looking causal powers. In the postscript of his 1980 paper, he refers to an 
counter-example which Richard Boyd pointed out to him. Boyd’s example is as follows. 
Suppose that there are just four substances, A, B, C, and D, in the world. Suppose also 
that X is composed of A and B, and Y is composed of C and D. As Boyd points out, it is, 
at least metaphysically, possible that X and Y have exactly the same causal powers. 
They bring about exactly the same outputs with any possible inputs. Even if we can 
never distinguish X and Y by their causal features, they should be different with each 
other because one is composed of A and B, and the other is composed of C and D. This 
counter-example shows, as Boyd sees it, that there is something wrong with the causal 
theory of properties. 
 In response to this counter-example, Shoemaker introduces a distinction 
between ‘forward-looking’ causal powers and ‘backward-looking’ causal powers. If X 
and Y bring about exactly the same outcome in any situation, that means they share all 
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the forward-looking causal powers. However, these are not all the causal powers that X 
and Y possess. They also have backward-looking causal powers: X has a 
backward-looking causal power of being made of A and B, and Y has a 
backward-looking causal power of being made of C and D. X and Y are different 
because their backward-looking causal powers are different. 
 With this alteration on the causal theory of properties, Shoemaker revises his 
formulation of realization as follows: 
 
[Shoemaker Realization 2] A property X realizes a property Y just in case: 
(1) the forward-looking conditional powers bestowed by Y are a subset of the 
forward-looking conditional powers bestowed by X, 
 and  
(2) the backward-looking conditional powers bestowed by X are a subset of the 
backward-looking conditional powers bestowed by Y.127 
 
Notice that the part-whole relation of the sets of conditional powers is reverse in the 
case of backward-looking conditional powers. More specific and more determinate 
properties can do more things in the future; however, on the contrary, they can be 
produced by less things in the past. A scarlet object can cause a conditioned pigeon to 
peck, which a red object cannot. On the other hand, the red object can be produced more 
easily than the scarlet object: we can suppose that the scarlet paint is more difficult to 
make than the other shades of colour. 
 Is Shoemaker right in introducing the distinction between forward-looking and 
backward-looking conditional powers and in revising his formulation of realization? 
Concerning this point, Brian McLaughlin has recently presented an objection to 
Shoemaker’s view. The next section I will discuss McLaughlin’s objection along with 
the principle of proportionality. 
 
９-５	 The Principle of Proportionality and McLaughlin’s Objection 
 
Before discussing McLaughlin’s objection, let us see another aspect of Shoemaker’s 
                                                
127 See Shoemaker (2007). 
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view, the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality is the principle 
that causes must be proportionate to effects.128 Let me explain it by means of Yablo’s 
vivid example129. Suppose that a pigeon is conditioned to peck red things (not just 
scarlet things but also pink things and wine red things and so on) and that she, in fact, is 
pecking a scarlet thing. What is doing the causal work (or what has causal efficacy) in 
this case is, as Yablo sees it, not scarletness but redness of the object, as the object 
would have been pecked by the pigeon even if it had been pink instead of scarlet. 
Causes must be proportionate to effects, according to Yablo. The property of being 
scarlet is ‘too large’ for the cause of the pecking effect. Yablo formulates the principle 
of proportionality as follows: 
 
[The Principle of Proportionality] c causes e only if (i) c is not screened off by any of 
its parts, and (ii) whatever has c as a part is screened off by it.130 
 
Note that the part-whole relation mentioned here is intensive (not extensive) part-whole 
relation: a typical example is the relation between determinates and determinables. Note 
also that a cause x ‘screens off’ y from an effect e if and only if e would have occurred 
even if x had occurred without y.131 
 It is important to notice that Shoemaker’s solution to the causal exclusion 
problem, examined in the preceding section, just guarantees that a physical property and 
a mental property does not conflict (or not compete) with each other. It just guarantees 
that a whole does not pre-empt a part of itself. It does not, therefore, positively state that 
mental properties do indeed cause something in some cases. However, if we require the 
principle of proportionality and if it is possible to show that mental properties are more 
proportionate to the effects than physical properties according to Shoemaker’s theory, 
then we can say that metal properties do cause the effects in appropriate cases according 
to Shoemaker’s theory. And Shoemaker indeed seems to be able to take this way, for 
the set of the (forward-looking) causal powers bestowed by a mental property is a part 
                                                
128 The principle of proportionality is forcefully defended by Yablo in his discussion of 
mental causation. See Yablo (1993). 
129 See Yablo (1993). 
130 See Yablo (2007), ‘The Seven Habits of Highly Effective Thinkers,’ 
http://mit.edu/~yablo/effthink.html. 
131 Ibid. 
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of the set of the (forward-looking) causal powers bestowed by the physical property and 
this means that the mental property is an intensive part of the physical property that 
realizes it.132 
 But there might be a stumbling block. In a recent paper, Brian McLaughlin 
attacks Shoemaker’s formulation of realization.133 As McLaughlin sees it, it is crucial 
for Shoemaker that physical properties entail mental properties: the fact that an object 
has a physical property P1 entails the fact that the object has a mental property M if P1 
realizes M. Without entailment of mental properties by physical properties, Shoemaker 
encounters two difficulties: (1) If entailment fails, supervenience also fails, which 
means that he must give up physicalism; (2) If entailment fails, he loses the only 
resource to guarantee the principle of proportionality.134 However, as McLaughlin sees 
it, his formulation ([Shoemaker Realization 2]) fails to do it. That is because the 
part-whole relation in the second part (concerning backward-looking conditional causal 
powers) of [Shoemaker Realization 2] is such that the set of conditional causal powers 
bestowed by the realizing property is a part of the set of conditional causal powers 
bestowed by a realized property. Suppose that P realizes M. [Shoemaker Realization 2] 
has it that the set of the forward-looking causal powers of M is a subset of the set of the 
forward-looking causal powers of P. Therefore, considering only the forward-looking 
causal powers, the fact that an object has P seems to entail the fact that the object has M. 
However, as the second part of [Shoemaker Realization 2] states that the part-whole 
relation between P and M is reverse as to backward-looking causal powers, considering 
both the forward-looking causal powers and the backward-looking causal powers, the 
fact that an object has P does not entail the fact that the object has M. Therefore, 
according to [Shoemaker Realization 2], realizing properties do not entail realized 
properties.135 
 What should we make of this? As I see it, if we count on backward-looking 
conditional causal powers for indentifying properties, then McLaughlin’s objection 
works. I am not so sure, however, if backward-looking conditional causal powers have 
                                                
132 Cf. Shoemaker (2001), p.78. 
133 McLaughlin (2007), ‘Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization,’ Erkenntnis 67. 
134 See McLaughlin (2007). We should also remember that according to Johnson’s 
classic definition, the determinables-determinates relation is defined by means of 
logical entailment relation. See section 7-3-2. 
135 Ibid. 
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something to do with identification (or individuation) of properties. If two properties, P 
and Q, share all the forward-looking conditional causal powers, but differ only in their 
backward-looking conditional causal powers, is it not the case where P and Q are, in 
fact, the same property (or exactly similar with each other) but they are produced in 
different processes? I am quite doubtful that Boyd’s counter-example really describes 
the real possibility. If X and Y share all the forward-looking conditional causal powers, 
then should we not conclude that X and Y are identical even if one is made of A and B 
and the other of C and D? It might be the case where a material is made of different 
constituents due to a mysterious chemical reaction. 
 I cannot present a conclusive argument as to if the backward-looking causal 
powers play a crucial role in identifying properties. I can only say that McLaughlin’s 
argument poses a very interesting point about the identification of properties and that if 
we need the principle of proportionality, we should reject [Shoemaker Realization 2] 
and go back to the first one, [Shoemaker Realization 1]. As I see it, it is quite doubtful 
that backward-looking conditional causal powers have something to do with the 
identification of properties. I believe, anyway, that there are many interesting points to 
be considered around here in the future research. 
 
Finally, I would like to just briefly mention if Shoemaker should take reductive causal 
theory, the strongest causal theory according to the classification I made in section 
6-3-1. As we saw in 6-3-1, it seems that Shoemaker once took reductive causal theory 
but later altered his view. As I see it, Shoemaker should take reductive one for the 
following reason. If the set of causal powers bestowed by M is a part of the set 
bestowed by P and properties are exhausted by their causal powers as the reductive 
causal theory insists, then it is natural to regard M as an intensive part of P, and 
therefore we seem to be able to avoid the conflict or competence between P and M 
(because a part and the whole do not compete with each other and the whole does not 
pre-empt a part of itself). But if properties are not exhausted by their causal powers and 
we should add something other than their causal powers to the properties, then is it so 
natural that M is an intensive part of P? In that case, we cannot so easily state that the 
former is a part of the latter. Rather we might have to say that the former, M, is distinct 
from the latter, P. For even if the sets of causal powers are in part-whole relation, the 
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added something to M and the added something to P might be totally different entities 
with each other. For this reason, I think Shoemaker should take reductive causal theory. 
The argument is not conclusive at all, but it should be clear that here also there are 
many interesting points to be developed in the future research. 
All in all, I think that Shoemaker’s view, with necessary amendments, is the 
most persuasive approach so far. We might have to give up [Shoemaker Realization 2]. 
We also have to consider if Shoemaker’s view should be reductive causal theory or not. 
But the advantage of his view is clear: it gives us a clue to insist that mental properties 
are genuine properties and yet have their causal powers distinguished from their 
physical realizers. And throughout these considerations, I believe I have shown that the 
metaphysical study of properties has a great and direct impact on the mental causation 
debates. Now let us depart from the problem of mental causation and get into the 
problem of consciousness. 
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１０	 Physicalism and Consciousness 
 
 
 
The conscious experience of human being is usually considered to be the most serious 
problem for physicalism. Why is consciousness a problem for physicalism? In order to 
understand this, we should see how it is that we understand a phenomenon in a 
physicalistic world view. 
Let us see a formulation of physicalism again (for details, see Chapter 2). 
According to Frank Jackson’s formulation, physicalism insists that any world which is a 
physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world.136 To use the 
concept of supervenience, it insists that every property in our world supervenes on 
micro physical properties and relations, the properties of fundamental particles and the 
relations between them. This is the second requirement for physicalism discussed in 
2-3. 
 With this rough formulation of physicalism (the second requirement for 
physicalism), let us ask what it is to understand a phenomenon (a phenomenon in 
general) in a physicalistic way. Let us take up a physicalistic understanding of 
biological gene, for it is comparatively uncontroversial that we can properly understand 
a biological concept of gene in a physicalistic way. First of all, how do we grasp the 
concept of gene? We begin with noticing that parents and their children are alike in 
some ways, in other words, that some traits of organisms are conveyed from parents to 
their children; this is the genetic phenomenon. Examining genetic phenomena in more 
detail, we come to think that if we posit a kind of particle which serves as a unit in 
genetic phenomena, we can systematically understand the genetic phenomena; we call 
this particle gene. Now, when we try to understand this concept, gene, physicalistically, 
what must be done? We must show that (1) genes are nothing over and above physical 
particles and (2) these physical particles play a causal role which is the constitutive 
character of gene. We know that DNA plays a causal role of gene by specifying how 
proteins are to be composed. We know that what genes do and we know that DNA do 
what genes do. In this way, we understand genetic phenomena in a physicalistic way. 
                                                
136 F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, p.12. 
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This is usually called functional explanation. 
Functional explanation, in general, takes the following form. First, a 
phenomenon which is to be explained is shown to be or have a functional property (or 
state) – whatever has a causal role essentially. Next, it is shown that a physical entity 
plays, as a matter of fact, the causal role. When a phenomenon is functionally explained 
in this way, we get a physicalistic understanding of the phenomenon. Notice, here, the 
connection between functional explanation and the formulation of physicalism offered 
above. If we can give a functional explanation to every fact in our world, then we can 
say that any world which is a physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter 
of our world; every property in our world supervenes on micro physical properties and 
relations. Furthermore, we can say that the functional explanation explains why this 
formulation obtains. If we cannot give a functional explanation of a fact, it is difficult to 
believe that a physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter, or that every 
property in our world supervenes on micro physical properties and relation, unless we 
have another good explanation. 
 Can we, then, understand consciousness physicalistically? What matters here is 
the qualia of conscious experience. There are two types of argument which try to show 
that we cannot understand conscious experiences with qualia within a physicalistic 
world view. One type of the argument relies on the conceivability of certain situations. 
Another type concerns the knowledge of conscious experiences. Let us take up the 
former first. 
 
１０-１	 The Conceivability Argument and the Representation Theory of 
Consciousness 
 
The Conceivability Argument 
 
Some philosophers who believe that we cannot solve the hard problem of consciousness 
within a physicalistic world view, rely on the argument from conceivability. Consider 
two people, A and B, in exactly the same functional state. We seem to be able to 
imagine that A has a quale which normally occurs when we see blue objects, while B 
has another quale which normally occurs when we see yellow objects. In this case, both 
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A and B would reply ‘It’s blue’ when they see the sky and are asked its colour, for we 
suppose that their functional states are identical. This possible situation is called 
‘inverted qualia’ situation. We also seem to be able to imagine that A has qualia and B 
lacks any qualia. This is called ‘absent qualia’ situation. There is a more extreme case, 
where A and B are in exactly the same physical state (not merely the same functional 
state) although A has qualia and B lacks any quale; this is called ‘Zombies’ situation.137 
Some philosophers argue that we can not get a physicalistic understanding of qualia 
because we can conceive of these cases and the cases seem to point out there are always 
some aspects which evade physicalistic description of the world. This is the outline of 
the conceivability argument against physicalism.  
 For the argument to be plausible enough, the argument must presuppose that the 
conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. We can conceive some situations, while 
we cannot conceive other situations: we can, for instance, conceive that the sky is red, 
while we cannot conceive that the sky is blue and red. It seems plausible that this 
conceivability corresponds with the metaphysical possibility, the possibility of the way 
the world could be. The sky could be red, but the sky could not be blue and red at the 
same time. Considering whether some situations are conceivable or not is always 
determined under some descriptions of the world, we can state this principle as follows: 
 
(CEM) Conceivability of a situation in some description of the world entails that the 
situation is metaphysical possible. 
 
Let us call the principle, CEM (Conceivability Entails Metaphysical possibility). CEM 
seems plausible enough. If we can say some situations are metaphysically possible and 
other situations impossible, how can we say that other than considering some situations 
as conceivable and other situations as inconceivable? 
 If we accept CEM, then it follows that we cannot accommodate qualia in a 
physicalistic world view. For if CEM is right, then the conceivability of Zombie entails 
the metaphysical possibility of Zombies, which means that it is quite possible that one 
person has qualia and the other thing (Zombie) with exactly the same physical state as 
that person lacks any quale. As this denies the second requirement for physicalism, we 
                                                
137 See D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, Chapter 7. 
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cannot retain a minimal physicalism. So goes the argument. 
 
A Reply from A Posteriori Necessity 
 
To reply to the conceivability argument, the physicalists should deny CEM in some 
ways. A notable reply from the physicalists concerns a case of a posteriori necessity (let 
us call it ‘A Reply from A Posteriori Necessity’. It goes like this. At first glance, it 
seems that we are able to conceive that water is not H2O but XYZ, as the conceivability 
argument insists. We seem to be able to conceive that the liquid which is called ‘water’, 
which is colourless and transparent, and which freezes at 0 degree centigrade (and so 
on), is not H2O but, in fact, XYZ. At least, it seems possible that a people who, lacking 
proper scientific knowledge, does not know that water is H2O, can conceive that water 
is not H2O but XYZ. However, the reply says, according to our current science, water is, 
by definition, a particular chemical material with a particular molecular structure H2O, 
and it is, in fact, not metaphysically possible that water is not H2O but XYZ even 
though we seem to conceive of the possibility of it. The upshot is that some necessity is 
a posteriori: although we come to know, by empirical investigation, that water has a 
microphysical structure, H2O, this does not mean that the fact is mere contingent. There 
are cases where a posteriori necessity holds, and the fact that water is H2O is one of 
those cases. This reply, thus, concludes that conceivability does not entail metaphysical 
possibility. 
 Does this reply successfully establish a case where conceivability does not entail 
metaphysical possibility? As I see it, this reply is on the right track. But one might 
object to this as follows. One might cast doubt on this reply, using the distinction which 
David Chalmers draws between primary intention and secondary intention.138 One 
might argue against the reply by insisting that the purported counterexample of CEM 
relies on the ambiguity of the concept (or word), ‘water’. As Chalmers sees it, we must 
distinguish two meanings (intentions) of ‘water’. ‘Water’ might refer to an entity with 
colourlessness, transparency, liquidity, and so on (whatever properties we normally 
associate with water in our world); ‘water’, on the other hand, might also refer to an 
entity with a particular molecular bonding which realizes such properties as 
colourlessness, transparency, liquidity and so on in our world. In the former sense 
                                                
138 Cf. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp.131-140. 
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(Chalmers calls it ‘primary intention’), ‘water’ could have any micro structure so long 
as it has colourlessness, transparency, liquidity and so on in the world which it belongs 
to. But in the latter sense (Chalmers calls it ‘secondary intention’), ‘water’ refers to the 
material which has those properties in our world. We can say that if we distinguish 
primary intentions and secondary intentions, the conceivability and the metaphysical 
necessity goes together. Understanding ‘water’ in the former sense (primary intention), 
we can conceive that what has colourlessness, transparency, etc. is not H2O but XYZ; 
there is a metaphysically possible world where XYZ realizes such properties as 
colourlessness, transparency, etc. according to the natural laws obtaining in that world. 
Understanding ‘water’ in the latter sense (secondary intention), on the other hand, we 
cannot conceive that a molecular structure which realizes water properties in our world 
(that is, H2O) is not H2O, and we can plausibly insist that this situation is not 
metaphysically possible either. Therefore, the reply which recourses to a posteriori 
necessity is not conclusive.139 
 I doubt, however, that Chalmers’ argument in the previous paragraph is the right 
way to support the conceivability argument and to rebut the physicalism. I agree with 
him that if we distinguish primary intentions and secondary intentions, the 
conceivability and the metaphysical necessity goes together. However, I don’t see how 
exactly this supports the conceivability of inverted qualia situations, absent qualia 
situations, or Zombie situations. To support the conceivability argument against 
physicalism, it should be possible that we conceive an inverted qualia situation (and 
others) with the intention of physical properties and qualia restricted to either primary 
or secondary respectively. I don’t see how it is possible.  
 Anyway, it should be admitted, at least, that the reply from a posteriori necessity 
is not conclusive. And the argument so far suggests that we will have to revise the 
concept of consciousness in some way if we want to accommodate consciousness 
within a physicalist world view. I will expound this approach in the next section. 
 
Revising the Concept of Consciousness 
 
It is suggestive to consider the concept of life. Former days, people believed that we 
                                                
139 Cf. ibid. 
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cannot understand the concept of life physicalistically. They believed that although the 
bodies of organisms are composed of physical materials, such as atoms or molecules, 
the physical materials themselves could never be alive; some non-physical energy must 
be added to the physical materials for them to be alive. Nowadays, however, many 
people believe that we can understand the concept of life physicalistically. Many people 
and philosophers believe that we do not need some mysterious energy anymore. What 
caused this change? We can point out two factors. First, the concept of life became 
clearer. We now know, thanks to the advancement of the biological science, that the 
essence of life consists in, for example, some functions such as self-replication, intake 
of energy, metabolism, and so on. Second, we now know, thanks to the advancement of 
the biological science again, that the physical materials, such as atoms and molecules, 
can realize these essential functions – that is to say, the physical materials occupy the 
causal roles specified by the functions essential to life activities. We should particularly 
notice here the first factor. Just as we come to believe that we can understand life 
activities physicalistically with the change in the concept of life itself, so we might be 
able to expect that we can understand consciousness physicalistically with the 
appropriate revision in the concept of consciousness itself. We need to clarify the 
conscious phenomena and to establish the proper concept of consciousness. 
 If we describe the world by appropriate concepts, then what is conceivable by 
our concepts would be metaphysically possible. However, the concepts that we 
currently possess to describe the world would not be fully appropriate; at least we 
should not expect that they are. If some of our concepts are not appropriate, then what is 
conceivable might turn out to be metaphysically impossible under those concepts. What 
we must do in these cases is to revise our old concepts so that we can make explicit the 
discrepancy between the conceivability and the metaphysical possibility. The concepts 
we now possess are not appropriate for the proper description of the world in these 
cases, so we must revise the concepts. The case of life is an example that we revised the 
concept in such a way. It is quite plausible that, in the case of consciousness, we face 
the same problem as we faced when we tried to understand the concept of life 
physicalistically. It might be true that we can conceive Zombies in our current concept 
of consciousness. But it is not quite certain that our current concept of consciousness is 
fully developed and appropriate to describe the world. In fact, there are some evidences 
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that apparently cast doubts on our current concept of consciousness. 
 One example is the blindsight. There are the patients who have blindsight. They 
suffered from tissue damages in some parts of their brains by accident. They deny that 
they see a visual image (spots on the screen, for example) which would be recognized 
by them if the damaged part of the brains worked properly. They cannot recognize that 
there are spots on a part of the screen. However, when they are asked to guess the place 
of the spots or the direction to which the spots move, they can correctly answer the 
question without being self-aware of perception. To be precise, they can not always but 
sometimes answer the tests correctly, the possibility of their answering correctly being 
higher than when someone who doesn’t see the screen at all makes a guess. This is the 
case of blindsight; they can, in some way, perceive something without knowing 
themselves that they perceive those things. It is sometimes said that the case of 
blindsight suggests the possibility of Zombies. Judging solely by their function, we 
cannot distinguish the patients who have blindsight from the people who have normal 
visual ability and sometimes make mistakes in the test of spot detection. Judging by 
their consciousness, however, they are different. While the people with normal visual 
ability have consciousness, a quale of the colour of spots or the shape of spots, when 
they detect spots on the screen, the patients with blindsight do not have such 
consciousness.140 Dennett offers a thought experiment in the blindsight case. He asks 
what if a patient with blindsight receives substantive trainings and gets an ability to 
answer the test correctly without exception. The patient would not have such feeling as 
making mere guesses ‘blindly’. Should we really regard this patient as not having any 
consciousness when they answer the test perfectly?141  
 These cases suggest that our current concept of consciousness is not appropriate, 
is confusing, and needs some revisions. The conceivability argument has it that our 
current conception of consciousness allows us to conceive Zombies and our current 
physical theory cannot capture this aspect of the world. Replying this argument, we can 
say that if we revise our current concept of consciousness and perhaps our current 
physical theory as well, we would be able to capture all aspects of the world including 
conscious experiences. 
                                                
140 For many cases of the blind sight, see, for example, Ramachandran (1999). 
141 See Dennett (1991), Chapter 11, Section 2. 
 124 
  
The Representation Theory of Consciousness 
 
In the preceding section, we saw the conceivability argument against physicalistic 
understanding of consciousness. We argued that the reply from a posteriori necessity is 
on the right track though it is still open to further discussions. We also saw that even if 
Zombies are conceivable under our current concept of consciousness, this does not 
immediately deny the possibility of physicalistic understanding of consciousness, for it 
is very likely that our current concept of consciousness is inadequate and needs some 
revisions. Our next task is to offer a positive account of how we can understand 
consciousness physicalistically. Even if physicalism is true as an ontological doctrine, 
we currently do not have with us an understanding of how physicalism is true. In the 
following, I will survey what I believe the most prospective approach to physicalistic 
understanding of consciousness – the representation theory of consciousness, which is 
powerfully advocated by Gilbert Harman and other philosophers. 
 We often regard qualia as non-physical properties. But, as Harman sees it, it is 
not right way to see qualia. Consider our experience of seeing a red apple. We are liable 
to think that what has a red quale is this experience. But, insists Harman, reflecting on 
this experience, what has a red quale is not this experience but the apple itself outside us. 
Harman generalizes this insight by using the concept of intentionality. Our experiences 
have intentionality: our experiences are representations. As to a representation, we must 
distinguish the properties of the representation itself, i.e. the intrinsic properties of the 
representation on one hand and the properties that the represented objects (the 
intentional objects) have on the other. The sentence printed on a paper, ‘The apple on 
the table is red’, has many intrinsic properties, such as being black, being composed of 
seven words, etc. The intentional object, the apple on the table, also has many properties, 
such as being red, being round, etc. The intrinsic properties of representations and the 
properties of intentional objects are usually different. Once this difference being noticed, 
as Harman sees it, the quale that we experience should be regarded as the property of 
the intentional object, not the property of our experience; qualia are to be understood as 
the properties of intentional objects.142 
                                                
142 See G. Harman, ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, in J. Tomberlin, ed., 
 125 
 Harman’s insight is important for physicalistic understanding of qualia. First, it 
suggests the way to revise our current concept of consciousness and qualia that brings 
about problems posed by the conceivability argument. Second, it suggests, more 
specifically, a way to understand qualia physicalistically via a physicalistic 
understanding of intentionality. We already have some physicalistic theory of 
intentionality and it is usually considered that a physicalistic understanding of 
intentionality would be easier than a physicalistic understanding of qualia (I will discuss 
physicalistic theories of intentionality later)143. If we can understand the concept of 
intentionality physicalistically, and the concept of consciousness can be captured by its 
intentional character, then we will have a way to understand consciousness 
physicalistically. This project is called representation theory of consciousness. 
 Harman’s insight on qualia and the project of the representation theory of 
consciousness are still rough sketches: it just outlines a way to physicalistic 
understanding of consciousness and there are several problems to be solved. Firstly, 
Harman just analyses some conscious experiences by means of the concept of 
intentionality and shows that the qualia accompanied by those experiences are the 
properties of the intentional objects represented by those experiences. If we want to get 
a physicslist theory of consciousness, we should have to show that every conscious 
experience can be analyzed in the same way. Secondly, and obviously, not every 
representation is a conscious experience. The sentences on this page are representations, 
but they are not conscious experiences themselves, although they induce conscious 
experiences on readers. The physicalists have to draw a line between representations 
which are connected with conscious experiences and mere representations which are not 
connected to conscious experiences, and also have to specify the criterion to draw the 
line. Let us see these problems. 
 
Are Every Conscious Experiences Analysed Intentionally? 
 
Let us consider if Harman’s view could be extended to every conscious experience. An 
                                                                                                                                          
Philosophical Perspectives 4, California: Ridgeview. 
143 For physicalistic theories of intentionality, see, for example, the following studies: F. 
Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind; R. G. Millikan, ‘Biosemantics’, Journal of Philosophy 
86, pp.281-97.; M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness. 
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anti-physicalist would refute that although some qualia might be regarded as properties 
of intentional objects, there should be other conscious experiences which don’t have 
any intentional content. Many philosophers agree that perceptual experiences and 
sensations have representational aspects. Consider, for example, the perceptual 
experience I undergo when I see a red apple on the table. This experience represent that 
a red round object is on a brown plane. It also seems uncontroversial that some feelings 
such as emotions and moods have representational content. There are, however, some 
feelings which seem to lack representations. 
 It is sometimes said that experiences of pain are not representational. One might 
insist that pain does not represent anything. Suppose one feels headache. It seems that 
the quale accompanied with this experience does not represent anything and that the 
quale is an intrinsic property of the experience itself (not a property of an intentional 
object such as table or an apple). This objection, however, could be replied. When we 
feel pain, we experience the pain as located somewhere in our body; we feel headaches 
in our heads. Sensations could be analysed within Harman’s framework in exactly the 
same way as visual experiences; the only difference between them is that the former has, 
as its intentional objects, a subject’s body.  
 What about the other mental states than pain? Michael Tye persuasively argues 
that the qualia accompanied with emotional experiences are understood as the 
compound states or properties of the subject’s body. The qualia that we have when we 
feel angry can be understood as the compound states or properties of the body, the 
components of which are the body being in the state of excitement, muscles being 
stretched, and the face being flushed etc. Imagery experiences can be understood as 
imitational visual experiences. The qualia that we have when we consciously think can 
be understood as imagery experiences of sounds and characters we use when we 
think.144 
 
Are Every Representations Conscious Experiences? 
 
Next, let us consider the second problem. If the representational theory of consciousness 
is right, then conscious experiences are representations. But are all representations 
                                                
144 See Tye (1997), pp.125-131. 
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conscious experiences? Obviously not. The things such as characters and pictures on a 
paper represent something. But it is absurd to think of these as conscious experiences. 
What conditions must be obtained for representations to be conscious experiences? 
 Two types of approaches have been suggested. The first type requires that 
representations must have higher order representations – the representations of the first 
order representations. This approach is based on the intuition that when an experience is 
conscious, the subject of the experience is aware of its own mental state. To use a more 
physicalistic image, for an experience to be conscious, the subject of the experience 
must monitor what is going on in the system. For example, when I drive a car, I am 
mostly aware of my mental states. But sometimes, especially when I am too familiar 
with the road, I just get to the destination without being aware of which road I have 
taken or how exactly I drove to the destination. In this case, my mental states when I 
was not aware of them should be non-conscious. This type of approach is further 
divided into two groups. One suggests that the higher order representation must be 
perception of the first order representation. According to this theory (Higher Order 
Perception theory, or HOP theory for short), a mental state is a conscious state if and 
only if there is a perception of the first order mental state. An experience of an apple is 
conscious if and only if the subject of the experience perceives the first order mental 
state.145 The second group also requires the higher order representations, but it requires 
that the higher order representation must be higher order thought. According to this 
theory (Higher Order Thought theory, or HOT theory for short), a brain state 
representing a red apple is a conscious experience if and only if this brain state is 
represented by a higher order thought with a content, ‘I am seeing a red apple’.146 
 But these attempts are not free from difficulties. It is well known that there are 
two kinds of consciousness – phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, the 
former being virtually equal to qualia and the latter being expressed as follows: 
 
Access Consciousness: A state is access consciousness if it is poised for direct 
control of thought and action. To add more detail, a representation is access 
                                                
145 For an earlier formulation of this theory, see Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of 
Mind, Chapter 5. 
146 See D. Rosenthal, ‘Two concepts of consciousness,’ Philosophical Studies 49, 1986: 
329-359. 
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consciousness if it is poised for free use in reasoning and for direct rational control of 
action and speech. An access state is one that consists in having an access 
representation.147 
 
For the first type of attempt, we would be able to point out that phenomenal 
consciousness might be confused with access consciousness. As Chalmers points out, 
our concepts of consciousness are usually ambiguous and sometimes include the 
meaning which is different from phenomenal consciousness.148 What we really need 
here are the conditions for a representation to be a phenomenal consciousness. But are 
the attempts above give the conditions for other consciousness than the phenomenal one 
that is functionally definable? 
 We might be able to say at least access consciousness is explained by Higher 
Order theories. But what about phenomenal consciousness? According to HOP theory, 
both first order perceptions and higher order perceptions include non-conceptual 
contents. On the other hand, according to HOT theory, while the first order perceptions 
include non-conceptual content, higher order perceptions include conceptual content. 
Now as to HOP theory, we can ask what is higher order non-conceptual content? Are 
higher order perception not collapsed into the first order perception? Also, according to 
HOP theory, there must be perceptual organs which perceive the first order perception. 
But what exactly are they like?   
 As to HOT theory, also there are many questions to be asked. Firstly, according 
to HOT theory, we have to have concepts as many as we can distinguish phenomenal 
qualia. But do we really have so many concepts? Secondly, according to HOT theory, 
higher order thought makes the first order perception conscious. But are higher order 
thoughts themselves really conscious? If they also need to be thought by much higher 
order thought, then obviously we face a regress. Thirdly, it seems that the requirement 
of HOT theory seems to be too strong. According to HOT theory, it is necessary for a 
representation to be a conscious experience that a subject has an ability of conceptual 
thought or has language in some way or another. This means that animals other than 
human beings could not have any consciousness unless they have languages or they are 
                                                
147 The definition is from Block (1995). 
148 See Chalmers (1997), Chapter 1. 
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capable of conceptual thought. Furthermore, we must say, according to HOT theory, 
that babies or even adults who lack linguistic ability or conceptual thought ability 
cannot have any consciousness. These are quite counter-intuitive. If they maintain their 
view, they have to show that what must be revised is our intuition about consciousness; 
this, however, seems to be very difficult.149 
 
What Has the Representation Theory of Consciousness Achieved So Far? 
 
It is true that there are many problems left for the representation theory of 
consciousness to solve. The suggestion in the previous section is just a sketch and we 
need to do more research about the representation theory of consciousness. However, it 
is also important to see what the theory achieved so far. If we take the representation 
theory, we have a prospect of soothing a fear of conceivability argument. According to 
the representation theory of consciousness, qualia are properties of intentional objects. 
The quale which Adam has when he perceives a red apple is nothing but the property of 
what Adam’s experience represents. And what Adam’s experience represents is 
determined by the intentional content of the representational state (a brain state of 
Adam’s) which realizes Adam’s experience. Now if we have a physicalistic account of 
intentionality (as we will discuss later in this chapter), the content of the 
representational state (a brain state of Adam’s) is determined by the fact that the brain 
state of Adam’s satisfies a causal role or a functional role. Therefore, if we take the 
representation theory of consciousness and a physicalistic account of intentionality, then 
there is no possibility that Adam has a different quale than he actually has. One cannot 
conceive of that possibility. 
This is true whether or not we take a causal theory of properties (pursued in 
Chapter 6 and 7). If we take a causal theory of properties, a physical state has a causal 
role in all possible worlds: it is metaphysically necessary that a physical state (property) 
has a causal role which is essential to that state (property). Even if we do not take a 
causal theory of properties, we can still say that a physical state (property) has a causal 
role in all possible worlds where the same natural laws as ours obtain. Therefore, if we 
                                                
149 For a very clear and accessible survey of higher order theories, see Kim (2011), 
p.283-289. 
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confine ourselves in those nomological possible worlds, we can say that the same 
physical state (property) realizes the same causal (functional) role. In any case, if two 
subjects are in the same physical state, then they must have the same representational 
state and, thus, have the same conscious experience in all nomological possible worlds. 
We can conclude, therefore, that if we take the representation theory of consciousness, 
we have, at least, a good perspective to cope with the problems posed by the 
conceivability argument. 
Now the next task would be to find out a proper physicalistic understanding of 
intentionality. But before that, we have to see another very popular argument against 
physicalism – the knowledge argument. 
 
１０-２	 The Knowledge Argument and the Representation Theory of 
Consciousness 
 
The Knowledge Argument 
 
There are two arguments against physicalistic theory of consciousness: one is the 
conceivability argument and the other is the knowledge argument. As to the 
conceivability argument, we argued above that the argument does not completely refute 
the physicalist pursuit in the theory of consciousness. We also argued that if the 
representation theory of consciousness is on the right track, then we do not have to be 
bothered with the possibility of inverted qualia situation, absent qualia situation, or 
Zombie situation. Now we must consider the second argument, the knowledge 
argument. 
 This well known argument, persuasively put especially by Frank Jackson, 
focuses on the knowledge about the experiences. Frank Jackson starts with the 
following formulation: 
 
Physicslism (FJ): Every knowledge is physical knowledge150 
                                                
150 In fact, Jackson uses the term ‘physical information’ rather than ‘physical 
knowledge’. See Jackson (1982). I believe this alteration does not affect the argument 
here. 
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With this in mind, he offers a thought experiment where a scientist, Mary, try to know 
the visual experiences. Mary was born and brought up in the circumstance where 
everything is black or white. She has a proper perceptual system to perceive colours, but 
she has not seen coloured things in all her life. She is a scientist and has all physical and 
physiological knowledge concerning colour perception. The only thing she lacks about 
colour perception is an experience of seeing colours. She has all knowledge on physical 
and functional facts about seeing coloured things. However, if she gets out of the black 
and white circumstance and sees coloured things, it seems that she will get new 
knowledge about colour perception, that is, what it is like to see coloured things. It 
seems that the knowledge she gets when she sees, say, a red thing, is something she 
cannot get until she, in fact, sees a red thing. This seems to show, as Jackson insists it, 
that there is non-physical knowledge that cannot be reduced to the physical one. 
Jackson calls this argument the knowledge argument. The argument can be formulated 
as follows:151 
 
(1) Physicalism (FJ): Every knowledge is physical knowledge. 
(2) Before released from black-and-white room, Mary has all the knowledge about 
human visual system. 
(3) When she is released and she sees a red thing, she gets new knowledge. 
(4) Therefore, what she gets is not physical knowledge. 
(5) Therefore, there is knowledge other than physical knowledge, and Physicalism 
(FJ) is false. 
 
 Now we have to notice, first, that Physicalism (FJ) should be a form of 
epistemological physicalism, not metaphysical physicalism. Compare with the 
following formulation: 
 
Physicalism (Metaphysical): Every fact is physical fact. 
 
It might seem, then, that the knowledge argument concerns only epistemological 
                                                
151 Ibid. 
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problem and it has nothing to do with metaphysical matters which we are interested in 
throughout this thesis. But it is not so obvious. 
 Let us ask, here, what sort of knowledge Mary lacks according to the argument. 
The knowledge argument presupposes that Mary can know all the physical and 
functional facts about perceptual experiences. This means that Mary would know all 
perceptual facts which is expressed by ordinary propositions; let us say that Mary has 
all the ‘propositional knowledge’. For example, Mary knows that ‘red induces 
excitation on the subject of the experience’, because the excitation of the perceptual 
subject and the process of inducement of excitation can be understood as objective 
physical states – appropriate functions. The knowledge that Mary lacks, then, would be 
something like what can only be expressed, very vaguely, ‘To be a bat is such and such’. 
Or it should be said that ‘to be a bat is such and such’ is not propositional knowledge at 
all, but it should be a ‘non-propositional knowledge’. Now, some proponents of the 
knowledge argument might insist that the reason why Mary cannot have 
non-propositional knowledge, is because there exists knowledge about non-physical 
facts. Being put in this way, the knowledge argument, based on an epistemological 
formulation of physicalism – Physicalism (FJ) – might have metaphysical implications 
or consequences. We will get back to this problem, later, when we discuss ‘Reply from 
Different Ways of Knowing’. 
 Also, even if we take the representation theory of consciousness and we 
understand all physical and functional facts about consciousness, it seems that we still 
cannot clearly understand how it is for Mary to see red things. At least in this respect, 
we need to give some explanation of the knowledge argument. 
 So, how can we reply to the knowledge argument? The argument is obviously 
valid, therefore we must ask either 
(a) Are premises true? 
or 
(b) Even if the argument is correct, does the knowledge argument implies something 
about metaphysical physicalism?  
I will take up, at first, a reply which questions (a) – The Ability Hypothesis. Then I will 
take up a reply which questions (b) – Reply from Different Ways of Knowing.  
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The Ability Hypothesis 
 
The first reply questions premise (3) in the argument. It insists that what Mary gets in 
(3) is not propositional knowledge (knowledge about facts) but an ability to perceive 
red or other colours. As Ryle emphasized it, we can distinguish two kinds of 
knowledge: the knowledge of ‘know that’ and of ‘know how’. Consider a man who 
knows every physical fact about a bicycle but cannot ride on it. Even though he knows 
the mechanism of a bicycle and how the energy produced by a foot is transmitted from 
the pedal to the wheel, he cannot ride on a bicycle. In this case he has much knowledge 
of ‘know that’ but does not have the knowledge of ‘know how’. In other words, he does 
not have an ability to ride on a bicycle. 
 Some philosophers argue that the knowledge argument confuses these two kinds 
of knowledge. When Mary is released from the black and white room and sees a red 
thing for the first time, what she acquires is not the knowledge about the non-physical 
facts, but an ability to recognize the experience of seeing a red thing. This is ‘know 
how’. Before she gets out of the room, she cannot remember the experience of seeing a 
red thing (as she doesn’t have the experience yet). When she gets out of the room and 
sees a red thing for the first time, she still cannot identify this experience she is having 
with the experience of seeing a red thing until she is told that it is. After she gets out of 
the room, sees a red thing, and is told that what she is looking at is a red thing, she can 
recognize the experience and remember the experience later. She can also distinguish 
the experience of seeing a red thing with the experience of seeing a green thing. It is not 
a mystery that she does not have these abilities before she gets out of the room and 
acquires them when she has the experience of seeing a red thing and others. She does 
not acquire the knowledge of non-physical facts about the world.152 
 At this point, a proponent of the knowledge argument might respond like this. 
We could admit that Mary gets an ability, or ‘know-how’ knowledge, in (3). But the 
fact that one gets an ability does not exclude the possibility that one gets a propositional 
knowledge as well. In this case, Mary certainly gets an ability, but we can still insist 
that Mary gets a propositional knowledge of seeing a red thing as well. To this, a 
                                                
152 See, for example, Laurence Nemirow, ‘Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of 
Acquaintance’, in Lycan ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader, 1990; David Lewis, ‘What 
Experience Teaches’, 1988. 
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proponent of Ability Hypothesis (i.e. physicalists) can ask: what kind of propositional 
knowledge does Mary gets, then? It should be something like ‘a red thing appears to me 
such and such (or like this)’. This shouldn’t seem to be an ordinary propositional 
knowledge as it contains indexicals, such as ‘such and such’ or ‘this’. The proponent of 
the knowledge argument would might respond: that the proposition includes indexicals 
is exactly the character of non-physical knowledge. At this state, the debates seem to 
come very close to metaphysical arena. 
 There are other problems with Ability Hypothesis. Why is it that Mary cannot 
acquire the abilities without having the experiences? Why does she need some 
experience in order to acquire the abilities? If the reason why she needs the experience 
is that non-physical properties of the experience play some crucial roles, then the 
Ability Hypothesis turns out to be inadequate for a defence of physicalism. The 
proponents of the ability hypothesis must explain the need of the experience in a 
physicalistic framework. I will get back to this point later, when we discuss a reply from 
the representation theory. 
 Although, as I see it, Ability Hypothesis is on the right track, there are many 
problems to be solved. And as I see it, the representation theory of consciousness gives 
us a better explanation on this. 
 
Reply from ‘Different Ways of Knowing’ 
 
As indicated in the previous section, the knowledge argument might have metaphysical 
consequences, if the existence of non-physical knowledge (non-propositional 
knowledge) implies the existence of non-physical facts. Many advocates of the 
knowledge argument seem to take this way. This is because, so it seems, they 
presuppose that for each fact, there is just one way of knowing it. If this is true, then we 
easily infer that there are two kinds of facts, physical facts and non-physical facts fromt 
the fact that there seem to be two kinds of knowledge. 
 Paul Churchland, however, denies this. As he sees it, there are two ways of 
knowing a single fact. And for Chrchland there are only physical facts. He accepts the 
functionalist view on conscious experiences and takes it that the conscious experiences 
are nothing over and above the functional states that are realized by the brain states. He 
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argues that we can know the brain states in two ways. On the one hand, we can know 
the brain states by scientifically observing the brain. On the other hand, we can know 
the brain states by introspection as well. Suppose one sees a red thing at time t. That 
person’s brain state at t can be known by scientifically observing that person’s brain. It 
is also known to that person when he/she introspects his/her own mental state at t and 
recognizes that he/she is then seeing a red thing. The former way of knowing is 
available to Mary, but the latter way of knowing is not available to Mary. As 
Churchland sees it, when Mary goes out of the black and white room and gets to know 
what it is like to see a red thing, what she acquires is not knowledge of a non-physical 
fact but a way of knowing what she already knew.153 
 Is this reply to the knowledge argument persuasive? I don’t think so. The main 
reason for this, as I see it, is that Churchland’s reply is not compatible with the 
representation theory of consciousness. Churchland’s reply has it that the knowledge 
that Mary acquires when she first has the experience of seeing a coloured object, is the 
knowledge about her own brain state. If the representation theory of consciousness is 
true, all the properties that we have when we experience something are the properties of 
the intentional objects. Therefore, all the knowledge that we acquire when we have 
some experiences should be the knowledge about the intentional objects of the 
experiences, not the knowledge about the brain states. The representation theory of 
consciousness, then, has it that Mary discovers some new facts about the world when 
she first has the experience of seeing coloured things, whereas Churchland’s view has it 
that Mary just uses a new way of knowing the old facts. This incompatibility itself does 
not refute the replies by Churchland, but we can at least say that if one wants to reply to 
the knowledge argument in the way Churchland does, one needs to offer a theory of 
consciousness as persuasive as the representation theory of consciousness. 
 
  
A Reply from the Representation Theory of Consciousness 
 
According to the representation theory of consciousness, when one has an experience, 
                                                
153 See, for example, Paul Churchland, ‘Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection 
of Brain States’, Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985, p.8-28. 
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what she sees in the experience is not the experience itself but the intentional objects 
and their properties that the experience represents. That is to say, she does not see her 
inner mental states but the world outside her. Therefore, as the representation theory of 
consciousness has it, what Mary acquires when she is released from the black and white 
room is not knowledge about her own experience, but knowledge about the world that 
her experience represents. Mary has all the knowledge about the colour perception but 
she still lacks some knowledge or information about the world before she is released 
from the room. It is true that she may know that the apple on the table in the normal 
room next to her black and white room is red by listening to someone talking on the 
telephone or by reading a note describing the normal room. But if she perceives the 
apple in the normal room, she will know a new knowledge or information about the 
redness. She will acquire a kind of knowledge which she cannot acquire by linguistic or 
conceptual ways. This should be non-propositional knowledge or non-conceptual 
knowledge. 
 What Mary acquires is not just non-conceptual knowledge, however. Before 
Mary gets out of the room, she can use the word ‘red’ in some proper ways, for she 
learned the meaning of the word ‘red’ by reading books or having talks on it. But she 
cannot apply the word ‘red’ to her own experience. When she gets out of the room, sees 
a red thing directly by her eyes, and is told that what she is looking at is a red thing, she 
acquires the non-conceptual knowledge and the knowledge about the connection 
between the non-conceptual knowledge and the conceptual knowledge as well: she will 
be able to get a conceptual knowledge that the book on the floor is also red by a 
perceptual experience of seeing a red book on the floor. 
 Remember the problem that worried the ability hypothesis. The ability 
hypothesis does not offer an explanation of how Mary can acquire the abilities to 
recognize and remember the experiences. The representation theory of consciousness 
offers an explanation: Mary acquires these abilities by acquiring the non-conceptual 
knowledge and the knowledge about the connection between the conceptual knowledge 
and the non-conceptual knowledge.154 
 
                                                
154 Thanks to Suzuki (2004) for suggesting this. 
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１０-３	 How to Analyze Intentionality in a Physicalistic Framework 
 
So far, I defended the representation theory of consciousness and qualia. According to 
the representation theory, the fact that our conscious experiences have qualia is 
explained as follows: a conscious experience is a mental state possessed by a particular 
in a subject; the mental state is a representation; qualia are the properties of the 
represented objects (the intentional objects). Although the representation theory has 
some problems of its own to be solved, I advocate the theory as an appealing option. 
The main reason for my advocate is that we have a prospect of explaining intentionality 
within a physicalistic framework. In this section, I will deal with the problem of 
understanding intentionality within a physicalistic framework. 
When we perceive, believe, image, expect, or remember, our minds are directed 
to something. Pictures or linguistic expressions are also directed to something – 
something that they mean. The property of being directed to something is called 
intentionality. At this state, we can presuppose that ‘something’ could be any 
metaphysical items: substances, properties, events, facts, and so on. When one sees an 
apple, one’s perception is directed to the apple; when one believes that the apple is sour, 
one’s belief is directed to the fact that the apple is sour. Also, ‘something’ does not have 
to exist or obtain; one might fear a ghost even if it does not exist; one might believe that 
the earth is flat even if the fact does not obtain in the actual world. 
 When we want to keep a physicalistic worldview and accommodate the 
intentionality therein, we face some difficulties. First of all, intentional objects are 
sometimes non-existent, or at least non-actual as stated above. How can a mere physical 
thing be directed to something non-existent or non-actual? Some philosophers think that 
the ultimate physical properties won’t include intentionality as a brute property. Jerry 
Fodor says as follows: 
 
I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they’ve been 
compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the 
likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear upon their list. But aboutness 
surely won’t; intentionality simply doesn’t go that deep. It’s hard to see, in face of 
this consideration, how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, 
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to some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real 
properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe of their 
supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. 
(Fodor, Psychosemantics, p.97) 
 
This quite well shows a motivation for physicalists to look for a physicalistic 
understanding of intentionality and a possible strategy such physicalists could take. If a 
physicalist doesn’t want to deny the reality of intentionality, it would be a pressing 
problem for her to accommodate intentionality, in some way or other, in a physical 
framework. 
There are, roughly speaking, three approaches to the reductive explanation of 
intentionality in a physicalistic framework: causal approach, functional approach, and 
teleological approach. In the following I will briefly review those approaches and show 
that teleological approach is the most prospective, although, as will be insisted at the 
end of this chapter, the three approaches might cope with each other within a 
physicalistic understanding of intentionality. 
 
The Causal Approach 
 
First, let us see the causal approach. This approach, advocated by the philosophers such 
as J. Fodor and F. Dretske, relies on causal correlations (in some sense) between 
representations and represented objects. Noticing an ordinary fact that a perception of, 
say, a duck is caused by the duck, this approach insists that mental states represents 
what cause those representations. Thus, it is formulated as follows: 
 
(1) X represents Y if and only if Y causes X. 
 
This is the crudest version of the causal approach. Being crude, it immediately faces 
some problems. When a mental state represents a duck, the representation (call it 
D-representation) does not have to be caused by a duck: a rabbit could produce a 
representation about a duck. Also, even if a representation is caused by a duck, it might 
not be a representation about a duck: the mental state might represent a rabbit. 
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 A more elaborated version of this approach is as follows: 
 
(2) X represents Y if and only if the occurrence of X is causally dependent on Y. 
 
However, even if elaborated like this, the causal approach does not completely 
overcome the problems. First, some representations can represent something that does 
not have any causal relation with the representations. For example, we can think about 
non-existent objects (i.e. we can have a representation that is directed to non-existent 
objects) such as unicorns and Sherlock Holmes, and it is obvious that non-existent 
objects do not cause (or are caused by) physical objects: non-existent objects cannot 
have any causal relation with anything. We can also think about mathematical entities, 
and it is not clear at all how mathematical entities enter into causal relations with 
physical objects. 
 Furthermore, and more importantly, there is another very serious problem – the 
problem of error. (2) insists that X being causally dependent on Y is necessary and 
sufficient for X representing Y. Suppose, first, causal dependence is necessary for 
representation. Then X could not represent Y when Y does not exist. Therefore, it is not 
possible that one misrepresents a duck. Suppose, next, that causal dependency is 
sufficient for representation. Then X would represent anything on which X is causally 
dependent. Therefore, D-representation in the first paragraph of this section would 
represent a disjunctive content, ‘rabbit or duck’. In any case, we cannot explain the 
possibility of error in representation. 
 
The Functional Approach 
 
The functional approach applies functionalism, a popular view in the philosophy of 
mind, to intentionality. According to the functionalism in the philosophy of mind, a 
mental state of a subject is determined by a pattern of the causal connections the mental 
state has with sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and other mental states of the subject. 
The functional approach expands this analysis to contents of mental states. It, thus, 
insists that a pattern of the causal connections a mental state has with other mental or 
physical states determines not only the mental state but also a content of the mental 
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state. In the case of contents, ‘the causal connections’ is interpreted wider: it includes 
not only ordinary physical connections but also inferential connections. In this way, the 
functional approach tries to analyse intentionality by means of functions.155 
 Sadly, though, the functional approach faces virtually the same problem as the 
causal approach faces – the problem of error. This is because a pattern of the causal 
connections of a mental state of a subject includes only inferences that the subject in 
fact does. Therefore, the pattern cannot capture inferences that the subject should do. 
 The problem of error shows that intentionality has a normative aspect. A mental 
state that represents a duck (D-representation) is not merely caused by a duck; 
D-representation is rather a state that should represent a duck. If D-representation is 
caused by something other than a duck, there occurs an error: D-representation 
misrepresents a duck. The normativity cannot be captured by mere causal correlations. 
Even if we introduce the concept of ‘ideal conditions’ and try to specify the causal 
correlations which determine the representation relation, it is not very clear if we can 
explain what is ideal condition without relying on normativity. 
 
The Teleological Approach 
 
Can we explain the normative aspect of representation in a physicalistic framework? 
The teleological approach is prospective in this respect. 
 This approach takes notice of the biological organs. The biological organs of 
living organisms, such as hearts and lungs have a particular function that fits the 
purpose of those organisms’ survival or reproduction. The long neck of a giraffe fits the 
purpose of the giraffe’ nibbling leaves on high branches, thereby contributes to the 
giraffe’s survival and reproduction in the circumstances where many trees are high. 
Lungs have a function of bringing oxygen in, thereby make it possible that our body 
combust nutrition; in this way, the function of our lungs fit the purpose of our survival 
and reproduction. 
 The biological organs, thus, have a function that fits the purpose of the 
possessors’ survival and reproduction. What is more, the living organisms have been 
naturally selected in virtue of their having those functions. These functions are usually 
                                                
155 See for example, Block (1986) for this approach. 
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called teleological function or, as R. G. Millikan calls them, proper function. 
 The teleological approach for mental representations has it that mental 
representations have a kind of teleological functions. Biological organs have their own 
biological functions and how a biological organ works is explained by a biological 
function of the organ. In the same manner, how a mental state represents is explained by 
a biological function of the mental state. 
 A distinct advantage of the teleological approach, compared with the first two 
approaches, is that the teleological approach has a prospect to explain the normative 
aspect of intentionality: proper functions are considered to have normative character. A 
proper function is determined not by what the possessor of the proper function in fact 
does (or is disposed to do), but by what it should do for the possessor to survive and 
reproduce itself. For example, even though almost all sperms fail to be inseminated with 
ova, sperms’ proper function is still to be inseminated with ova. Even if an animal’s 
heart might be disabled and cannot pump blood properly, the proper function of the 
heart is still to pump blood.  
 So if we analyse mental representations and intentionality by means of 
biological functions, then we might be able to accommodate intentionality (especially 
its normative character) within a physicalistic world view, as we obviously have 
physicalistic explanation of biological functions. There is, however, one stumbling 
block. Although mental states can be considered to have some functions that contribute 
to the subject’s survival and reproduction, those functions are not always the function in 
virtue of which the organisms have been naturally selected. For example, a belief that 
there is a snake causes the behaviour of escaping from the snake, and thereby 
contributes to the survival of the subject. But this belief itself is not passed down from 
generation to generation. What is passed down is not a mental state itself, but a 
mechanism that produces and uses this mental state. The belief-producing-mechanism 
produces, for example, a belief that there is a snake in case there is a snake ahead and a 
belief that there is an apple in case there is an apple in front of the subject, thereby 
contributes to the subject’s survival and has been naturally selected: it contributes to the 
subject’s survival by producing the appropriate beliefs according to the various 
environments. The belief-using-mechanism uses a thus produced belief to conduct 
practical reasoning and bring about the appropriate behaviours, thereby contributes to 
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the subject’s survival and has been selected. In this way, belief-producing-mechanisms 
and belief-using-mechanisms have teleological functions. A particular belief itself, on 
the other hand, does not have teleological functions, as it is not naturally selected in the 
history of evolution. Although beliefs themselves do not have teleological functions, 
they can have a kind of functions that derive from genuine teleological functions. The 
teleological function of the whole mechanism, the combination of 
belief-producing-mechanism and belief-using-mechanism, is to produce a belief P and 
to use P in order to conduct practical reasoning and bring about the appropriate 
behaviours in case of P. In this case, we can say that P has a kind of teleological 
function derivatively. Millikan calls the former type of function a direct proper 
(teleological) function and the latter a derived proper (teleological) function.156 
 
Proper Function and the Normativity of Intentionality 
 
Let us see Millikan’s definition of proper function in detail. A device or an item of a 
system (an organism) has a (direct) proper function as a member of a special kind of 
family that she calls a ‘reproductively established family’. A (direct) proper function is 
defined as follows. Where m is a member of a reproductively established family R and 
R has the reproductively established character C, m has the function F as a direct proper 
function if and only if: 
 
(1) Certain ancestors of m performed F. 
(2) In part because there existed a direct causal connection between having the 
character C and performance of the function F in the case of these ancestors of m, C 
correlated positively with F over a certain set of items S which included these 
ancestors and other things not having C. 
(3) One among the legitimate explanations that can be given of the fact that m exists 
makes reference to the fact that C correlated positively with F over S, either directly 
causing reproduction of m or explaining why R was proliferated and hence why m 
exists.157 
                                                
156 Millikan (1984), p.41. 
157 Millikan (1983), p.28. 
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An example would make it easy for us to grasp the idea. Your heart has a function of 
pumping blood. Your ancestors’ hearts had the pumping blood function in the past, and 
the pumping blood function had positive effects for survival and reproduction of the 
ancestors in the history of evolution. This is why you have your heart now. In this case, 
the function of pumping blood is a proper function. 
 Notice that all three conditions (1)-(3) refer to the past facts. (1) requires that 
your ancestors’ hearts pumped blood in their bodies. (3) requires that the existence of 
your heart is explained by the historical fact that the family was naturally selected in 
virtue of the correlation between the constitution of the human hearts and the function. 
Notice also that the character which plays the function (constitution of ancestors’ 
hearts) might not be the same as the character the device in fact has (constitution of, say, 
your heart). Your heart might lack the character of accomplishing blood pumping and 
still it has the function of blood pumping: this is the case that a device with a function 
fails to accomplish the function. A proper function depends not on the property of the 
device, but on the history of the family where the device belongs. Although a heart 
produces sound of pulses, producing the sound of pulses has nothing to do with the 
history of the heart being naturally selected. Therefore it is not to be regarded as a 
proper function of the heart. Thus we can say that a proper function is determined not 
by what the device in fact does, but by what it should do (or what it is designed to do). 
In this way, Millikan explains the normativity by referring to the history. 
 
More about Teleological Approach 
 
Teleological functionalism insists that the normativity of representations is captured 
from a viewpoint of biological functions. However, as Millikan emphasizes it, the mere 
insistence that what a mental representation represents is determined by what the metal 
representation has a function to represent, is quite vague unless we have a theory of 
mental representation.158 There are two possible ways to take concerning theories of 
mental representation within teleological functionalism. In this section, I will examine 
                                                
158 See Millikan, 1989, ‘Biosemantics’, reprinted in her White Queen Psychology and 
Other Essays for Alice, p.84. 
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them. 
 Let us see an example by Dretske. Dretske says: 
 
Some marine bacteria have internal magnets (called magnetosomes) that function like 
compass needles, aligning themselves (and as a result, the bacteria) parallel to the 
earth’s magnetic field. Since these magnetic lines incline downwards (towards 
geomagnetic north) in the northern hemisphere (upwards in the southern hemisphere), 
bacteria in the northern hemisphere … propel themselves towards geomagnetic north. 
The survival value of magnetotaxis (as this sensory mechanism called) is not obvious, 
but it is reasonable to suppose that it functions so as to enable the bacteria to avoid 
surface water. Since these organisms are capable of living only in the absence of 
oxygen, movement towards geomagnetic north will take the bacteria away from 
oxygen-rich surface water and towards the comparatively oxygen-free sediment at the 
bottom.159 
 
The problem is what the direction of internal magnets represents. Does the direction of 
internal magnets represents ‘the geometric north’ (the direction of earth’s magnetic 
field)? Or does it represent ‘the absence of oxygen’? Dretske takes the first option.160 
Dretske basically takes a version of the causal approach for representations. He insists 
that there must be causal connections, in some way or other, between representations 
and intentional objects. And he relies on teleological functions just for explaining the 
normative aspect of representations. His theory being based on the causal connections 
between representations and intentional objects, Dretske insists that contents of 
representations are determined by the causes of the representations. The cause of the 
movement of internal magnets of the marine bacteria is the earth’s magnetic field, 
therefore, the direction of the internal magnets of the marine bacteria represents the 
geomagnetic north. Just as a length of mercurial column in a thermometer indicates the 
temperature of the environment, so the direction of the internal magnets indicates the 
geomagnetic north of the environment. 
 On the other hand, some advocates of the teleological approach such as Millikan, 
                                                
159 Dretske (1986) p.26. 
160 Other than Dretske (1986), see, for example, Neander (1995) for an approach to this 
direction. 
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Papineau, Elder, and Price, take the second option.161 They take it that not only causes 
but also effects of representations concern the contents of the representations. The 
internal magnets are directed to the geomagnetic north, and thereby are directed to the 
absence of oxygen, which is crucial to their lives. Thus, the function of their internal 
magnets should be to move themselves towards the absence of oxygen. And the internal 
magnets represent absence of oxygen. If the function of the internal magnets is to 
indicate the geomagnetic north, then we cannot understand why they have such 
function. 
 As Millikan sees it, when a representation represents something, there must exist 
a user (or a consumer in Millikan’s terminology) of the representation.162 That is to say, 
Millikan states the following as a necessary condition for intentionality: 
 
[Necessary Condition for Intentionality (NCI)]: For a mechanism to be 
representational, it is necessary that the mechanism has a function to control the 
consumer of the mechanism in the way that the consumer’s behaviours conform to 
the condition in the environment. 
 
As to the marine bacteria, their propulsion unit (i.e. ciliation) is a consumer of the 
internal magnets. If the internal magnet has a function to control the propulsion unit in 
the way that the unit moves the bacteria to the absence of oxygen, then the internal 
magnet is qualified as a representational mechanism. Thinking in this way, we cay say 
that the content of the representation (the internal magnet) concerns the absence of 
oxygen, not the geomagnetic north. That is because for the behaviour of the consumer 
(the propulsion unit) to be optimum, it is necessary that the direction of the internal 
magnets corresponds to the absence of oxygen. The internal magnets contribute to the 
survival of the bacteria because the direction that they point to corresponds to the 
absence of oxygen, and thereby the internal magnets have a proper function of 
controlling the propulsion unit in that way. 
 Now let us see how Millikan’s teleological approach can explain the normativity 
of representations. The first point to be noticed is the introduction of proper functions 
                                                
161 Cf. Papineau (1993), Elder (1998), and Price (2001). 
162 Millikan (1993), p.88. 
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and the definition of proper functions refers both to organisms which can reproduce 
themselves and to the history of organisms’ reproduction. If there is anything normative 
in a physical world, the most probable candidate should be a ‘success’ of reproduction 
of organisms. I cannot even imagine what other option we have. We will get back to 
this later in this chapter.   
 The second point to be noticed is the introduction of consumer. As Price 
pointing out, the introduction of consumer mechanism gives us the source to explain the 
problem of error.163 If we consider only two kinds of items, representations on one 
hand, and intentional objects on the other hand, then it is very difficult to say something 
is right or something is wrong; there is less possibility that errors occur. Adding 
consumers to representations and intentional objects, there come to be communication 
between representations and consumers; therefore, representations are considered to 
convey some information. If they can convey information, they can convey erroneous 
information as well. Thus, in Dretske’s view, the bacteria that are taken out to the 
presence of oxygen (danger zone) by a bar-magnet are not ‘deceived’, whereas, in 
Millikan’s view, they are certainly ‘deceived’. This is certainly an advantage of 
Millikan’s view.164  
 
The Problem of the Indeterminacy of Content 
 
In general, when one tries to explain the content of an intentional state by the function 
of that intentional state, one often faces the problem that the content is not uniquely 
fixed because the function is not uniquely fixed. The advocates of teleological approach 
insist that if we use teleological functions, not functions tout court, to explain 
intentionality, we will not be bothered about the indeterminacy of content, and this is 
the advantage of this approach compared with the other approaches. However, there has 
been offered some cases where even teleological functions seem not to be fixed 
uniquely. In this section, I will examine the objection of this kind to the teleological 
approach and see if the teleological approach can overcome the objection. 
 Consider the predatory activities of frogs. When frogs see small flying insects, 
                                                
163 Price (2001), p.77. 
164 I am helped in this paragraph by Price (2001) and Maeda (2004). 
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they stick out their tongues and catch small insects to eat them. However, it is not only 
small insects that cause frogs to stick out their tongues and catch them: it is observed 
that when frogs see something small and blackish (for example, a small piece of 
blackish plastic) moving quickly, they stick out their tongues and try to catch them. 
Now, given a moving small blackish object, a frog’s neural mechanism forms a neural 
state N. The neural state N, with other necessary conditions, causes the frog to stick out 
its tongue. What, then, does N represent? Does it represent that there is a small insect 
flying ahead? Or does it represent that there is a moving small blackish piece in ahead? 
Or both? 
 Our intuition seems to insist the first option. The neural state N represents that 
there is a small insect flying ahead. If there is indeed a small insect flying in front of a 
frog, the frog’s neural state N rightly represents the insect and leads the frog to 
successful actions (e.g. catching the insect and eating it). If there is, instead, a small 
black piece flying in front of the frog, N wrongly represents the piece as an insect and 
leads the frog to unsuccessful actions. Therefore, we would like to say that N represents 
that there is a flying insect: if N is indeed produced by an insect, N represents rightly; if 
N is produced by a small black piece, N represents wrongly. 
 Despite our intuition, however, the neural mechanism of the frogs is such that 
the neural state N can be produced when there is a small black piece flying in front of 
the subject; the frogs’ neural mechanism is not such that N is produced only when there 
is a flying insect in front – it is not so precise. Therefore, even if N is produced by a 
small black piece, it does not mean that there is something wrong with the frog’s neural 
mechanism. Even in this case, the frog’s neural mechanism does not malfunction; it 
works properly. If so, doesn’t N represent that there is a moving small black piece? 
 Although, intuitively, N seems to represent that there is a flying insect in front, 
the frog’s N-producing-mechanism seems to suggest that N represents that there is a 
moving small black piece in front. Which content does N represent? The teleological 
approach insists that if we introduce teleological functions, we can fix the content of the 
representation in accordance with our intuitions. As the teleological approach has it, it is 
important to distinguish two mechanisms: a mechanism which produces a 
representation and a mechanism which uses (‘consumes’ to use Millikan’s terminology) 
a representation. In frogs’ case, we can think of the former as the frog’s perceptual 
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mechanism, and the latter as the frog’s motion mechanism. 
 On the one hand, the motion mechanism of the frog uses the representation N 
and makes the frog to stick out its tongue and try to catch the objects. The motion 
mechanism has contributed, in the biological history of frogs, to the survival and 
reproduction of the frogs, and the teleological function of the frog’s motion mechanism 
is to make frogs to stick out their tongues and catch a flying ‘insect’: for it does not 
contribute to the survival or reproduction of frogs at all to make frogs to catch a moving 
piece of plastic. On the other hand, as to the frog’s perceptual mechanism, its 
teleological function is to support the motion mechanism to conduct the teleological 
function of the motion mechanism. The frog’s perceptual mechanism supports the 
frog’s motion mechanism by producing a neural state N. In order to support the motion 
mechanism properly, the perceptual mechanism must produce N when there is a flying 
insect in front of the subject. If the perceptual mechanism produces N when there is a 
moving piece of plastic, it does not have the teleological function of supporting the 
motion mechanism to conduct its own function of making the frog to catch an insect. 
Therefore, if the perceptual mechanism of the frog has a teleological function at all, the 
teleological function must be to produce N when there is a flying ‘insect’ in front of the 
subject. 
 Now, N itself has a derived teleological function. The derived teleological 
function of N is to be produced when there is an insect flying in front and to control the 
frog’s behaviours. Therefore, we can say that N represents not that there is a moving 
small black piece but that there is a flying insect. 
 In this way, the teleological approach seems to solve the problem of 
indeterminacy of content quite well. Jerry Fodor, however, argues that even if we 
introduce teleological functions, mental contents are not uniquely fixed because 
teleological functions themselves are not uniquely fixed. Fodor insists that we could 
attribute a teleological function to an organ in a different way than Millikan does. 
Millikan insists that the teleological function of the frog’s motion mechanism is to lead 
frogs to catch a flying insect and eat it. But if frogs inhabit in a normal environment, the 
environment should be such that all the moving, small and black objects are, in fact, 
flying insects. Therefore, in the normal environment, to catch a moving small black 
piece should be nothing but to catch small insects. Then we can say that the frogs’ 
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motion mechanism contributes to the frog’s survival and reproduction by leading the 
frog to catch a moving small black piece. We can also say that the function of the frogs’ 
perceptual mechanism is to produce N when there is a moving small black piece. In this 
way, therefore, we would be able to say that N represents that there is a moving small 
black piece in front.165 
 What exactly is at issue here? If the environment where the frogs have been 
developed so far in their biological history is the environment where there exist moving 
small black pieces which are not flying insects, then the teleological functions of frogs’ 
motion mechanism and perceptual mechanism should be about flying insects (not 
moving small pieces in general), because the moving mechanism and the perceptual 
mechanism have been naturally selected not because they perceive and react moving 
small black pieces in general, but because they perceive and react a more specific subset 
of moving small black pieces, flying insects. However, what Fordor has in mind 
shouldn’t be like this. What if the frogs have been developed in the environment where 
there are no moving small black pieces other than flying insects? That is to say, what if 
the extension of a set of moving small black pieces and a set of flying insects are 
exactly the same with each other. If this is the case, the teleological function of frogs’ 
motion mechanism and perceptual mechanism would be not only about flying insects 
but also about moving small black pieces. If all moving small black pieces are insects, 
then to make frogs catch and eat moving small black pieces is nothing but to make frogs 
catch and eat flying insects. If to make frogs to catch and eat flying insects contribute to 
the frogs’ survival and reproduction, then to make frogs to catch and eat moving small 
black pieces also contribute to the frogs’ survival and reproduction. Therefore, if to 
make frogs catch and eat flying insects is the teleological function of the motion 
mechanism, then to make frogs catch and eat moving small black pieces is also the 
teleological function of the motion mechanism. In exactly the same way, to produce N 
when there are moving small black pieces is nothing but to produce N when there are 
flying insects. Therefore, if to produce N when there are moving small black pieces is 
the teleological function of the perceptual mechanism, then to produce N when there are 
moving small black pieces is also the teleological function of the perceptual mechanism. 
In sum, it seems to be concluded that even if we introduce teleological functions, N can 
                                                
165 Cf. Fodor (1990) pp.69-77. 
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be interpreted not only as representing that there are flying insects but also as 
representing that there are moving small black pieces: the content of N is not 
determined. Intuitively, however, the content of N seems to be fixed even in this case. 
This should be what Fodor intends to point out. 
 C. L. Elder tries to solve this problem by noticing the intensional character of 
causal explanation166. The argument is as follows. There is a well-known fact that the 
causal explanations form intensional contexts. As Donald Davidson insists it, the 
context ‘c causes e’ is usually considered to be extensional. Consider a sentence 
expressing a causal relation, ‘The storm caused the falling of the oak tree’. If ‘the storm’ 
and ‘the event reported on the newspaper’ refer to the same event, then substituting ‘the 
storm’ with ‘the even reported on today’s news paper’ does not change the truth value 
of the sentence. The sentences expressing causal relations form extensional context. On 
the other hand, the sentences expressing causal explanations form intentional context. 
Consider a sentence expressing causal explanation, ‘The storm causally explains the 
falling of the oak tree’. If we substitute ‘the storm’ with ‘the event reported on the 
newspaper’, then the truth value of the sentence changes from true to false. Now, the 
fact that a frog catches a flying insect causally explains the fact that the frog takes the 
nutrition. However, although ‘a flying insect’ and ‘a moving small black piece’ have the 
same extension, the fact that a moving small black piece does not causally explain the 
fact that the frog takes the nutrition. This is the reason why catching a flying insect is 
the teleological function of the motion mechanism of the frog, whereas catching a 
moving small black piece is not.  
 One might insist, however, that appealing to the intensional character of causal 
explanations is not appropriate. ‘A flying insect’ and ‘a moving small black piece’ have 
the same extension in the actual environment where frog’s have been developed. And in 
this actual environment that a frog’s catching a moving small black piece does explain 
the frog’s taking nutrition in this environment. Confining the situations to the 
environment that the frogs in fact have been developed, there obtains a causal law that if 
a frog catches a moving small black piece, the frog takes nutrition. It is, of course, 
possible that the environment that the frogs have been developed is the environment 
where the moving black small pieces are not always insects, and in this possible 
                                                
166 See Elder (1998). 
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environment the causal law does not obtain. However, as long as we consider the 
teleological functions of the frog’s motion mechanism and perceptual mechanism, we 
should exclude these possibilities. If we are concerned with the possible 
(counterfactual) teleological functions of the frogs, then the possibility matters. As we 
are concerned with the actual teleological functions of the actual frogs, what matters is 
the environment that the frogs have actually been developed in their actual biological 
history. We are now supposing that the environment where the frogs have actually been 
developed is such that the extension of ‘moving, small, and black pieces’ and the 
extension of ‘flying insects’ are identical with each other. As long as we confine the 
environment to this one, the law ‘if a frog catches a moving small black piece, the frog 
takes nutrition’ obtains in this situation. If this law obtains, then the frog’s catching a 
moving small black piece causally explain the frog’s taking nutrition. And we can 
regard making frogs to catch a moving small black piece as the teleological function of 
the frog’s motion mechanism. Therefore, appealing to the intensional character of 
causal explanations does not solve the problem of indeterminacy. Appealing to the 
intensional character is to appeal to a counterfactual environment, but the facts in those 
counterfactual environments do not matter the problem about the teleological functions 
in the actual environment.167 Fodor offers an example that might support this point.168 
Consider the brightly coloured fish that are found in sunless ocean deeps. The bright 
colour of the fish might have some functions advantageous to their survival and 
reproduction if their environment were lit up. However, the bright colour does not have 
such functions in the environment where they actually inhabit, ocean deeps. What 
teleological function an organ has is determined by in what environment it has actually 
been developed and how it has actually contributed to the owner’s survival and 
reproduction. What function it has in counterfactual environments doesn’t matter at all. 
One might attack Millikan and Elder in this way. 
 Is this objection conclusive? It is true that teleological functions of an object 
should be functions in the actual world, not in other possible worlds. The teleological 
functions of frogs’ perceptual mechanism and motion mechanism should be those in the 
actual world where the extension of ‘a flying insect’ and ‘a moving small black piece’ 
                                                
167 Thanks to Nobuhara (1999) for pointing out this objection. 
168 See Fodor (1990). 
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are the same. However, in order to specify actual functions, we need to consider 
possible situation. Even if ‘X’ and ‘Y’ have exactly the same extension in the actual 
world, that does not immediately mean that ‘A causes X’ and ‘A causes Y’ have the 
same status as causal statement. Suppose every instance of X are followed by every 
instance of A, and, also, every instance of Y are followed by every instance of A. 
Suppose, however, that not every instance of Y are followed by every instance of A 
whereas every instance of X are followed by every instance of A in a possible world W’ 
(suppose W’ shares all the natural laws with our actual world). In this case, we have to 
conclude that ‘A causes X’ is true, but ‘A causes Y’ is false in the actual world. The 
point is, if a causal connection obtains or not cannot be determined solely by means of 
the actual occurrences or correlations. We need to have recourse to possible situations 
even to determine if a causal connection obtains in this actual world. And the same is 
true for functions. This is a notable character of modal concepts. Therefore, even to 
determine the actual teleological functions of the perception mechanism and motion 
mechanism of frogs, we need to look at possible situations where ‘a flying insects’ and 
‘a small moving black piece’ have different extension. If we look at those possible 
situations, we can easily conclude that perceiving and catching a small moving black 
piece does not give nutrition to frogs, therefore ‘perceiving and catching small moving 
black pieces’ is not a proper teleological function of the perceptual mechanism and the 
motion mechanism of frogs. 
 As I see it, Fodor’s objection can be overcome as argued above. However, even 
if Fodor’s argument be right, the situation might not be so bad for the teleological 
approach. Suppose we accept Fodor’s argument. Suppose that, confining the 
environment to the actual one where all the moving small black objects are flying 
insects, making frogs to catch moving small black pieces is nothing more or less than 
making frogs to catch flying insects. The teleological function of the frog’s motion 
mechanism to make frogs to catch moving small black pieces is identical with the 
teleological function to make frogs to catch flying insects, and so is the perceptual 
mechanism. As both the motion mechanism and the perceptual mechanism are uniquely 
fixed, there is no indeterminacy of the teleological functions. However, although the 
teleological function is uniquely fixed, the content of N might not be uniquely fixed. N 
can be considered to represent that there is a moving small black piece, and can be 
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considered to represent that there is a flying insect as well. To see why, it is important 
to notice how a perception is formed by the frog’s perceptual mechanism and how it is 
used by the frog’s motion mechanism. Let us see, at first, the perceptual mechanism. N 
is produced by the frog’s perceptual mechanism through the processing of the 
information such as moving, small, or black. It is not produced through the processing 
of the information such as flying, small or noisy. Therefore, it seems that N represents 
not that there is a flying insect but that there is a moving small black piece. We must, 
however, consider not only the perceptual mechanism but also the motion mechanism. 
The frog’s neural state N is produced through the processing of the information such as 
moving, small and black. And it is used when the frog’s motion mechanism makes the 
frog to stick out its tongue and try to catch an object. Does this N-using-process reflect 
the way N is produced? Probably not. It seems that the way N is used would not change 
even if the way N is produced changes. For example, even if the frog’s perceptual 
mechanism changes and N were produced in a different way (e.g. produced through the 
processing of the information such as flying, small or noisy), N would be used in the 
same way: the frog’s motion mechanism would make the frog to stick out its tongue and 
try to catch the object. Therefore, the way N is used does not reflect the way N is 
produced. Even if N is produced through the processing of the information such as 
moving, small and black, N does not represent that there is a moving small black piece, 
considering the way N is used. On the other hand, we cannot say that N represents that 
there is a flying insect, because we cannot find, in the frog’s perceptual mechanism or 
motion mechanism, any factor that support the conclusion that N represents the content 
about insects. Do we have to conclude, then, that our intuition that N represents that 
there is a flying insect cannot be explained even by the teleological approach? Here we 
might be able to insist that the problem is in our intuition itself: we could doubt our 
intuition that the content of N is about insects. When we consider the perception of the 
frogs, we try to see how the frogs perceive objects, placing ourselves in the frog’s 
situation. We put ourselves in the frog’s place and consider the perceptual content. 
Therefore, it is not frog’s perception but our perception. Human beings would be able to 
have both a perception that there is a flying insect in front and a perception that there is 
a moving small black piece in front, and would be able to catch a flying insect only 
when there is indeed a flying insect in front. However, if we consider the frog’s 
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perception from the frog’ point of view, we don’t have any reason why we should think 
that N represents not that there is a moving small black piece but that there is a flying 
insect. The intuition that N represents a flying insect might not be a right intuition which 
is to be explained but a wrong intuition which should be discarded. What, then, does N 
represent? We could insist that N represents that there is something that is neither a 
flying insect nor a moving small black piece; the content of N is something that has not 
been finely differentiated. Understood in this way, the problem of the indeterminacy of 
the content might be resolved.169 
 
A Problem for the Teleological Approach 
 
So far, we have seen that intentionality has normative character and that only the 
teleological approach has a prospect of explaining normativity in the physicalistic 
framework. We have also seen that the problem of the indeterminacy of the content can 
be solved or dispelled in some sense by the teleological approach. In this section, 
however, I will deal with a serious objection to teleological approach, which throws a 
premise of teleological approach itself into doubt: it impeaches upon its historicism. 
 Donald Davidson’s ‘Swampman’ thought experiment will make the point clear. 
‘Swampman’ is what is born accidentally when thunder strikes a swamp. He is 
physically indistinguishable from Davidson himself, therefore behaves exactly like 
Davidson.170 However, if intentionality essentially depends on history, then he lacks 
intentionality as he lacks his history. Therefore, even if Swampman has exactly the 
same brain state at the time when Davidson has when he thinks about something, 
Swampman does not think anything at all. 
  The Swampman problem poses a serious problem for the teleological approach. 
It questions the premise of the teleological approach, that is, the premise that functions 
are essentially determined by historical facts. It would be clear if we suppose the 
following situation. Suppose Swampman, after his birth, continues to live a happy life, 
and someday he finds a partner and has children of his own. These children grow up 
and have their own children in course of time. According to the teleological approach, 
                                                
169 I am helped in the argument of this paragraph by Nobuhara (1999). 
170 See Davidson (1987). 
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the organs of Swampman’s descendants have functions, because those organs contribute 
to the owners’ survival and existence. However, the teleological approach must insist 
that the organs of Swampman himself do not have any function – they are not really 
biological organs. But from the physical point of view, they are the same; Swampman’s 
heart has exactly the same constitution as those of his descendants.171 
 We should notice here that the teleological approach has an externalistic factor. 
Facing the Swampman thought experiment, some of the externalists insist that 
Swampman’s thoughts lack contents because Swampman lacks appropriate causal 
connection to objects and events in the world. The teleological approach might have to 
deny, in nearly the same manner as the externalism about mental contents does, that 
Swampman has mental contents like ours. Now the question is this: has the teleological 
approach offered enough metaphysical ground for asserting that Swampman really lacks 
proper functions or mental contents? At least, we can say that Millikan relies on a kind 
of causal explanation of the existence of organs, which might suggest that the 
teleological approach gives only epistemological implications, not metaphysical ones. 
At this stage, there, I myself am fairly close to be persuaded by John Heil’s view 
expressed in the following quotation: 
 
 … Swampman is dispositionally indistinguishable from Davidson. This, I 
suggest, is enough to endow Swampman’s thoughts with significance. … 
 I like to think of Swampman as a counter-example to externalism: if, on 
externalist grounds, we would be obliged to deny that Swampman has endless 
thoughts, externalism is mistaken.172 
 
We must discard the teleological approach as a metaphysical theory of representations 
unless we get more metaphysical grounds than offered so far. 
 I must admit that Swampman poses a serious problem for the teleological 
approach. Among the philosophers who are interested in the problem of intentionality, it 
is widely accepted that normativity is an essential character of intentionality. We also 
have assumed this so far. However, the Swampman problem might suggest that we 
                                                
171 Thanks to Maeda (2003) for pointing out this possibility. 
172 Heil (2003), p.215. 
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should question this assumption. Dretske recently argues that although the biological 
functions that support normativity rely on historical facts, we should doubt if 
normativity is an essential character of intentionality.173 
 
What Has the Teleological Approach Achieved? 
 
What do we have to say about the teleological approach? Does it fail and have to be 
thrown away? First, we should notice that the three theories – the causal theory, the 
functional theory, and the teleological theory – are not opposed to each other: they are, 
in fact, compatible. We do not have to think that all the aspects of intentionality are 
explained by a single theory. Although we might have to discard metaphysical 
assertions of teleological approach, we will still be able to rely on it as an 
epistemological explanation of intentionality.   
 Second, even if the normativity might not be an essential character of 
intentionality, it is still true that the normativity would be one of the most important 
aspects of intentionality. And we don’t have any prospective theory to explain 
normativity other than the teleological theory. The causal theory and the functional 
theory do not help in this matter at all: they are no better than the teleological theory 
with respect to explaining the normativity.  
 Third, and most importantly, the teleological approach has many advantages of 
its own. As we have seen above, when we think about the problem of what is a minimal 
requirement (necessary conditions) of intentionality, the teleological theory gives us 
good insight. It also helps us to understand how it is possible for intentionality to evolve 
in the history of living organisms; it tells us how a simple organism could have a 
(simple) proper function.  
 The teleological approach is still a very prospective one towards the 
understanding of intentionality and normativity in a physicalistic framework. It will 
give us more understanding about the concept of intentionality and normativity. When 
we think about the problem how to accommodate intentionality in a physicalistic 
framework, we can never ignore the insight given by the teleological approach. 
 
                                                
173 See Dretske (2001). 
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In this chapter, I have traced and developed several achievements in the theories of 
consciousness and intentionality. My general approach is to analyse consciousness by 
means of intentionality and to analyse intentionality physcalistically. This approach is 
very close to an eliminativism about consciousness and qualia. But notice that the 
approach does not just eliminate consciousness and qualia easily. The approach includes 
some attempts of revision of the concept of consciousness and qualia. As the sciences of 
consciousness have just started recently, there should exist much conceptual and 
empirical confusion. But if we try to find out how our minds are accommodated in a 
physical world, we have both to wait for the development of scientific research and to 
revise our ordinary concepts of consciousness and intentionality at the same time. What 
I did in this long chapter is to trace a prospective approach and see what have been 
achieved by it and what have not been achieved yet. 
 As to the problem of mental causation, the problem was generated from a very 
basic metaphysical background: in fact, it occurs, as we saw in the previous part of this 
thesis, when we presuppose the minimal requirements of physicalism. Therefore, in the 
case of mental causation, we should be able to apply the metaphysical achievements in 
the general theory of properties directly to the problem concerning mental causation, 
and so I did. As to the problem of consciousness and qualia, however, we are not in the 
same situation as the problem of mental causation. In the case of conscious and qualia, 
what we can do at the present is to apply the achievements of the metaphysics of 
properties in somewhat indirect way. I will attempt this in the next chapter. 
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１１	 The Problem of Qualia and the General Theories of Properties 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the problem of consciousness (qualia) which has 
been bothering physicalism. I surveyed several attempts to accommodate consciousness 
within a physicalisitic worldview, and argued that the representation theory of 
consciousness is a very prospective one for physicalism although it still has many 
problems to be solved. In this chapter, I will show how we can look at the problem of 
consciousness and qualia from the perspective of the general theory of properties which 
I expounded in Chapter 6 and 7. 
 My goal in this chapter is to locate (or, at least, to suggest a prospect of how to 
locate) the problem of phenomenal qualia in philosophy of mind within a more general 
and wider problem of metaphysics – the general theories of properties174. Before going 
to the main task, let us see that qualia are considered, by many philosophers of mind, as 
properties of some sort: qualia are considered to be ontological entities which 
characterize particular objects or particular regions of space-time. When we experience 
qualia, we always experience them as whatever characterize particular objects or 
particular regions of space-time. When I experience a quale of blueness, I experience it 
as a property which characterizes, say, a part of the sky above me. When I experience a 
quale of pain, I experience it as a property which characterizes a part of my body. It is 
true that those properties might not be instantiated by actual particulars in this 
space-time. When, for example, I am dreaming of a green apple, the quale of greenness 
does not characterize an actual apple in this actual space-time. Still, qualia are 
considered to be properties of some kind. 
 According to the representation theory advocated in the previous chapter, qualia 
are not the properties of conscious state; they are the properties of intentional objects. 
Nonetheless, qualia are considered to be properties of some sort. Also, it might come 
                                                
174 Maeda (2009) draws a parallel between the theories of properties and the qualia 
problem, and suggests a general plan to deal with the qualia problem in view of the 
theories of properties. My argument in this chapter could be viewed as an attempt to 
develop the general plan according to the framework set in the previous chapters. 
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out that our intuition always miss-locate qualia: if a blue quale of the sky above me is 
nothing more than a brain state of me as some physicalists insist, then the quale is not 
really the property of the sky above me. However, we are still able to consider qualia as 
a kind of properties. This is to be confirmed before we go on and try to apply the 
general theories of properties to the problem of consciousness and qualia. 
 But what kind of properties? Here the metaphysics of properties kicks in. 
 
What kind of properties ? 
 
Qualia can be considered as properties of some sort. But what kind of properties? Here I 
list three presuppositions on qualia many of the current philosophers of mind seem to 
take. 
 
(1) Intrinsicness 
It is quite natural to consider qualia as intrinsic properties. Roughly speaking, an 
intrinsic property is ‘a property that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be 
going on outside of itself’.175 For a subject of an experience to decide if a particular 
quale is instantiated by a particular (or a particular space-time region) or not, it seems to 
be sufficient that the subject looks at or pay one’s attention to the space-time region 
only. 
 
(2) Non-Functionality 
Qualia are also considered, by many philosophers of mind, to be properties which can 
not be completely grasped by their functional characterizations (causal profiles). 
Remember the conceivability argument and the knowledge argument discussed in 
chapter 10. Both arguments point out that qualia evade the functional characterization. 
Even if we completely describe a system’s functional (or physical) aspect, there always 
seem to be a possibility that the system differs in its qualia: this is the basic intuition 
which both arguments rely on or point out. 
 
                                                
175 I borrow this expression from Yablo (1999). To use David Lewis’s definition, an 
intrinsic property is a property shared by a particular and its duplicate. See Lewis 
(1983a) for his definition of extrinsic and intrinsic properties.  
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Now, it is very important, as I see it, to bear in mind that (1) Intrinsicness does not 
entail (2) Non-Functionality. A property being extrinsic or intrinsic does not have direct 
connection with a property being functional or not. In fact, I defended a version of 
Causal Theory of properties, in Chapter 6 and 7, which insists that a disposition (power) 
has causal profiles necessarily but it is nonetheless intrinsic. 
 Although (1) does not entail (2), (2) will entail: 
 
(3) Quiddity 
The second presupposition, Non-Functionality, seems to suggest that qualia are 
properties with quiddity. This will be discussed from the next section. 
 
 Now, I do not insist that qualia must, in fact, be intrinsic, non-functional, and 
quiddistic properties. I rather insist that many philosophers of mind, especially 
physicalists, whose arguments we discussed in the previous chapters, rely on an 
intuition about qualia, and that the intuition should presuppose some metaphysical 
views on properties. In fact, according to the discussions in the previous chapters, the 
second presupposition and the third presupposition are quite doubtful, although we may 
accept the first one. 
 In the following, I will show how the general theories of properties cast light on 
the problem of qualia. 
 
The Problem of Qualia and the General Theories of Properties 
 
As I suggested in the previous section, we can see metaphysical problems concerning 
general (not just mental) properties in the presuppositions about qualia problem. In fact, 
as I see it, the problem of qualia can be interpreted as a branch of the metaphysical 
problem concerning general properties. In Chapter 6 and 7, I examined several theories 
of properties and defended a version of causal theory. Remember that there are three 
main theories of properties: Humean Theory (Humean Categoricalism), Causal Theory 
(Weak version and Strong version), and the Identity Theory. As I discussed in Chapter 7, 
one of the main battle lines between Humean Theory and Causal Theory (and the 
Identity Theory) concerns the problem of quiddity. Humean Theory accepts the quiddity 
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of categorical properties, whereas Strong Causal Theory rejects it. Now the point 
mentioned in the previous section – qualia cannot be completely grasped by their causal 
profiles – seems to show that qualia might be considered as properties with quiddity. 
 Before going on, I have to point out that there is another theory of properties – 
Dualism. Dualism insists that there are two kinds of properties – dispositions and 
categorical properties, and that one is not reducible to the other.176 Although I cannot 
take up this in detail here, I would like to give just one comment. As I see it, the relation 
between properties and their causal profiles should be common to all kinds of properties. 
If there are two kinds of properties, one of which being such that the properties have 
their causal profile contingently (i.e. categorical properties) and the other of which 
being such that the properties have their causal profile necessarily (i.e. dispositions), 
then we face a question: why are there two kinds properties at all? What explains the 
difference between two kinds of properties? If we have a theory of properties which 
analyzes all properties in the same way, this is, I believe, much more ideal as a 
philosophical theory.    
 If the relation between properties and their causal profiles are common to all 
kinds of properties (as I believe they should be), then how we think about the relation 
between properties and their causal profiles should have something to do with how we 
deal with the problem of qualia. In the following, I will keep myself neutral about the 
theories of properties, for the time being, and see what consequences we get about the 
problem of qualia from the theories of properties. 
 
Humean Theory of Properties and Qualia 
 
Let us start with Humean Theory of Properties. As we saw in Chapter 6 and 7, Humean 
Theory accepts quiddity of properties in general. Therefore, according to Humean 
Theory, it is possible to insist that both physical properties and mental properties 
(especially qualia) are in the same situation as to the relation to their causal profiles: 
properties of both kinds have contingent relation to their causal profiles. A physical 
property, say a molecular structure, has a disposition, say being fragile, in this actual 
world; but the same physical property has a different disposition, say being sturdy, in a 
                                                
176 See, for example, Place (1996) and Molnar (2003) for Dualism of properties. 
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possible world. In the same way, a mental state, say feeling pain, has such and such 
function (causal profile); but the same mental state has another function in a possible 
world. Suppose Humean Theory is correct. What consequences does it have to the 
problem of qualia? 
 Firstly, as mentioned above, the fact that qualia seem to have qualitative aspects 
that cannot be exhausted by their causal profiles, does not pose a problem just for 
physicalism any more. That is because there is no difference between physical 
properties and qualia in that both properties cannot be exhausted by their causal profiles. 
 Secondly, the problem of how qualia could be identical with or supervene on 
physical properties, the problem we discussed in the previous chapters, might come out 
not to be a problem just for physicalism any more. That is because the relation between 
properties and their causal profiles is contingent, and perhaps could be seen as brute 
facts which need not be explained, regardless of the fact that they are physical 
properties or non-physical properties – qualia. In this case, the remaining problem might 
be to find out how we could connect qualitative aspects of qualia with quiddities of 
physical properties. 
 Thirdly, it is sometimes argued in the philosophy of mind that qualia could be 
epiphenomenal, but Humean Theory of properties has the same problem of 
epiphenomenalism as well, as Robinson points out.177 If two properties could be 
different with each other only in their quiddities with their causal profiles being 
identical, then it is quite plausible to think that their quiddities are causally idle. It is 
true that there are many problems concerning quiddity (as I discussed in Chapter 7), but 
the problem might not be the problem concerning qualia in particular. The problem of 
epiphenomenalism comes out to be not a problem solely for qualia but a problem for 
properties in general.178 
 All in all, if we take Humean Theory of properties, the problem of qualia could 
be subsumed under a branch of general theory of properties. We might be able to say 
that the problem of qualia (the problem particularly concerning qualia) as a problem in 
the philosophy of mind is eliminated by means of generalizing it as a more basic 
ontological problem. This, however, is not to say there remain only easy task. Rather 
                                                
177 Cf. Robinson (1993). 
178 Cf. Maeda (2009), p.34. 
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philosophers face a very difficult problem to explain or establish the relation between 
quiddity and powers, as, according to Humean Theory, quiddity is considered to be such 
ontological items as freely floating from their causal profiles. We need to find out a 
plausible relation between them, otherwise quiddity remains as a deep mystery. 
 
Causal Theory of Properties and Qualia 
 
Now let us consider the Causal Theory of Properties. We have two versions of Causal 
Theory, Strong Causal Theory and Weak Causal Theory. As I showed in Chapter 6, the 
Weak Causal Theory incorporates quiddity and, therefore, is in exactly the same 
situation as Humean Theory discussed in the previous section. I will, therefore, focus on 
the Strong Causal Theory here. 
 Causal Theory simply rejects quiddity. Therefore, it cannot so quickly take the 
same line as Humean Theory which tries to deal with phenomenal qualia and other 
(physical) properties in the same manner. Obviously, there are two ways to take: accept 
qualia and try to find a connection between qualia and physical properties, or simply 
reject qualia. If we take the former, the problem of qualia is, for the Causal Theory, a 
specific problem of the philosophy of mind: the problem of qualia cannot be subsumed 
under a more general problem in the ontology of properties. Here again, philosophers 
face a great stumbling block. Suppose one takes functionalism. Suppose also one takes 
(2) Non-Functionality, and thereby accept (3) Quiddity. This view obviously faces the 
conceivability argument and the knowledge argument. This is, in fact, the situation 
where functionalism in the philosophy of mind has been. As to mental states like belief 
and desire, functionalism work well. This is because those intentional states could be 
regarded as the properties exhausted by causal profiles. On the other hand, as to the 
mental properties which are not exhausted by causal profiles (or which seem not to be 
exhausted by causal profiles), functionalism does not work well. The conceivability 
argument and the knowledge argument in the previous chapter well indicate this point. 
 Therefore, the most natural and plausible approach to the problem of qualia for 
the proponents of Causal Theory to take is to take the second way, that is, to reject (i.e. 
to eliminate) qualia, if, of course, we have a prospect to do so properly within the 
framework of physicalism. This is why the previous chapter was devoted to the 
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representation theory of consciousness. The representation theory of consciousness, in a 
way, eliminates qualia, but in doing so, the theory tries to revise the concept of 
consciousness (and intentionality). Although there are many problems to be solved 
about the representation theory of consciousness (and the teleological approach to 
intentionality), I have, at least, showed that it is prospective. And more importantly, 
with a prospective theory of properly eliminating qualia in a physicalistic framework at 
hand, the Causal Theory of properties would also gain its plausibility, which is what I 
have been trying to do in the whole thesis. 
 
Identity Theory and Qualia 
 
Finally, let me briefly comment on Identity Theory. As we discussed in Chapter 6, 
Identity Theory has it that there is only one kind of properties but there are two aspects 
of it – powers and quality. What, then, would be the consequence on the problem of 
qualia, if we take Identity Theory as a theory of general properties. 
 If we take Identity Theory, the problem of qualia could be subsumed under a 
branch of the general theory of properties, as there is only one kind of properties 
regardless of it is physical or mental. This is similar to the case of Humean Theory 
discussed above, although Identity Theory does not accept quiddity as ontological items 
freely floating from their causal profiles. Unlike Humean Theory, Identity Theory has at 
hand a possible solution to the problem of finding out the relation between quiddity and 
causal profile – identity. However, this does not immediately mean that Identity Theory 
is free from serious problems. As we saw in chapter 6, John Heil’s identity theory is 
presented as ‘a default view’ which avoids the difficulties of both pure dispositionalism 
and pure quality theory (categoricalism). But, as I also showed it, the theory leaves the 
unintelligibility of the identity relation aside. I discussed that Heil’s view faces the 
difficult problem of how to understand the identity between powers and qualities. I also 
insisted that his example of Necker Cube is not persuasive enough. 
There is a similarity between the difficulty which Heil’s identity theory faces 
and the difficulty which the mind-body (or mind-brain) identity theory in the 
philosophy of mind faces. Both theories have to find out how to identify quality with 
their causal profiles. Both theories have to explain, in some way or others, how the 
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properties which seem to be so different with each other could be identical. There 
should be much work to be done, and I must say that the work has not been done 
enough compared with the causal theory of properties.     
  
Concluding Remarks 
 
The problem of consciousness (especially, of qualia) has been worrying 
physicalists. As many philosophers see it, qualia (or phenomenal properties) seem to be 
something more than mere functional properties. The problem has been considered to 
be the problem arising from the physicalist presupposition. As I showed in this chapter, 
however, the problem is very likely to be a problem concerning QUIDDITY, a problem 
in the general theory of properties. The problem of qualia for physicalists is, in fact, a 
form of the problem concerning the relation between the essential intrinsic qualities 
(quiddity) of a property and its causal powers (causal profiles). Which view in the 
general theory of properties we should take affects which view in the study of qualia we 
should take. If we take a causal theory of properties (as I took in the previous part of the 
thesis), then we are very likely led to an eliminativist view on qualia. I have presented 
the representation theory of consciousness and the teleological approach to 
intentionality as an example. 
As to the general theory of properties, I expounded my own view, Causal Trope 
Theory in comparison with other views. With this theory in mind, I concluded that we 
could find a way to understand mental causation in the direction which Shoemaker 
suggested, although there still remain many problems to be solved. As to the problem of 
consciousness, I defended and developed a representation theory of consciousness 
independent of the general theory of properties. And then, I viewed the problem of 
consciousness from the perspective of the general theories of properties and showed that 
my own view on properties and a representation theory of consciousness are good 
combination. The arguments I presented for a version of the causal theory of properties 
and for a version of the representation theory of consciousness are not conclusive, of 
course. However, if I have shown that there is a prospect that the problem of mental 
causation and consciousness will be subsumed into the general theory of properties and 
that there are many philosophical merits for us to view those problems in this way, the 
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purpose of this thesis is accomplished. 
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Appendix: The Problem of Extrinsicness of Mental Properties 
 
 
 
Roughly speaking, there are three problems about mental causation: the problem from 
Anomalous Monism, the problem from causal exclusion, and the problem of the 
extrinsicness of mental properties. We have already seen the first two problems in the 
thesis. In this appendix, I will very briefly deal with the third problem: the problem of 
the extrinsicness of mental properties.  
 
Extrinsicness of Content Properties 
 
There are many mental properties. Some of them are ‘content properties’ – properties 
with propositional contents. For example, the property of believing that the earth is flat 
and the property of desiring that I should drink a glass of water are content properties 
(their propositional contents being ‘the earth is flat’ and ‘I should drink a glass of water’ 
respectively). 
 Since Putnam offered a famous thought experiment on twin earth, it is widely 
considered that content properties are not intrinsic but extrinsic properties of the subject. 
That is to say, they are considered to be the properties that the subject has in virtue of its 
having some relations with other objects. Putnam’s twin earth thought experiment is as 
follows. Suppose there is a twin earth which is the exact duplicate of our earth except 
just one difference: in twin earth there are XYZ, instead of H2O, that look exactly like 
water in our earth. On the twin earth is twin-you that cannot be distinguished from you 
with respect to the intrinsic properties (suppose for the sake of argument that your body 
does not contain H2O). Suppose that you desire that you should drink a glass of water. 
Then, at the very same time on the twin earth, twin-you should have that kind of desire, 
for you and twin-you are in exactly the same brain state. You and twin-you, nonetheless, 
have different mental contents with each other, for your desire is about H2O whereas the 
desire of twin-you is about XYZ. To decide what content property a subject has at a time, 
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it must be taken into account what kind of external environment the subject is in.179 
 Content properties, thus, are considered to be extrinsic properties. However, if 
the intrinsic properties of two subjects are completely equal, their physical behaviours 
should be completely equal as well. For example, if you and twin-you share exactly the 
same intrinsic properties, you and twin-you always respond to the same questions in the 
same manner. It seems, then, that a subject’s physical behaviours are completely 
determined by its intrinsic properties. 
 Here kicks in a question. If a subject’s behaviours is completely determined by 
the subject’s intrinsic properties and content properties are extrinsic as many 
philosophers believe them to be, then what would content properties of the subject do in 
determining the subject behaviours? What is left for content properties to do in causing 
the subject’s behavioural outputs? It seems that content properties, which are typical 
mental properties, have no causal efficacy in bringing about the physical or bodily 
behaviours of the subject, which seems to show that mental causation is impossible as 
far as content properties go. This is the problem of the extrinsicness of mental 
properties (content properties).180 
 
The Problem of Extrinsicness and Physicalism 
 
This problem, however, is not the main theme of the thesis. That is because while the 
exclusion problem is a problem for physicalism, the problem of extrinsicness is not a 
problem for physicalism alone. The exclusion problem is a problem for physicalism 
because it depends on the principle of supervenience and the principle of causal closure 
which are necessary conditions for a minimal physicalism (see Chapter 2 and Section 
4-1). The problem of extrinsicness, on the other hand, has nothing to do with whether 
you take physicalism or not. Suppose you are a Cartesian dualist. You insist that mind 
and body are different substances; a non-physical (mental) event causes and is caused 
by a physical event; neither the principle of supervenience nor the principle of physical 
closure obtain. However, if content properties are extrinsic properties, as Putnam and 
other philosophers insists, then you will be troubled with the problem of extrinsicness as 
                                                
179 See Putnam (1975a), “The meaning of ‘meaning’”. 
180 Cf. Kim (1998) pp.35-37. 
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long as you admit that only intrinsic properties of the subject have causal efficacy in 
bringing about physical (bodily) behaviours. In this way, even a robust Cartesian dualist 
would be troubled with the problem of extrinsicness. Therefore, it is not a problem 
solely for physicalism.181 
 
How Can We Solve the Problem of Extrinsicness? 
 
The main theme of the thesis has been to examine the problem of mental causation in a 
physicalistic framework. Although the problem of extrinsicness is not a problem for 
physicalism alone and it does not concern primarily the present thesis, I will just briefly 
suggest how this problem could be solved. 
 Very briefly put, my suggestion is to reject externalism about mental contents 
and to take internalism instead. As I see it, we should cast doubt on the premise of the 
extrinsicness problem itself: the premise that content properties are extrinsic properties. 
The debate between externalism and internalism of content properties is not a problem 
that we can fully examine in just one chapter or two. Here I am going to offer some 
suggestions that might help the problem of extrinsicness to be solved. 
 It is true that content properties are described in terms of propositional contents. 
And it is probably true that a content property of you at a time and the corresponding 
content property of twin-you at the corresponding time are described in terms of 
different propositional contents; ‘I should drink a glass of H2O’ in case of you and ‘I 
should drink a glass of XYZ’ in case of twin-you. However, it does not immediately 
follow from this that you and twin-you have different properties. My daughter is 
described as ‘my daughter’; she is also describes as ‘my father’s granddaughter’. But 
this does not mean that my daughter has two different properties corresponding to two 
different descriptions. 
 The point is: do we really have to pose different content properties for each 
different description? As I suggest it, we do not have to, if we ascribe a disposition D, 
‘to drink H2O in our actual world and to drink XYZ in twin earth’, both to you and 
twin-you. Suppose twin-you were brought from the kitchen of twin-you’s house on twin 
earth to the kitchen of your house on our earth, instantly, at the time twin-you has a 
                                                
181 Cf. Kim (1998) and Mino (2004). 
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desire to drink a glass of water (XYZ). How would he/she behave in your kitchen? 
He/She would drink a glass of H2O (that is, ‘water’ in our world) in your kitchen on the 
earth because he/she has a disposition D. Conversely, if you were brought to twin earth, 
you would drink a glass of XYZ (that is, ‘water’ in twin earth) because you have a 
disposition D.182 It seems that if we introduce a disposition, we do not have to pose 
different content properties for each descriptions. This might suggest that there really do 
not exist content properties. Or this might suggest that content properties of you and 
twin-you are really identical with each other even though they are differently described 
in terms of different propositional contents.183 
 Notice that dispositions are (plausibly) considered to be intrinsic properties and 
causally efficacious as I discussed in Chapter 6 and 7. Therefore, we do not have to be 
bothered with the problem of the extrinsicness any more if we identify content 
properties with dispositions. All in all, as in the ‘Swampman Case’ discussed in Chapter 
10, I would like to take the problem of the extrinsicness of mental properties as a 
counter-example to externalism until a more persuasive argument for supporting 
externalism is offered. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
182 A dart-tossing model offered by John Heil might help. See Heil (2003) pp.210-211. 
183 For a general plan of identifying content properties with dispositions, see Crane 
(1998b) and Heil (2003). Mino (2004) suggests a similar view although it does not 
explicitly introduce dispositions as a candidate for content properties.  
 
 171 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Achinstein, P. (1974). The identity of properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 11: 
257-75. 
Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A Materialist Theory of Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Armstrong, D. M. (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Armstrong, D. M. (1989). Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press. 
Armstrong, D. M., Place, U. T., and Martin, C. B. (1996). Dispositions: A Debate. 
London: Routledge. 
Baker, L. R. (1993). Metaphysics and mental causation. in Heil and Mele eds. (1993). 
Bird, A. (2007). Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Block, N. (1986). Advertisement for a semantic for Psychology. Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 10: 615-678. 
Block, N. (1995). On the confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 18: 1-41. 
Bogdan, R. ed. (1986). Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Buller, D. J. (1998). Etiological theories of functions: a geographical survey. Biology 
and Philosophy 13: 505-27. 
Chakravartty, A. (2005). Causal realism: events and processes. Erkentnis 63: 7-31.  
Chalmers, D. (1997). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory: Oxford 
University Press. 
Churchland, P. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal 
of Philosophy 78, Reprinted in Lycan ed. (1990). 
Clapp, H. (2001). Disjunctive properties: multiple realizations. The Journal of 
Philosophy 98: 113-36. 
Crane, T. ed. (1996). Dispositions: A Debate by D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. 
Place. London and New York: Routledge. 
Crane, T. (1998a). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In A. O’Hear (ed.) Current 
 172 
Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Crane, T. (1998b). The efficacy of content. In Human Action, Deliberation and 
Causation, edited by J. Bransen and S. E. Cuypers: 199-233. 
Crane, T. (2001). Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Crane, T. (2003). The Mechanical Mind: Second Edition. London: Routledge 
Davidson, D. (1969). The individuation of events. reprinted in Davidson (1980). 
Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. Reprinted in Davidson (1980). 
Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Davidson, D. (1987). Knowing one’s own mind. reprinted in Davidson (2001)  
Davidson, D. (1993). Thinking causes. In Heil and Mele eds. (1993). 
Davidson, D. ( 2001). Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Davies, P. M. (1994). Trouble for direct proper functions, Nous 28. 
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown. 
Dretske, F. (1986). Misrepresentation. in R. Bogdan ed. (1986) 
Dretske, F. (2001). Norms, history and the mental. In Naturalism, Evolution and Mind, 
edited by D. M. Walsh, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Ehring, D. (1997). Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation. Oxford 
University Press. 
Ehring, D. (2003). Part-whole physicalism and mental causation. Synthese 136: 359-88. 
Elder, C. L. (1998). What versus how in naturally selected representations. Mind 
107:349-63 
Ellis, B. (2002). The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism. Chesham: 
Acumen. 
Fara, M. (2006). Dispositions. Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/ 
Fodor, J. (1974). Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis. 
Synthese 28: 97-115. 
Fodor, J. (1990). A Theory of Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gibb, S. C. (2004). The problem of mental causation and the nature of properties. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 464-76. 
Gillett, C. (2002). The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View. 
 173 
Analysis 62: 316-323. 
Gillett, C. (2003). The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the 
Special Science. The Journal of Philosophy: 591-603. 
Gillett, Carl and Bradley Rives (2005). The non-existence of determinables: or, a world 
of absolute determinates as default hypothesis. Nous 39: 483-504. 
Hawthorne, J. (2006). Causal structuralism. In Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4. 
Heil, J. (2003). Multiply Realized Properties. In Walter and Heckmann eds., 
Physicalism and Mental Causation, Imprint Academic 
Heil, J. (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heil, J. and A. Mele eds. (1993). Mental Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Honderich, T. (1982). The argument for anomalous monism. Analysis 42. 
Horgan, T. (1997). Kim on mental causation and causal exclusion. Philosophical 
Perspectives 11:165-84. 
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-138. 
Jackson, F. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: Oxford University Press. 
Jacob, P. (1997). What Minds Can Do. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kim, J. (1976). Events as property exemplifications. reprinted in Kim (1993b). 
Kim, J. (1984a). Concepts of supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 45. Reprinted in Kim (1993b). 
Kim, J. (1984b). Self-understanding and rationalizing explanations. Philosophia 
Naturalis 82. 
Kim, J. (1987). ‘Strong’ and ‘global’ supervenience revisited. Reprinted in Kim 
(1993b). 
Kim, J. (1989a). Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion. Philosophical 
Perspectives 3. Reprinted in Kim (1993b). 
Kim, J. (1989b). The myth of nonreductive physicalism. Proceedings and Addresses of 
the American Philosophical Association 63. Reprinted in Kim (1993b). 
Kim, J. (1992). Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 52. Reprinted in Kim (1993b). 
Kim, J. (1993a). The nonreductivist’s troubles with mental causation. In Mental 
Causation, edited by Heil and Mele. Reprinted in Kim (1993b). 
 174 
Kim, J. (1993b). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kim, J. (1996). Philosophy of Mind. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and 
Mental Causation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kim, J. (2011). Philosophy of Mind: Third Edition: Westview Press. 
LePore, E. and B. Loewer (1989). More on making mind matter. Philosophical Topics 
17: 175-91. 
Lewis, D. (1966). An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 63. 
Reprinted in Lewis (1983c). 
Lewis, D. (1983a). Extrinsic properties. Reprinted in Lewis (1999) 
Lewis, D. (1983b). New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 61. reprinted in Lewis (1999). 
Lewis, D. (1983c). Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lewis, D. (1997). Finkish dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47. Reprinted in Lewis 
(1999). 
Lewis, D. (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Loar, B. (1997). Phenomenal states (revised version). In The Nature of Consciousness: 
Philosophical Debates, edited by N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere, 
597-616. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Loux, M. J. (2002). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, Second Edition. 
London: Routledge. 
Lowe, E. J. (2000). Causal closure principles and emergentism. Philosophy 75: 
571-585. 
Lowe, E. J. (2001). Dispositions and laws. Metaphysica 2: 5-23. 
Lowe, E. J. (2006). The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for 
Natural Science. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Lycan, W. ed. (1990). Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Lycan, W. (2001). The case for phenomenal externalism. Philosophical Perspectives 
15: Metaphysics: 17-35. 
 175 
Maeda, T. (2004). Intentionality and the Teleological Functionalism (in Japanese). in 
Nobuhara ed. (2004).  
Maeda, T. (2009). Quidditistic Qualia (in Japanese). Journal of the Japan Association 
for Philosophy of Science 37: 29-38. 
Marcus, E. (2005). Mental causation in a physical world. Philosophical Studies 122: 
27-50. 
Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44: 1-8. 
McKitrick, J. (2003). The bare metaphysical possibility of bare dispositions. Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 66: pp.349-69. 
McKitrick, J. (2003). A case for extrinsic dispositions. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 81: 155-74. 
McKitrick, J. (2004). A defence of the causal efficacy of dispositions. Sats: Nordic 
Journal of Philosophy 5: 110-130. 
McKitrick, J. (2005). Are dispositions causally relevant? Synthese. 
McLaughlin, B. (2007). Mental causation and Shoemaker-Realization. Erkenntnis 67. 
Mellor, D. H. (1974). In defence of dispositions. Philosophical Review 83: 157-81. 
Mellor, D. H. (2000). The semantics and ontology of dispositions. Mind 109: 757-80. 
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Millikan, R. G. (1989). Biosemantics. Journal of Philosophy 86. reprinted in Millikan 
(1993). 
Millikan, R. G. (1993). White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Mino, T. (1995). Anomalous monism and mental causation (in Japanese). Jinbun 
Kenkyu, Osaka City University 47: 43-61. 
Mino, T. (2004). Mental causation and physicalism (in Japanese). in Nobuhara ed. 
(2004). 
Molnar, G. (2003). Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Edited by S. Mumford. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mumford, S. (2004). Laws in Nature. Routledge 
Nagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World. 
 176 
Neander, K. (1995). Misrepresenting and malfunctioning. Philosophical Studies 79: 
109-41. 
Nobuhara, Y. (1999). Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (in Japanese). Keiso Shobo. 
Nobuhara, Y. ed. (2004). Series Philosophy of Mind Vol.1 (in Japanese). Keiso Shobo. 
Noordhof, P. (1998), Do tropes resolve the problem of mental causation? Philosophical 
Quarterly 48: 221-6. 
Papineau, D. (1990). Why supervenience? Analysis 50. 
Papineau, D. (1993). Philosophical Naturalism. Blackwell Publishing. 
Pereboom, D. (2002). Robust nonreductive materialism. The Journal of Philosophy 99: 
499-531. 
Place, U. T. (1996). Structural properties: categorical, dispositional or both?. in Crane 
ed. (1996). 
Poland, J. (1994). Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Price, C. (2001). Functions in Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Prior, E. W., Pargetter, R. and Jackson, F. (1982). Three theses about dispositions. 
American Philosophical Quarterly 19: 251-7. 
Prior, E. W. (1985). Dispositions. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. 
Putnam, H. (1975a). The meaning of ‘meaning’. In Language, Mind, and Knowledge: 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7, edited by K. Gunderson. 
Reprinted in Putnam (1975b). 
Putnam, H. (1975b). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Ramachandran, V. S. (1999). Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the 
Human Mind: William Morrow Paperbacks. 
Robb, D. (1997). The properties of mental causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47: 
178-94. 
Robb, D. (2001). Reply to Noordhof on mental causation. Philosophical Quarterly 51: 
92-3. 
Robinson, D. (1993). Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties. Philosophical Studies 
69: 1-34. 
Rosenthal, D. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49: 
 177 
329-359. 
Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. 
Shapiro, L. A. (2000). Multiple realizations. The Journal of Philosophy 97: 635-54. 
Shoemaker, S. (1980). Causality and properties. Reprinted in Shoemaker (2003). 
Shoemaker, S. (1998). Causal and metaphysical necessity. Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 79. Reprinted in Shoemaker (2003). 
Shoemaker, S. (2001). Realization and mental causation. In Physicalism and Its 
Discontents, edited by C. Gillett and B. Loewer. Reprinted in Shoemaker (2003). 
Shoemaker, S. (2003). Identity, Causes, and Mind: Expanded Edition. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Shoemaker, S. (2007). Physical Realization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sosa, E. (1984). Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 9 
Stoutland, F. (1980). Oblique causation and reasons for actions. Synthese 43. 
Suzuki, T. (2003). Qualia and the hard problem of consciousness (in Japanese). in 
Nobuhara ed. (2003). 
Tye, M. (1997). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the 
Phenomenal Mind. A Bradford Book.  
Wilson, J. (1999). How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be? 
Philosophical Quarterly 49: 33-52. 
Yablo, S. (1992). Mental causation. The Philosophical Review 101: 245-80. 
Yablo, S. (1999). Intrinsicness. Philosophical Topics 26: 479-505. 
Yablo, S. (2007). The seven habits of highly effective thinkers. 
http://mit.edu/~yablo/effthink.html. 
 
 
 
 
